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Abstract
This thesis concludes that aggregate stock market prices are significantly linked to 
the real economy. The thesis does, however, find a number of instances of non­
efficient market behaviour, in terms of unexplained stock returns prior to financial 
crises, the predictability of the equity premium, and, possibly, the weak statistical 
relationship between stock market prices and corporate investment.
Chapter I examines stock price behaviour prior to the stock market crash of 1987. 
Using data from 23 stock markets, there is little support for the view that the recent 
crash was caused by a bursting bubble. However, there is evidence that equity prices 
have recently moved in a non-random manner on some of these exchanges.
Chapter II investigates the movements of stock prices in the United Kingdom from 
1700 to 1987. A strong nominal interest rate effect on excess returns is found for the 
entire period, but it appears that inflation has a consistent, negative effect only after 
1950.
Chapter III analyzes major British financial crises since 1700. Using efficient and 
non-efficient market models, it is found that fluctuations in macroeconomic variables 
account for up to one half of equity price variation. As well, relatively few crises 
have been preceded by the excessive positive returns consistent with rational bubbles.
Chapter IV finds that Tobin’s Q in OECD countries is inappropriately modelled 
within a static framework but is improved markedly using a dynamic error correction 
model. The Q measures are also superior to real stock prices as predictors of 
investment.
Chapter V compares the effects of equity prices on corporate investment and output 
in Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. It seems that 
the effect of the equity market is greater in the latter two countries for various 
institutional reasons associated with managerial autonomy.
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Corrigenda
Page 13 - Delete the last sentence of the first paragraph. Insert the following 
sentence at the end of the second paragraph: "Finally, the wide dispersion of 
alternative Q measures within each country is suggestive of inherent problems in the 
construction of the measures, and not simply a function of noise in the data." Also, 
substitute "unexplained" for "non-efficient" in the second sentence of the last 
paragraph.
Page 14 -  Delete "and are, for this reason, inherently unpredictable" from the first 
paragraph.
Pages 18 and 19 - Replace (l+rt) with (l+rt+at) in Equations (7), (8) and (9) and 
adjacent paragraphs.
Page 20 -  ZK in Equation (10) is correctly calculated as the maximum (over every
K year subperiod) of the absolute value of the terms on the right hand side of the
equation.
Page 30 - Insert the following at the end of the first paragraph: "Schachter et al 
(1985) provide indirect evidence for this relationship by showing that American bull 
markets in the post-1960 era are characterised by positive mean returns, i.e. the 
markets went up too much in those periods, and positive directional movements in 
returns, i.e. the markets moved in an upward direction too many times, in excess of 
random walk expectations. Therefore, the probability of a bubble is positively 
correlated to the strength of the bubble, and this, in turn, is negatively correlated to 
the degree of decline when the bubble bursts."
Page 43 - Delete "although there exists sufficient evidence of non-random price 
behaviour to bring into question the assumption of efficient markets" from the first 
paragraph.
Page 97 - Insert the following at the end of the first complete paragraph: "The strong 
negative correlation between inflation news and real stock returns in the first two 
rows of Table 2 does not contradict the assertion of the previous chapter that
inflation had no such relationship with excess equity returns before 1914. Inflation
was difficult to predict prior to 1914; therefore, the inflation news variable is highly 
correlated with the ex post inflation series, since the former is the residual from an 
estimated equation which poorly explains the latter. Given that real stock returns are 
calculated as nominal stock returns less ex post inflation, it is not surprising that a 
negative correlation emerges between this variable and the inflation news variable 
on the right hand side of the Table 2 regressions."
Page 137 - Insert the following after the first word on the page: "The F-tests in rows
1, 3, 5 and 7 of the two tables test whether lagged and current values of d(R) are 
jointly significant in this equation, while rows 2, 4, 6 and 8 test the same null 
hypothesis for lagged and current values of d(Q)."
Page 184 - Substitute Gordon for Gorden in the last sentence of the page.
Page 215 - Delete the third sentence of the first paragraph and the last sentence of 
the last paragraph.
Page 216 - Insert the following at the end of the first paragraph: "Finally, the wide 
dispersion of alternative Q measures within each country is suggestive of inherent 
problems in the construction of the measures, and not simply a function of noise in 
the data." Also, replace "The instances of non-efficient market behaviour" with 
"Various instances of market behaviour" in the last sentence of the last paragraph.
Bibliography - Add the following references:
Gordon, R.H. and Jorgenson, D.W. (1976) "The Investment Tax Credit and Counter­
cyclical Policy", in O. Eckstein (ed.), Parameters and Policies in the U.S. Economy. 
pp. 275-314, North-Holland: Amsterdam.
Hall, R.E. and Jorgenson, D.W. (1967) "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior -Reply  
and Further Results", American Economic Review. 59 (3), pp. 388-401.
Introduction
This thesis makes a contribution to explaining aggregate stock prices within an 
econometric framework by examining correlations between such prices and standard 
macroeconomic variables. Chapters I and II investigate two recent puzzles concerning 
movements in share prices: the market crash of 1987 and the relationship between 
inflation and equity prices. Chapter III extends the analysis of these chapters by 
investigating British financial crises in historical perspective. Shifting attention to the 
consequences of share price fluctuations, the last two chapters present correlations 
between such prices and aggregate output and corporate investment.
The investigation is comparative in nature, using varying data frequencies, examining 
different time periods from 1700 to the present, and employing a wide range of 
national data sources. The econometric analysis is augmented by institutional detail, 
where relevant, and employs standard statistical techniques. The unique aspects of 
the thesis lie in its data sources and the statistical facts which emerge from the 
analysis.
In brief, the following conclusions emerge from the thesis.
Chapter I examines stock price behaviour prior to the stock market crash of 1987. 
Using monthly and daily data from 23 stock markets, there is little support for the 
view that the recent crash was caused by a bursting bubble. However, there is 
evidence that equity prices have recently moved in a non-random manner on some 
of these exchanges.
Chapter II investigates the movements of stock prices in the United Kingdom from 
1700 to 1987. A strong nominal interest rate effect on excess returns is found for the 
entire period, but it appears that inflation has a consistent, negative effect only after 
1950. The changing influence of inflation on equity prices may be linked to Britain’s 
adherence to the gold standard.
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Chapter III analyzes major British financial crises since 1700. In the first part, using 
efficient and non-efficient market models, it is found that fluctuations in 
macroeconomic variables account for up to one half of equity price variation. In the 
second part, these models reveal that relatively few crises have been preceded by the 
excessive positive returns consistent with rational bubbles. The success of non­
efficient market models in explaining equity returns does imply, however, that the 
efficient markets hypothesis does not strictly hold for this data set.
Chapter IV finds that Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of the corporate 
sector to the replacement cost of its capital, is inappropriately modelled within a 
static framework but is improved markedly using a dynamic error correction model. 
The Q measures are also superior to real stock prices as predictors of investment in 
the OECD countries under investigation. These results imply that Q, and hence stock 
prices, are correlated to investment. However, the relationship is relatively weak and 
depends on the exclusion of other relevant explanatory variables from the investment 
equation.
Chapter V compares the broader effects of equity prices on corporate investment and 
output in Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. It 
seems that the effect of the equity market is greater in the latter two countries for 
various institutional reasons having to do with the degree of managerial autonomy 
from stock price fluctuations.
Overall, it appears that aggregate stock market prices are significantly linked to the 
real economy. The thesis does, however, find a number of instances of non-efficient 
market behaviour, in terms of unexplained stock returns prior to financial crises, the 
predictability of stock returns, the influence of lagged and nominal variables on the 
equity premium, and, possibly, the weak statistical relationship between stock market 
prices and corporate investment. All of these results offer support to a view of the 
stock market influenced not only by fundamental factors, but also possibly by social 
and psychological elements.
13
Chapter I: Stock Prices and Rational Bubbles
I. Introduction
The efficient markets hypothesis posits that equity prices incorporate all information 
known to market participants at any point in time and are, for this reason, inherently 
unpredictable. A further extension of the theory relates such prices to expectations 
of the present discounted value of all future dividends attached to the stocks in 
question. This suggests that equity prices are intimately related to underlying real 
economic processes and are, therefore, rationally based.
The crash of 1987 and the mini-crash of 1989 suggest to others, however, that stock 
prices are divorced from economic reality. From this perspective, these events were 
caused by the bursting of a speculative price bubble over a short period of time. 
Coming to such a conclusion suggests that the stock market is appropriately studied 
within a multidisciplinary framework incorporating economic, psychological and social 
elements.
This chapter therefore explores one explanation of the crash that has been put 
forward from many quarters, namely that the events of October 1987 were the end 
result of a speculative bubble, in order to comment on these two views of stock 
market pricing.1,2 While such bubbles may be rationally or irrationally based, the 
necessary condition for linking them to the crash is prior existence. To sum up the 
chapter’s basic conclusion, it is found that this necessary condition is not satisfied. 
In addition, although there is evidence for bubbles occurring in some of the countries 
examined here, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive explanation for the 
international differences.
The chapter applies a variant of the traditional runs test on asset prices to reach 
these conclusions and the result is therefore dependent on the ability of such tests 
to measure bubble like activity. The novel aspects of this investigation are, firstly, the 
extension of the particular runs methodology used here to the equity markets of a 
number of different countries and, secondly, the application of the bubble view to
14
an explanation of the market crash.
Section II describes previous theoretical and empirical work on speculative bubbles 
and outlines the empirical method used here. In Section III, the bubble probabilities 
are presented and Section IV discusses the bubble question from the perspective of 
option pricing theory and evidence. Section V provides an investigation of the cross 
country differences. The conclusions of the chapter follow in Section VI.
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II. Theoretical and Empirical Issues
The notion that economists typically try to capture with work on bubbles is that 
market behaviour may be self-fulfilling and therefore divorced from standard 
economic considerations of valuation. On the theoretical side, bubbles may be 
classified as rational, non-rational or based on asymmetric innovations in 
fundamentals.3 On the empirical side, bubbles have been tested using variance 
bounds tests, runs tests, price/fundamentals correlation tests, variance ratio tests and 
tests based on fundamentals.4
Ha. Theoretical Bubble Specification
The first theoretical category, rational bubbles, refers to the compensation expected 
by investors when the probability of a market crash increases over time; in order to 
compensate for the expected loss, investors rationally demand a sustained increase 
in asset prices. The second category, irrational bubbles, refers either to investment 
decisions divorced from rationality or else to the existence of biased expectations. 
The former are impossible to model using the rationality assumptions underlying the 
neoclassical paradigm while the latter may be a function of imperfect information 
flows or adjustment costs to changing portfolios in response to new information. The 
third category, asymmetric fundamentals, refers to market responses under the 
efficient markets hypothesis where bubbles exist due to continued bouts of 
unexpectedly good or bad news.
In order to discriminate between the various explanations, a full theoretical 
specification must be constructed which offers testable hypotheses. Additionally, some 
assumptions must be made about the relative information flows that the investor and 
the econometrician observe. We will now examine how the existence of rational 
bubbles affects the properties of asset prices and discuss a number of methods for 
measuring such phenomena.
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Mathematically, the standard efficient markets view of asset pricing (in the absence 
of bubbles) may be denoted as
(l) ECRJ $t) = rt + at
where
Rt -
and Rt is the return on the asset due to the capital gain and dividend yield, Pt is the 
price of the asset, Dt is the dividend issuing from the asset, rt is the risk-free asset 
rate of return, and at is a risk premium which compensates the owners of the asset 
for the relatively high level of risk in the asset return. is the information set 
available at time t and the expectation of Rt given $ t is rational, in the sense of 
Muth (1961).
The ex ante relationship in (1) can be expressed ex post in the following way 
(2) = rt + at + ^
where ct is a random element distributed normally with mean zero and constant 
variance, gt is the capital gain (price appreciation) component of Rt and dt is the 
dividend yield.
In the situation where Xt = 0, gt will appear in the data as a random variable 
without any trend component; the dynamic behaviour of Pt will therefore follow that 
of a random walk. Given, however, that Xt > 0 was the general state of affairs 
internationally in 1987 (and indeed, ex ante, is almost always true), as interest rates
or
(3)
(4)
St = r t + ort - d t + 
= X, + *
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rose and dividend yields continued to fall, there is an implicit positive trend in stock 
price changes that will bias upward any tests for bubbles. Therefore, any finding that 
positively trending bubbles are empirically unimportant is even more strongly 
supported for the 1987 test period due to the upward bias in the test itself.5
The no-arbitrage condition in (1) can also be solved in terms of Pt using recursive 
substitution of Pt+1 to yield
(5) P*t -  ;?„(! + r, + “t) 'E(D1+i. J % )
This equation prices the asset using the expected discounted value of all future 
dividends. Note that the price is strictly a function of the discount rate rt, the risk 
premium at and the expected market fundamentals Dt.
The notion of a rational bubble enters when one considers other solutions to pricing 
the asset. One such solution takes the form
(6) P, -  !?](! + r. + a .)" 'E (D ,+ i -j| %) + c,
= P"t + c,
and
(7) E(ct+1| $t) = (l+rt)c t
In this case, the no-arbitrage condition between safe and risky assets holds but the 
price does not necessarily adhere to its fundamental value. Since rt is non-negative, 
ct is expected to grow over time and Pt is strictly greater than P*t.
There are various ways to specify ct itself. A deterministic solution where ct = 
c0(l+ r t)t is somewhat unreasonable because it implies that the bubble will grow 
endlessly as t approaches infinity.
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Another solution has
(8) ro  + rt) "i:t = \ — n —  )  c t - i  +
or ct =
The first equation occurs with probability while the second occurs with probability 
(I-*). 7T is defined as the unconditional probability that the bubble continues while 
(1-*) is the associated probability of a crash; nt is IID with mean equal to zero. The 
term (l+ r t)jr'1 is greater than ( l + rt) during the duration of the bubble in order to 
compensate for the risk of the bubble bursting.
Finally, the bubble term ct can be formulated in terms of a continuously regenerating 
process:
In this case, bubbles begin every period in a completely random fashion. Hamilton 
(1986) likens this process to looking a t " which football team wins the Super Bowl 
before purchasing stock, because that is what everybody else is doing, and only by 
behaving in the same way can one make the expected rate of return (1+r)".
Relative to the no-bubble price solution P*t, the Pt resulting from any of these 
definitions of ct has a higher variance, is less correlated to the market fundamentals 
and has the property of positive autocorrelation.6 When testing for the existence of 
the third characteristic, one does not require any specification of Dt since the no­
bubble alternative is a random walk with or without positive drift. This is an 
advantage of runs tests relative to tests for relative volatility and correlation since 
explicit assumptions must be made in the latter cases regarding the form of the 
fundamental factors. We will therefore focus on tests for autocorrelation in asset
19
prices and, in particular, on the Evans (1986) modified runs test.
lib. Empirical Bubble Tests
As mentioned above, the empirical tests have relied on testing for evidence of bubble 
behaviour against either random walk predictions or else against some specified 
model of asset pricing based on economic considerations. The variance ratio and 
runs tests fall into the former category while the variance bounds and fundamentals 
tests fall into the latter. While the former tests do not rely on assumptions of any 
specified model for asset pricing, they are essentially atheoretical and are therefore 
open to many interpretations.
The methodology used in this chapter is a variant of the runs test based on median 
returns. Evans (1986) presents a description of the test which may be summarised 
in the following fashion:
1) Generate 10,000 random samples of N pluses and minuses. For compatibility with 
the Evans paper, N is set equal to 155. The units for N are months in the case of the 
full equity bull market analysis and days in the case of the daily analysis for 1987.
2) For varying subsamples of size K in each of the 10,000 random samples, calculate 
statistics ZK where
(10) Zk = Pk - ^ . K
PK is the actual number of pluses generated in sample size K and the second term 
on the right hand side of the equation is the random walk prediction of the number 
of pluses, ie 50% of the sample size.
For example, given that the subsample K is 12 months, the theoretically expected 
number of positive movements in a random variable is equal to 6. If the data sample 
actually indicates that 7 positive movements occurred, then Z12 is equal to 1. The 
value ZK is therefore defined as the most extreme deviation from the null hypothesis
20
of a random walk for a given subsample size.
3) Calculate A* as the number of random samples of size K (maximum 10,000) that 
take on values greater than or equal to ZK; \  is therefore a cumulative distribution 
over ZK.
For example, if K = 12 as above and the 10,000 random samples are distributed with 
6,000 samples having Z=0; 3,000 with Z = 1; 900 with Z=2; 90 with Z=3 and 10 with 
Z=4, then the distribution of A12 has a value of 10,000 at Z>0; 4,000 at Z> 1; 1,000 
at Z>2; 100 at Z>3 and 10 at Z>4.
The value of AK/ 10,000 is the nominal significance level used to test deviations from 
a random walk for any given Z and K. Given a critical value of .05, only the Z12 
values equal to 3 and 4 in this example would indicate statistically significant positive 
deviations from a random walk. The reason for this is that AK/ 10,000 at Z=3 and 
Z=4 is equal to .01 and .001 respectively.
A further step is undertaken to control the degree of data mining which may occur 
in any exercise such as this, where substantial degrees of freedom exist for choosing 
sample sizes and sample periods. Therefore,
4) Generate a further 10,000 random samples and set Y equal to the minimum of 
A over K.
(11) Y = min AK
Y is the most extreme value of A for all subperiods K within N; low values of Y 
indicate higher probabilities of deviation from a random walk. In our example, Y is 
set to 10 since this is the most extreme deviation from a random walk given a 
subsample K of size 12. Adjusting the nominal significance level of AK/ 10,000 by 
using the distribution of Y controls for potential data mining by the econometrician 
and therefore allows for a free choice of any sample size for consideration. In 
essence, this step is an optimal data mining exercise over 10,000 sample periods.
Given these Monte Carlo results for comparison, the researcher selects a sample size 
for his data, calculates the Z values and then obtains the bubble probabilities A 
and/or Y.
22
III. Empirical Results
The Evans bubble methodology is applied to the case of 23 countries over two time 
frames: October 1982 to October 1987 for the monthly data analysis and 2 January 
1987 to 16 October 1987 for the daily data analysis. The first time frame is chosen 
to approximately correspond to the present upswing in the American business cycle 
and to provide a 5 year sample that is common across countries and appropriately 
sized to use Evans’ derived probability tables. The second time frame is chosen to 
capture the rapid equity price appreciation in most exchanges prior to the crash and 
ends on the last trading day prior to the crash.
All of the data are expressed in percentage rate of change and are measured from 
closing day prices in consecutive periods. The probability values are calculated using 
a null hypothesis of a random walk in prices against the alternative hypothesis of 
positive movements in excess of a random walk. As noted in Table 1, one index is 
used per country with the listed exceptions taking on values equal to unweighted 
averages of several indices. The separate probability values for these latter countries 
do not differ markedly from each other and therefore the use of an unweighted 
average value is a very close approximation to the relevant bubble probability.
As one can see from Table 1, the range of probability values extends from 0.0027 to 
over 0.5. The countries are divided into categories according to whether their values 
fall within the .05 or .20 probability bounds and it is apparent from this distinction 
that less than one third of the countries demonstrate strong evidence of bubble 
behaviour. It should be noted that for the United States, the country which 
precipitated the sharpest international price movements on 19 October 1987, there 
is no evidence of any bubble activity whatsoever. In addition, as will be seen in the 
next section, it appears to be difficult to explain the cross country variation since 
countries with markedly different characteristics share similar probability values. For 
example, stock market capitalization or size of the domestic economy cannot explain 
the similar bubble activity in Japan and New Zealand nor can the differences in 
international investment access that exist in South Korea and Hong Kong explain 
their relative rankings.
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Table 2 extends the monthly analysis to subperiods of K years within the 5 year bull 
market examined. Evans’ adjusted probability values to control for data mining are 
used in this table, in contrast to the other probability tables, since the sample size 
is variable and there is a deliberate attempt to find the periods where bubble activity 
is most prominent. As with Table 1, there is evidence in many countries that prices 
deviated from random walks for sustained periods, although it is difficult to explain 
in a general fashion why the deviations occurred. The bubbles in Italy, Sweden and 
Austria are present even in the absence of longer term indications over the entire 
sample period, an illustration of the value of choosing varying time periods for an 
analysis of this type.
The previous analysis is refined and extended in Table 3 where daily price changes 
are tested over the 1987 pre-crash period. In addition, equity premiums are 
calculated, where the premium is defined as the percentage stock price change less 
the yield on risk-free bonds, and these values are examined for the existence of 
bubbles.7 A comparison is also made with probabilities that are calculated from the 
beginning of the year to the date when the particular market peaked, usually prior 
to the crash. As is intuitively obvious, these latter values should always indicate 
higher bubble probabilities than those ending at the market crash.
Once again, the evidence for a bubble triggering the American market crash is not 
supported empirically; the values for both the market price and equity premium fall 
considerably outside of standard significance levels. A number of countries exhibit 
strong deviations from random walks at their market peaks but less so at the time 
of the crash. In fact, if a significance level for the existence of bubbles is imposed at 
approximately 95%, only Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom provide evidence 
for bubbles in prices and only Japan shows bubbles in the equity premium. As well, 
in the latter case, it is likely that the equity premium evidence is weaker than 
suggested in the table since daily varying bond prices were not available for this 
study. These daily movements, in a period when interest rates were rising rapidly, 
would have served to reduce the positive movements in the index and, therefore, the 
probability of deviations from a random walk.8
24
This section demonstrates that the Evans methodology can be used to find and 
calibrate deviations from random walks for asset prices expressed in rate of return 
form. The evidence does not support the argument that the American market had 
bubble characteristics prior to the crash but does find that other markets deviated 
from random walks for prolonged periods. Japan and the United Kingdom are 
especially important countries in the latter category because of their market size 
and international influence and also because of their high bubble ranking in both the 
monthly and daily analyses. The evidence is consistent with other studies that use 
different testing methodologies and find significant price deviations from random 
walks.9
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IV. Option Pricing Evidence
Option pricing theory provides another perspective from which to judge the validity 
of the bubble explanation of the crash. Since the prices of options and the underlying 
cash market are intimately related, any bubble which occurs in the latter should by 
definition occur in the former. Likewise, the increase in the volatility of stock prices 
which accompanies the introduction of bubbles should also be reflected in option 
prices. Lastly, given that stock market price volatility can be implied from standard 
option pricing formulas, this volatility should increase over the period during which 
the bubble is formed.
It can be shown that volatility (as measured by the current variance of asset prices) 
is increasing in terms of the introduction of a bubble element in prices and rises over 
time as the bubble progresses. Following Blanchard and Watson (1982), return to 
equation (6)
(6) Pt = P*t + ct
The definition of the conditional variance of X is
(13) V(X| «,) -  E(X -  E(jq * , ) ) 2
and so
(14) V(Pt| $,) = E(Pt -  E(P,| 4V))2
-  E(f, + g 2
where the first element is the innovation (unexpected component) in the 
fundamentals term and the second element is the innovation in the bubble term.
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Separating elements,
(15) V(Pt| *t) = V(ft) + V(^> + 2  cov(ct, g
Assuming that the covariance term is non-negative, V(Pt |$) is strictly greater than 
V(P*t | $), the no-bubble case; this assumption is not very strong since it is most 
unlikely that positive innovations in the fundamental term are positively correlated 
with adverse bubble innovations. Since the implied variance derived from option 
pricing purports to measure the true variance of stock prices, one expects to find 
higher implied volatility in periods where bubbles occur.
It is trivial to show that V(ct | $) is equal to a2M, and there is, therefore, no relation 
between the variance of the bubble term conditional on the information set and ct 
itself. However, to see that V(ct) is strictly increasing in terms of ct, and that the 
growth in the bubble term over time will lead to a monotonic increase in the 
variance of Pt, substitute equation (8) into the following equation for the 
unconditional variance and set rt = r
(16) V(X,) = E tV ^ X ,) ]  + VIEj.^X,)!
Rearranging and cancelling terms results in
(17) V( ct) » + ( 1+r)2 V( ct_ j)
since /xt is IID with constant variance and variables at t-1 are in the information set 
at time t.10 Using the bubble formulation in (9) leads to similar results where V(ct), 
and therefore V(Pt), is increasing in ct.11
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The bubble effect on option prices themselves can be seen by using the benchmark 
call option pricing formula of Black and Scholes (1976)
(19) Ct = PtN(X) - K ^N C X -oj^t)
where12
( 20)
As Cox and Rubinstein (1985) show,
( 21) 3pJ = N(X) > 0
and XT -  N*(x > > 0
and so we should expect option prices, as well as the implied stock price variance, 
to increase in a bubble environment relative to a non-bubble environment and also 
during the progression of the bubble itself.
Table 4 and Diagram 1 demonstrate that the theoretical expectation of volatility 
under conditions of a bubble in prices is at variance with the empirical evidence, at 
least for the UK in the 1980’s. The table specifies the averages and coefficients of 
variation of ax over several test periods between 1984 and 1987. The data frequency 
is weekly and the calculation is based on the weighted implied standard deviation 
type of formula found in Chiras and Manaster (1978).13
While the mean value of ax shows a trend increase from 1984 to 1986, Diagram 1 
indicates that this pattern is uneven. As well, there is no significant upward trend in 
the 13 weeks prior to the crash. If anything, the options pricing data would indicate 
that the bubble burst in the week starting 1 June 1987, when at was at a local apex. 
Looking back to Tables 1 and 3, in contrast, one sees that strong evidence exists 
there for bubbles in prices since the probability of a deviation from a random walk
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over the full bull market is .9841 and the associated probability during 1987 is .9464.
It therefore appears that there is some justification for rejecting the rational bubble 
explanation in the UK owing to the conflicting evidence shown in the options market. 
Other explanations for non-random pricing behaviour, such as those discussed in 
Footnote 5, are therefore much more plausible.
One leading candidate may be an asymmetric distribution in the innovations of 
fundamental factors. The UK corporate sector has posted a number of years of what 
many see, based on historical observation, as surprisingly strong growth figures. It 
may be that the stock market discounted these surprises as they occurred and, as a 
result, created a positive trend movement in prices; the asymmetry here is a 
positively skewed distribution of news coming to the market. The 1987 daily data 
results do not, however, support this sort of medium-term explanation since this 
asymmetry would have to operate on a daily basis.
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V. Cross Country Differences
The hypothesis that bursting bubbles lie behind the occurrence of the 1987 crash 
leads on to specific implications for post crash price movements. Assuming that 
bubbles exist, and that they are burst at a constant rate over time according to their 
initial strength, it is possible to test the bubble theory by examining the correlation 
between price declines and bubble probabilities for different countries. It is expected 
that a positive correlation will exist since higher bubble probabilities should 
correspond to greater price declines.
The regression results reported in Table 5 and Diagrams 2 and 3 demonstrate that 
there is no correlation between bubble probabilities and post crash price 
performance. Table 5 presents ordinary least squares estimation equations where the 
cross-sectional price declines at a given point in time are regressed against the 
respective bubble probabilities. Diagrams 2 and 3 plot bubble probabilities against 
price declines where the X axis is labelled by country and is ordered in terms of 
declining bubble probabilities.
The F and t statistics from the table indicate that the explanatory power of these 
estimations is absolutely insignificant. In addition, if the focus is directed solely to 
those probabilities lying within the .05 probability bound, (Finland, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Australia and Ireland for monthly data and 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Japan for daily data), it is readily seen from the 
diagrams that there is an incorrectly signed negative correlation in the former case 
and a correctly signed positive correlation in the latter. The small sample size for the 
daily data case (three observations) does not, however, allow firm conclusions to be 
drawn from the data.
This simple test of the bubble story seems to suggest that more sophisticated 
explanations are required in order to account for the marked differences observed 
across countries prior to the crash. Possible explanations for the differences might 
rest on continued batches of unexpectedly good news in the countries with indications 
of bubbles or evidence for continued learning processes due to structural changes in
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the flow of news to the market.14 However, the failure of the regressions reported 
here seems to imply that the bubble story cannot be true for all of the countries in 
the sample. Certainly, it is not true for the United States, the central country during 
the crash, since it exhibits insignificant probabilities of non-random behaviour;15 at 
the same time, this country’s post crash price adjustments are in the middle of the 
range of international responses.
While a simple risk adjustment is used in the daily data analysis by calculating the 
equity premium, it can be argued that the prices should be appropriately adjusted for 
systematic risk on the basis of a CAPM-type model. Aside from the greater data 
requirements that this sort of exercise would entail, it is unlikely to shed further light 
on the issue of cross country differences. It is difficult to support the argument that 
the countries with high bubble probabilities were riskier over the specified sample 
periods than those with low probabilities. For example, the risk rankings of Finland, 
Australia or France seem to be little different from those of Sweden, Hong Kong or 
West Germany on an a priori basis, and yet each pair have divergent bubble 
probabilities.
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VI. Conclusions
This chapter presents international estimates of deviations from random walk 
behaviour in stock market indices over the period 1982 to 1987. Two hypotheses are 
tested and rejected: first, that there is evidence for a bubble in the United States 
indices prior to the October 1987 market crash and, second, that the post crash price 
declines can be explained by the pre crash bubble probabilities.
While these hypotheses are rejected, the very existence of non-random behaviour 
may provide a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis if it is assumed that 
information arrives into the market in a random fashion. A complete theoretical 
model of some alternative price generation mechanism in the stock market is needed 
in order to test whether this particular empirical bubble methodology has explanatory 
power for such issues. In terms of this thesis, however, the rejection of a bubble 
explanation for the 1987 crash, and the finding that bubbles existed for other 
countries and subperiods, are both consistent with a theory of stock market pricing 
that stresses economic and non-economic factors.
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1. A bubble is defined in this chapter as a statistical construct that measures the 
probability of a deviation from a random walk in price movements. Evans (1986) 
presents the methodology and distribution properties behind this construct. It should be 
stressed that this definition of a bubble is not necessarily equivalent to theoretically 
defined bubbles or to the notion that prices may be over-valued relative to fundamental 
or other factors. A fuller discussion of these points is contained in Section II below.
2. There appears to be a widely held belief that the October 1987 crash was the 
inevitable result of previous market overvaluation. Market participants such as John 
Hennessy (1988) of CSFB talk of ’excessive speculation’, government reports and 
politicians cite ’speculative bubbles’ (Glauber (1988) and Healey (1988)) or state that 
the bull market was ’clearly too good to last’ (Lawson (1987)). The American General 
Accounting Office (1988) report on the crash stressed that prior overvaluation may have 
existed in the market while the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
stated that prices were unsustainably high (Greenspan (1988)).
The post-crash surveys conducted by Shiller (1987,1988) found that investors responded 
to price signals in a self-fulfilling fashion while generally ignoring news which was 
concurrently entering the market information set. While many argued the case for 
overvaluation from hindsight, most prescient market commentators felt that Japan, and 
not the United States, was the prime candidate for a sharp market correction; see Soros
(1987) on this point. Santoni (1987) provides further references from the popular press 
and also lists a number of similar commentaries on the possibility of bubbles causing the 
1929 crash. One recent comparison of the 1929 and 1987 experiences is found in 
Kindleberger (1988).
3. This classification is more fully specified in Evans (1986), Blanchard and Watson 
(1982) and Hamilton (1986) and the references therein.
4. The variance bounds tests are found in the papers by Shiller (1981) and Kleidon 
(1986) while the runs tests have been undertaken in Blanchard and Watson (1982). One 
recent reference to the variance ratio test is Poterba and Summers (1988). The 
fundamentals based models take a number of forms and can be found in the works of 
West (1985), Shiller (1984) and Summers (1986).
5. There are, of course, many other reasons for the detected drift or trend movements 
in equity prices. As Evans (1986) discusses, the distribution of price changes may be 
skewed to the right due to asymmetric distributions of fundamental factors which affect 
asset prices. Incremental learning by agents over regime shifts may also induce positive 
autocorrelation in prices, as may any other factors which lead to an overshooting type 
of pricing equilibrium in the manner of Dombusch (1976).
Other explanations rest on assumptions of irrationality, unobserved fundamentals or pure 
random chance during a given subperiod. These latter explanations are, however, 
difficult to analyze using present theoretical and empirical techniques which rely on 
optimising behaviour and appropriate specification of the data and model.
6. See Blanchard and Watson (1982) for a discussion of these points.
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7. Using the earlier notation, the relationship that is tested is
( 12) ^  -  rt = a t -  dt + ^
The use of the equity premium should dampen the trend element of g and therefore 
reduce the positive bias in the bubble test. This will accordingly reduce the probability 
of rejecting a random walk in prices.
An examination of Table 3 shows this to be the result for all countries and all time 
periods except for Japan and the United States on October 16th. In the former case, 
weekly bond yields are used to proxy rt and the low level and variability of these rates 
over 1987 made no difference to the bubble probabilities. In the latter case, both 
probabilities are well outside conventional significance levels.
The apparently sizeable change in the American probabilities in Table 3 is a function 
of the distribution of Z. For example, given that K = 120 (equivalent to a sample size 
of 4 months in the daily test), the Monte Carlo results indicate that A changes from 
.0001 to .0012 to .0144 to .0973 to .3802 to .8729 as Z declines from 24 to 4 in 
increments of 4; the increments between values of A therefore increase as Z decreases. 
In this regard, it is not surprising that the significance levels for the United States 
reported as .3729 and .2555 on October 16th differ from each other by a Z value of only 
one.
8. Roll (1989) presents evidence for 23 countries using daily data during 1987. 
Employing a variance ratio test, he finds that 18 of the 23 exhibit significant positive 
autocorrelation in stock prices. Since bull markets tend to have relatively larger positive 
price movements, while bear markets exhibit relatively larger negative price movements, 
see Schachter et al (1985), the Roll methodology is biased towards finding positive 
correlations over the bull market of 1987. In contrast, the sign test that underlies the 
Evans methodology is invariant to periods of bullish and bearish price movements since 
it is adjusted for potential data mining biases. Although this chapter finds that 5 out of 
9 price indices deviate from random walks prior to the market peaks, see Table 3, it is 
difficult to make an exact comparison with the Roll paper since it is not clear which 
countries deviate from random walks there.
9. Examples of these studies are found in the references of Poterba and Summers
(1988). The Poterba and Summers paper itself is in full agreement with this chapter’s 
conclusions since they find evidence of positive correlation in stock returns at 
frequencies of less that one year for a wide variety of countries. It should be stated, 
however, that very few of their results are statistically significant at standard levels.
10. Although the variances in Equation 17 are likely undefined from period to period 
because of non-stationarity while the bubble is forming, the probability limit of V(ct_k) 
as k increases from 1 should become stationary due to the rise and fall of the bubble 
over time. Therefore, Equation 17 is defined for some k > 1 and the variance of the 
bubble term grows over the progression of the bubble. I am indebted to Enrique 
Sentana for pointing out this line of thought to me.
11.
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The resulting equation is
(18) V(c,) -  o ^ l+ r ) -2' + V (c,.,)
12. Ct is the spot option price, Pt is the stock price, K,. is the exercise price, at is the 
standard deviation of Pt and N is a cumulative standard normal distribution for the 
given parameters.
13. I am grateful to Prof. Julian Franks for allowing me to use his data on implied 
volatility.
14. A discussion of the latter explanation in found in Tabellini (1988). The author notes, 
in a discussion centred on the volatility of exchange rates, that the existence of bubbles 
may indicate only that a continual learning process takes place in the market. This 
activity is due to expectational uncertainty concerning parameter stability in economic 
models.
15. This conclusion is consistent with the results in Santoni (1987). He presents 
autocorrelation coefficients and a runs test on daily price changes in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index from January 2 1986 to August 25 1987 (the US market peak). The 
results of his exercise indicate that the hypothesis of random walk behaviour cannot be 
rejected.
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Table 1
International Comparison of Bubbles in Price Indices 
October 1, 1982 to October 1, 1987
Category Country Probability of Random Walk
fin ascending order)
"Bubble" Finland .0027
Japan .0142
United Kingdom .0159
New Zealand .0182
France .0182
Australia .0303
Ireland .0396
Near "Bubble" Spain .0814
Canada .1773
Norway .1773
Portugal .1773
No "Bubble” Sweden 3121
Germany .4089
Netherlands .4955
Belgium .4955
Austria .4955
Switzerland >.5
United States >.5
Hong Kong >.5
Greece >.5
South Korea >.5
Italy >.5
Denmark >.5
Singapore >.5
Note: The data consist of commonly used composite or industrial indices
which are sampled at the last trading day of each month. One index per 
country is examined, with the exception of the following countries which
are ranked according to the unweighted average of several broad domestic 
indices: United States (7),United Kingdom (6), Japan (3), Australia (3),
Netherlands (3),France (2), Germany (2), Italy (2), Denmark (2) and Hong 
Kong (2). The probability values are calculated in Evans (1986) using
10,000 random number computer simulations of 155 months each. A bubble is 
defined as upward movements in indices over time that are in excess of the
number predicted by the random walk theory. A certain probability of a 
random walk would be expressed as a value equal to 1.
Data Source: Datastream
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Table 2
International Comparison of Bubbles in Price Indices 
Subsamples from October 1, 1982 to October 1, 1987
Country Subsample Probability of Random Walk
Bubble
fin ascending order)
Finland 8/85 - 8/87 .0009
U.K.: FT All Share 7/84 - 7/87 .0247
Italy 10/84 - 10/86 .0335
Near Bubble
U.K.: Total Market 7/84 - 7/87 .0707
France 7/84 - 7/87 .0707
Canada 10/82 - 10/83 .1070
Finland 10/82 - 10/83 .1070
Greece 8/86 - 8/87 .1070
Ireland 9/86 - 9/87 .1070
Italy 4/85 - 4/86 .1070
New Zealand 1/83 - 1/84 .1070
11/85 - 11/86 .1070
Austria 8/83 - 8/85 .1486
Portugal 8/83 - 8/85 .1486
Sweden 7/85 - 7/87 .1486
No Bubble
Japan subsamples of 12 months >.2
West Germany duration i t
Spain H
Norway n t t
Belgium If H
Australia M it
Switzerland ff tt
United States t t i t
Hong Kong i t t t
South Korea t t t t
Denmark i t t t
Singapore i t i t
Note: The data consist of commonly used composite or industrial indices
which are sampled at the last trading day of each month. The probability
values are calculated in Evans (1986) using 10,000 random number computer
simulations of 155 months each. A bubble is defined as upward movements 
in indices over time that are in excess of the number predicted by the
random walk theory. A certain probability of a random walk would be 
expressed as a value equal to 1. Data Source: Datastream
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Table 3
International Comparison of Bubbles in Price Indices 
January 2, 1987 to October 16, 1987 and Market Peak
Country Peak Market Peak October 16
Price Equity
Premium
Price Equity
Premium
Pacific Economies
Australia 
Joint All 
Ordinaries
Sept 21 .0030 .0782 .0324 .3242
Japan
Nikkei-Dow
Oct 14 .0410 .0410 .0544 .0544
Hong Kong 
Hang Seng
Oct 1 .1290 3822 .1602 .4228
Atlantic Economies
United 
Kingdom 
FT-SE 100
July 16 .0182 .0587 .0536 .1794
United States 
Dow Jones 
Industrials
Aug 25 .0410 .0480 3729 .2555
Canada
Toronto
Composite
Aug 13 .0109 .0449 >.5 >.5
European Economies
Switzerland 
Swiss Bank Corp. 
General
Oct 5 >.5 >.5 >.5 >.5
France 
Paris CAC 
General
March 26 .4716 >.5 >.5 >.5
West Germany 
FAZ General
Aug 17 > 3 >3 > 3 >.5
Note: The figures show the probability that the prices and equity premiums
follow random walks; a bubble is defined as positive index movements in
excess of that predicted by a random walk expectation. Probabilities are
calculated as in Evans (1986) and are interpolated to account for the
larger sample sizes used here. The equity premium is calculated as the
return above that earned by risk-free assets (defined as 30 to 90 day bonds
where the prices are market determined). TTie Hong Kong equity premium
uses a U.S. bond as the risk-free asset, while the Japanese bond varies
only on a weekly basis.
Data Source: Datastream oo
Table 4
Implied Volatility of United Kingdom Stock Prices 
Derived from Option Prices, 1984 to 1987
Samole Period Mean Coefficient of Variation
15 October 1984 - 
14 October 1985
.114 .14
14 October 1985 - 
13 October 1986
.180 .29
13 October 1986 - 
12 October 1987
.195 .22
5 January 1987 - 
1 June 1987
.207 .16
1 June 1987 - 
12 October 1987
.217 .14
19 October 1987 .739 .04
Note: The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. The 
mean for 19 October 1987 is the value during that week while the standard deviation is that 
for 1 June 1987 to 12 October 1987. The index used is the FTSE 100. The data are 
provided courtesy of Prof. J. Franks.
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Table 5
Regression Results: Cross Section of Monthly 
Various Periods of Stock Price Declines
Bubble Probabilities on
Independent Coefficient Value F statistic
Variable ft statistic!
One day after crash -1.56 .076
(028)
Two days after crash 6.88 .954
(0.98)
One week after crash 1.68 .059
(0.24)
One month after crash 5.74 .596
(0.77)
Six months after crash 5.63 .249
(0.50)
Note: Sample size is generally equal to 22. The one day regression
excludes Hong Kong while the two day regression excludes both Hong Kong 
and Singapore due to missing data. All equations include a constant term 
which was always negative and significantly different from zero at .95 
probability. The F statistics test the null hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficient is equal to zero.
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Chapter II: Stock Prices and Inflation
I. Introduction
The previous chapter investigated the stock market crash of 1987 and found that a 
rational bubble explanation is not wholly convincing, although there exists sufficient 
evidence of non-random price behaviour to bring into question the assumption of 
efficient markets. This chapter broadens the analysis of equity prices by extending 
the investigation back in time, while exploring whether nominal prices are important 
determinants of the real equity premium. In particular, it appears that inflation and 
nominal interest rates do not have similar effects on equity prices (at least in the 
U.K.) over a sample period extending from 1700 to the present.
The examination of the link between inflation, both expected and unexpected, and 
share prices follows an extensive literature which documents a negative relationship 
between the two.1 Virtually all previous studies confine their analysis to the post- 
1950 period, however, and none (to our knowledge) examine the 18th and early 19th 
centuries. Using a newly developed data set, this chapter finds that the negative 
relationship between inflation and excess returns is confined to the post-1950 period. 
In the preceding two and a half centuries, there is no consistent correlation between 
the two; if anything, there are long periods of time when there is a positive 
association.
Even though inflation is not found to be generally detrimental for equity returns, 
there is evidence that nominal interest rates have a consistently negative relationship 
since 1700. As well, the Tisher Effect’ (the notion that nominal interest rates rise 
point-to-point with expected inflation) is essentially absent in the pre-World War II 
period, a result possibly related to the gold standard of that period.2 So, while the 
use of recent data makes it difficult to discriminate between nominal interest rates 
and inflation as predictors of stock returns,3 the use of data from 1700 is more 
appropriate in this respect. The data, methodology and results are discussed in 
Sections II and III below.
There are a number of interesting attempts to explain the link between inflation and
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stock returns, for example, Fama (1981), Geske and Roll (1983), Modigliani and 
Cohn (1979), Pindyck (1988) and Stulz (1986), to name the main contributions. 
Section IV briefly reviews the implications of our findings for such work and then 
concludes the chapter. Finally, a detailed appendix follows which presents the data 
used here (and later in Chapter III of this thesis).
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II. Data and Methodology
In the work below, we present estimated equations of the form
(1) REt - RFt = a0 - a1 Et. 1^ t - a2 Et.,,RFt + ut
where REt is the ex post return on equities, RFt is the interest rate, Et.17rt is the rate 
of inflation expected at time t-1 and ut is distributed N(0,a2). The dependent variable 
is the excess return on equities (or the equity premium).
Equation (1) is representative of much of the research in this field. Given the 
theoretical result of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that the equity 
premium is a function of risk alone, the ’puzzle’ that arises here, as elsewhere, is 
that a, and/or a2 are estimated to be statistically significant. Note that although the 
equation takes required excess equity returns to be constant, this assumption will be 
relaxed below by introducing the expected volatility of returns as an additional 
regressor.
Ha. The Data
As discussed in Appendix I, there is no single index of share prices that goes back 
to 1700. Researchers are, therefore, forced to splice together various different indices 
to obtain a complete series. While coverage may vary across sectors and companies 
over time, the indices used here have the common property that they measure the 
changes in share prices of the leading quoted companies of the day.
Unfortunately, for a part of this period (1700 to 1810), the data are only available 
in the form of annual averages4; for consistency, the entire data set was, therefore, 
put together in this way. The data were then transformed prior to estimation to deal 
with the moving average error process which is introduced by averaging truly random 
processes.5 As a robustness check, estimates are also presented below for selected 
subsamples where end-of-period data exist.
A second problem with the data is the absence of a long series on dividend yields.
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Therefore, RFt generally refers to only the capital gain portion of equity returns, 
except for those subperiods indicated below where dividend yield information is 
available.6
As mentioned in Appendix I, consumer prices are used to measure inflation and 
the short and long interest rates are the three month commercial paper rates and 3% 
government consols, respectively. Due to the absence of data prior to 1827 and the 
use of lagged instruments, equations employing the short interest rate begin in 1830.
Before turning to the formal results, it is worth reminding the reader that the 
behaviour of inflation over the past half century has been quite different from that 
in the previous two centuries. Diagram 1 demonstrates that the mean inflation rate 
from 1700 to the 1930s was very close to zero. In contrast, the period since that time 
is marked by the absence of deflation, with the exception of the year 1943 (which is 
marked in any case by wartime price controls and is not a free market outcome). 
The radical change in the underlying inflation generation process is suggestive of the 
possibility that the relationship between inflation and equity returns might also have 
changed.7
lib. Methodological Issues
As previously mentioned, the use of time-averaged data implies that the error term 
(ut) in Equation (1) will follow a first-order moving average process with a serial 
correlation coefficient of approximately 0.25, (see Working (I960)). We replace Et_ 
1irt and Et.1RFt in Equation (1) by the actual outcomes, which, under a Rational 
Expectations assumption, only differ by a serially uncorrelated error term. In 
addition, the ’errors-in-variables’ problem is treated by using instrumental variables 
estimation.
However, as Hayashi and Sims (1983) note, some care is needed in a situation where 
there is a moving average error. Therefore, in order to preserve the timing conditions 
that make the instruments and the transformed disturbances orthogonal, the data are 
pre-transformed by subtracting future rather than past values.8 Sargan’s (1958) test 
for the validity of instrumental variables is also reported.
III. Empirical Results
Ilia. Basic Results: Excess Returns and Inflation
The link between excess returns and inflation is examined first by setting a2 = 0. The 
results are shown in Table 1 where two alternative dependent variables are 
employed: ERS, which is the excess return on equities defined relative to the short 
interest rate, and ERL, the excess return relative to long interest rates. The 
instruments that are used are lagged, untransformed values of inflation, stock returns, 
industrial production growth, real money supply growth, interest rates and armed 
forces employment (to capture the effect of wars and government expenditure).
It is clear from Table 1 that a significant negative relationship between expected 
inflation and excess returns is confined to the post-1950 period. The estimated 
coefficients on expected inflation in earlier subperiods range from -0.01 to +0.44. 
Notice that there is some evidence of a modest positive association between inflation 
and excess returns over 1830 to 1913. The basic thrust of the result is independent 
of the form of the left hand side variable, the precise sample period, or the actual 
estimation technique (the OLS and IV results are not very dissimilar).
We next investigate the relationship between interest rates, inflation and excess 
returns.
Illb. Basic Results: Excess Returns and Interest Rates
In this section, a1 is set equal to zero to concentrate on the effect of nominal interest 
rates on excess returns. The results of Table 2 indicate the existence of a consistent, 
negative relationship between expected interest rates and excess returns; this holds 
irrespective of subsample or choice of dependent variable. The coefficient on the 
nominal interest rate is also generally statistically significant and large, ranging from - 
1.30 to -6.09.
The basic result that there is a consistent, negative relationship between nominal 
interest rates and the equity premium also holds if end-of-period data are used, or
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if equity returns are measured by including the dividend yield. This may be seen in 
Table 3, where, in the upper section, evidence is presented for end-of-period data; 
since the Hayashi-Sims transformation was unnecessary, conventional instrumental 
variable estimates are given. Notice that the results are very similar to those obtained 
using the H-S transformed data (e.g., over 1914-1949, the coefficient on interest rates 
is -3.06, as compared to -2.92 previously).
The lower section of Table 3 contains estimates of the interest rate-excess return 
relationship when excess returns are correctly defined to include the dividend yield. 
Once again, the results are largely unchanged: the coefficient for 1919-1983 is -2.96, 
as compared to -2.92 previously, although, over 1950-1983, the coefficient falls from - 
1.97 to -1.41. So, the basic result does seem robust to the definition of the dependent 
variable and whether or not the Hayashi-Sims transformation is needed.
So, on these results, inflation appears to affect excess returns, but only via the 
nominal interest rate. Additional direct effects from inflation are tested, however, in 
Table 4. The typical result there is that the nominal interest rate depresses excess 
returns. Further, inflation only contributes any significant additional explanatory 
power in one out of the ten cases presented.9 This suggests that attention should 
probably be concentrated on the interest rate estimates shown in Table 2.
IIIc. How Robust is the Link Between Nominal Interest Rates and Excess Returns?
The results in Table 2 suggest that there is a fairly stable and consistent negative 
correlation between expected nominal interest rates and excess returns. In this 
section, various experiments are performed to assess the robustness of this empirical 
result.
Under the standard CAPM,
(4) Et.1 (REt - RFt) = <*0 + P Et.,a t
where a2t is a measure of equity risk, (see Merton (1980)). Equation (1) excludes 
any term which allows changes in volatility to affect stock returns, and so the first
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robustness check introduces lagged squared excess returns as a proxy for expected 
volatility.10 Although expected volatility often attracted a positive coefficient (which 
was sometimes statistically significant), the basic negative correlation between 
nominal interest rates and excess returns was unaffected. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 
5 show representative results of this experiment.
A second factor which may affect the basic result stems from Fama’s (1981) assertion 
that the correlation between inflation and the stock market may be spurious. He 
argues that high inflation is merely a proxy variable for lower future output growth 
(which it might be according to money demand theory). Similarly, nominal interest 
rates may also presage lower activity and, hence, be associated with lower equity 
returns.
In deference to this view, the future growth rate of industrial production was added 
to Equation (l) .11 The results in Table 5, Columns 3 and 4, show that our basic 
argument about nominal interest rates stays intact with a coefficient which is largely 
unchanged. Additional experiments using future growth in real GNP for shorter 
subperiods produced similar results.
Hid. The Changing Relationship Between Interest Rates and Inflation
The previous results show that higher expected nominal interest rates depress stock 
returns, while changes in expected inflation rates bear no consistent relationship with 
these returns. This section examines how the relationship between the two nominal 
variables has changed over time.
In our experiments, when the following equation was estimated
(5 ) Rgt - R pt — Otg +  fiy E t .^ 7Tt + 02
(where Et.1rt is the expected real interest rate), we obtained a negative statistically 
significant estimate of py and, typically, py = p2- However, if Et.1rt is omitted from 
the equation, then py is estimated to be positive prior to 1950 and negative after that 
date. Of course, if Equation (5) describes the true underlying data generation
process, then the estimate of py is biased for standard omitted variables reasons, i.e.
(6) Bias (b,) = (^2)6,_r
where b1 is the estimate of py and St r is the coefficient of tt in a regression of Et.
i r t  011
It is well known from the sources in Endnote 2 that the correlation between interest 
rates and inflation has changed over the period since 1700. Some confirming 
evidence is presented in this regard by estimating
(7 ) Rpt =  “o + “ i E tTt*i + v t
and similar variations. The results are presented in Table 6 and show that the 
estimate of a1 rises markedly during the most recent sample period. Of course,
< 1 corresponds to * < 0, a negative correlation between real interest rates and
inflation. So, given a negative value for p2, b1 will be biased towards becoming 
positive. Since the absolute value of Sv r declines through the sample period, it is 
clear that the size of the bias of b1 also falls. So, in the period prior to 1950, the size 
of the bias of b1 is sufficient to make p1 positive, but since interest rates are more 
responsive to inflation after 1950, the size of the bias also falls.
Another way of summarizing these results is that there was no consistent relationship 
between inflation and stock returns in the pre-World War II period, because the 
direct depressing effect of inflation on stock returns was offset by the boost to 
equities provided by an inflation-induced decline in real interest rates. However, in 
the post-World War II period, higher inflation had only a modest depressing effect 
on real interest rates; so, overall, equity returns tended to fall with inflation.
An important component of an ’omitted-variable’-based explanation of these findings 
is that the Fisher hypothesis did not hold prior to 1950. Some have argued that 
regressions of interest rates on expected inflation are not very informative about the 
Fisher effect since inflation was not very forecastable over the gold standard period 
(see especially Barsky (1987)). While it is true that autoregressive processes for
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inflation do not provide good forecasts of future inflation, this is not true of more 
general inflation prediction processes.
So, while Barsky (1987) finds that past values of inflation have virtually no 
explanatory power before 1913 (R2 = 0.006 from Table 7), thus rendering tests of 
the Fisher hypothesis suspect, this is not true of our more general information set 
(R2 = 0.30). We believe that this latter information set, even limited as it is with 
respect to the information in financial journals of the day and, therefore, a 
substantial underestimate of the market’s ability to predict inflation, provides 
sufficient forecastability of future inflation to credibly test the Fisher hypothesis on 
18th and 19th century data.
Ille. The Role of Changing Monetaiy Institutions: The Gold Standard
The previous discussion on the differential effect of real interest rates and inflation 
on excess returns is formalised in Tables 8a and 8b. In the tables, a dummy variable 
for the period of time when Britain was on and off of the gold standard is interacted 
with the expected nominal interest rate and its subcomponents, expected real interest 
rates and expected inflation. As before, I.V. and OLS estimates are shown for both 
short and long interest rates and returns.
The first and third columns of each table demonstrate that the effect of nominal 
interest rates on the equity premium was stronger while Britain was on the gold 
standard; this result is essentially a restatement of the subsample estimated 
coefficients in Table 2 above. The interesting point to note is that when the expected 
nominal interest rate is decomposed into its constituent components (Column 2 in 
Table 8a), one finds that the stronger depressing effect of nominal interest rates on 
excess returns during the gold standard years is primarily due to the role of real 
interest rates.12 In contrast, there is no significant difference between the effect of 
inflation on excess returns on and off of the gold standard.
These findings are consistent with the discussion in Section Hid above which stressed 
that the effect of inflation on excess returns before World War II (or in this case 
before 1932 when Britain last left the gold standard) depended on the role of real
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interest rates. The predominant effect of real interest rates relative to inflation 
during the gold standard, and the reverse situation after 1950, emphasises that both 
must be explained to provide a complete interpretation of the effect of nominal 
interest rates over the entire sample period.
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IV. Implications and Conclusions
There is an extensive literature that attempts to explain the link between inflation 
and stock returns. We briefly review this literature to assess whether these theories 
can explain the basic empirical result that inflation and real interest rates together 
depress returns, but inflation on its own bears no consistent relationship with returns.
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that because investors suffer from ’inflation 
illusion’, they incorrectly use nominal interest rates to capitalise real cash flows. 
However, this story predicts that the required return on equity rises with higher 
inflation (although it does explain a negative relationship between returns and 
unexpected inflation).13 Further, it is not clear that Modigliani and Cohn could 
explain a link between real interest rates and returns which coexists with one 
between inflation and returns.
As discussed above, Fama (1981) argues that higher inflation simply proxies for 
lower expected growth. In the empirical experiments reported above, the inclusion 
of the expected future growth rate did not appear to affect the basic relationship 
between nominal interest rates and the equity premium. Also, it is not clear that a 
money-demand based explanation could account for the absence of a link between 
inflation and stock returns in the pre-World War II period.
Another class of explanations relies on the existence of tax effects (see, e.g., 
Feldstein (1982)). However, it does not seem plausible that tax-based effects can 
even account for the post-war effect (as Modigliani and Cohn (1984) and Pindyck 
(1984) note). On our findings, it is difficult to see why the nominal interest rate 
would depress returns by nearly twice as much in the low taxation period of 1830- 
1913, as in the high tax regime of 1950-1983. Furthermore, it seems that this 
explanation would have the same difficulty as the other stories in simultaneously 
accounting for inflation and real interest rate effects.
«
A further class of explanations are based on the need to measure risk appropriately. 
So, for example, Pindyck (1984) argues that higher inflation is associated with higher 
variability of returns. Of course, in standard models, greater uncertainty regarding
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equity returns would be rewarded with a higher risk premium, so while this 
explanation can account for a negative relationship between unexpected inflation and 
returns, it perversely predicts a positive association between expected inflation and 
returns. Once again, it is not obvious that this theory can account for the real interest 
rate effect, as well as the accompanying inflation effect.
A further possible explanation that is also based on risk considerations is offered by 
Stulz (1986), who, by including real balances in his definition of wealth, is able to 
construct an equilibrium model where higher expected inflation lowers equity returns. 
However, the model does not appear to account for a negative relationship between 
real interest rates and excess returns in addition to the inflation-excess returns link.
So, to conclude, it seems that existing theories need to be amended to explain:
(I) A consistent, negative relationship between higher expected nominal interest rates 
and excess returns and,
(II) The absence of a link between expected inflation and returns in the pre-World 
War II period, followed by the well-documented negative relationship in the post- 
World War II period.
If finding (I) could be adequately explained, then (II) might be explained by 
appealing to the change in the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
inflation that occurred prior to 1950 (although the latter needs explaining as well).
In any case, for the purposes of this thesis, it seems that stock prices and the process 
of general inflation are not consistently linked over time. This fact, combined with 
the puzzling linkage between nominal variables and the real excess return, is possibly 
evidence of the influence of non-economic factors, such as institutional structure, 
on stock prices.
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Appendix I: U.K. Historical Data, 1700 to 1987
This data appendix provides the details for the construction of indices measuring 
equity prices, short and long term interest rates, consumer prices, two definitions of 
money supply, industrial production and a proxy for government deficit financing, 
total employment in the armed forces. The description of sources in this section is 
followed by diagrams and a list of the data.
The data extend from 1700 to 1987 and are all measured as annual averages. 
Although coverage varies from one subperiod to another, the general thrust is 
directed towards obtaining the broadest possible measure of each variable. 
Therefore, the data usually refer to the entire United Kingdom and to the most 
comprehensive subsector of the particular market being measured.
Table 1 summarizes some of the discussion in the rest of this appendix. The table 
includes the source of the index, the period covered and the conversion factor used 
to transform the raw data to the final stated form. Standard splicing techniques were 
used to link the various data sets.
Equity Prices
The final index has a base year of 1750 equal to 100.
The data from Mirowski (1981) consist of an equally weighted index of the Bank of 
England, East India Co., South Sea Co., London Assurance, the Royal Exchange 
Assurance and the Million Bank. All of the companies, with the exception of the 
East India Co., were financial corporations of one sort or another.
The Bank of England is well known, as is the South Sea Co., an early example of 
debt for equity conversion which helped to spark off the South Sea Bubble of 1720. 
The London and Royal Exchange Assurance were insurance companies with large 
holdings of mortgages and stock and annuities from the other major publicly listed 
companies. In similar fashion, the Million Bank, contrary to its name, was primarily 
an investment trust specialising in government annuities.14
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Although Scott (1912) estimates that some 150 joint stock companies existed in 1695, 
very few of these companies were listed in the financial press of the day. For 
example, the Course of the Exchange, the most comprehensive contemporary source 
and the precursor of the Official List of the Stock Exchange, reported on the shares 
of only 13 different companies during the eighteenth century.15 It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that the market index used here is broadly indicative of market 
movements, especially since it includes the three largest quasi-public corporations, 
the Bank of England, the East India Co. and the South Sea Co.
The year 1811 marked the first occasion when prices for non-government or quasi­
public corporations appeared on the official quotation list. Included in these new 
listings were canal, dock, insurance and waterworks shares, and those of American 
firms. Gayer et al (1953) includes representative companies from each of the 
foregoing domestic categories (plus insurance) from 1812, as well as railway 
companies, banks and mining firms in later years;16 there are 52 different companies 
included in all.
The Gayer et al (1953) sub-indices are constructed as average share prices weighted 
by the number of outstanding shares. The final index is then constructed by weighting 
the sub-indices by the ratio of paid-up capital in the sub-index to the total market. 
The total index, exclusive of mining shares, is used here since the mining companies 
were almost all producing in the Americas; as well, the speculative mining boom of 
1825 and the sharp slump of 1841 in this sub-sector are only weakly echoed in the 
other sub-indices.17
A monthly index produced by Hayek is found in Gayer et al (1953), p.457. His index 
includes most of the sub-sectors listed above, with the exception of banks and 
insurance companies (but including British mining and coke production shares). The 
index is an unweighted average and consists of high capitalization companies with 
continuous quotations.
The Smith and Home (1934) Index of Industrials, by contrast, includes a sub-sample 
of companies in the following sectors: coal and iron, electrical goods, textiles, food,
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drink, building materials, lighting, chemicals, stores and transport (excluding 
railways). The number of companies listed rises from 26 in 1870 to 92 in 1925. As 
with the Hayek index, the share prices enter the index in an unweighted form. The 
London and Cambridge Economic Service (LCES (1971)) Industrial Ordinary index 
is simply a continuation of the Smith and Home index of 92 industrials. The final 
component of the share price index is the FT Industrial Ordinaries index presently 
used in the London market.
It should be noted that the average price of equities in 1914 is only based on the first 
six months data due to the closure of the exchange in mid-year.
Dividend Yield
Very few of the foregoing sources for share prices present equivalent information for 
dividend payments. Therefore, the series used here combines the BZW (1987) index 
income yield from 1919 to 1954 with the CSO FT Industrials dividend yield from 
1955 to 1987. The resulting series is presented as an annual percentage rate of 
change.
Consumer Prices
The final index has a base year of 1750 equal to 100 and is the broadest possible 
measure of consumer goods prices.
The Schumpeter (1938) price index is composed of the unweighted averages of 31 
consumer goods, while the Rousseaux (1938) Indice Total measures industrial and 
agricultural prices. The Retail Price Index (RPI) is published in Feinstein (1971) and 
is extended in Cappie and Webber (1986) and CSO (1986,1988). Inflation rates based 
on this series are constructed as differences of log levels.
Industrial Production
The index has a base year of 1750 equal to 100. The construction industry has been 
excluded from the analysis, although most other large industries are included.
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The industrial production data in Hoffman (1934,1955) are indices of consumer and 
producer goods industries. The series excludes the construction industry because the 
data for this sector are calculated using a double 10 year moving average and are, 
therefore, less accurate measures of yearly production. Hoffman’s series includes 50% 
of total industrial production prior to 1800 and up to 74% at various points in the 
nineteenth century. While acknowledging the criticisms by Deane and Cole (1962) 
concerning the validity of this series, there appears to be no consistent alternative 
source of data prior to 1800.
The Lomax (1959) index also excludes building and is calculated by interpolating 
between the census years of 1930, 1933, 1934, 1935 and 1937. The post-war series 
from UN (1953) was used to bridge the gap from 1946 to the start of the CSO 
(1986,1988) data in 1948 and also to align the 1938 and 1946 values to a common 
base year. This index measures total manufacturing industry output, adjusted for the 
number of working days per month.
The data from 1939 to 1945 do not exist and they were therefore interpolated from 
the figures for real GNP found in Feinstein (1971). The GNP data from 1938 to 1946 
were regressed against a constant and a time variable to remove the trend element.18 
The residuals from this regression were then aligned to the industrial production data 
endpoints at 1938 and 1946 and these formed the new intra-war data.19
The last component of this index is the index of output in the production industry 
in CSO (1986,1988). Like the other components, the output of the construction 
industry is excluded.
Long Interest Rate
The interest rate used is the British government 3% consol. The data are expressed 
at market rates with no base year.
The data to 1958 are found primarily in Homer (1963), with the exception of the 
new issue rates for 1698 and 1704-1708 found in Dickson (1967). Following Homer
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(1963) and Shiller and Siegel (1977), market yields on two and one half percent 
consols were used between 1881 and 1888; the reason for this is that the low level 
of interest rates at that time constrained the 3%  consol yield from falling further 
because of the possibility of redemption.
Since continuous data on market rates exist from only 1729 onwards, market data 
prior to that date were estimated by using new issue rates. Market rates were 
regressed on a constant and the new issue rate for all years in the eighteenth century 
for which matching data were available.20 New issue rates for missing data points 
were then interpolated from existing new issue rates in adjacent years21 and these 
data were used with the estimated regression coefficients to backcast the market 
rates prior to 1729.
The remainder of the bond yield data are taken from Capie and Webber (1986) and 
CSO (1986,1988).
Short Interest Rate
The three month commercial paper rate is taken from Deane and Cole (1962), which 
is in turn derived from the Overend Gurney and Williams primary sources. The data 
from 1845 to 1856 are averages of the two sources and those for 1911 to 1937 are 
averages of the high/low Williams data. From 1938 to 1987, the interest rates are 
averages of the monthly data presented in CSO publications. All data are expressed 
at market rates with no base year.
MO - Narrow Money
The index has a base year of 1750 equal to 100. Narrow money is defined as notes 
in circulation and deposits at the Bank of England.
The initial data come from Bank of England (1967) and are derived from balance 
sheets of the Bank. The missing data in 1765 and 1774 are linearly interpolated from 
adjacent values. Starting in 1870, the Capie and Webber (1986) high powered money 
base series is used. The series ends with MO values for 1983 to 1987 from CSO
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(1986,1988).
M3 - Broad Money
The index has a base year of 1750 equal to 100. Broad money is defined as notes in 
circulation, deposits at the Bank of England and deposits at commercial banks.
From 1844 to 1869, total net public liabilities of joint stock banks from Collins (1983) 
are added to the Bank of England (1967) data. The Capie and Webber (1986) series 
for M3 is used from 1870 and CSO (1986,1988) fills the gap from 1970.
The net public liability data cover England and Wales while the Capie and Webber 
and CSO data are measured for the entire United Kingdom. The increasing financial 
linkages between London and the provinces over time implies that these differences 
in the scale of coverage should not greatly affect the intertemporal fluctuations in 
money due to economic factors.
Armed Forces Employment
This series is a proxy for the extent of deficit financing undertaken by the British 
government over the period in question. Under conditions where the Ricardian 
Equivalence Theorem does not hold, increased demand for funds by the government 
places upward pressure on interest rates and hence influences other financial 
variables via portfolio rebalancing and arbitrage.
From 1700, the series is calculated as the sum of the number bourne in the navy and 
the number voted in the army from BPP (1868-69). Values for 1716, 1717 and 1800 
are linearly interpolated from adjacent data. From 1868, the Feinstein (1971) data 
for armed forces employment are used. CSO data are used from 1966 to 1987 to 
complete the index.
The series is scaled by the total population of the United Kingdom in order to 
remove an upward trend element. Annual values are linearly interpolated for 1700 
to 1869 from decennial information in Deane and Cole (1962) and Maddison (1982);
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data for England/Wales in several years are grossed up by the ratio of these 
countries to total U.K. population in 1750. Maddison (1982) annual population data 
are used from 1870 to 1978 and UN sources finish the series to 1987.
Gold Standard Dummy Variable
This variable takes the value 1 for 1700-1797, 1821-1914 and 1925-1932. In all other 
years, the U.K. was off of the gold standard. Dates come from Bordo and Schwartz 
(1984).
War Periods Dummy Variable
The periods of warfare with other nations are divided into two categories following 
Rasler and Thompson (1983). The global warfare index takes the value one for 1701-
1713,1793-1815,1914-1918 and 1939-1945, while the interstate warfare variable takes 
the value one for 1718-1720, 1727-1728, 1739-1748, 1778-1783 and 1854-1856. A 
general index is formed as the sum of these two subindices.
End-of-Period Data
The December equity price series uses data compiled by Prof. G. W. Schwert of the 
University of Rochester and provided by him on a floppy diskette. In addition, equity 
capitalization values for 387 representative stocks from the Bankers' Magazine are 
used from December 1913 to December 1919, while December 1920 to December 
1925 price index values come from Bowley et al (1931).
The December short interest rate values from 1880 to 1938 come from the Bankers' 
Magazine and those from 1939 are from the CSO. Midpoints of bid and ask prices 
are used where both prices are quoted in the Bankers' Magazine.
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The December equity price series uses data compiled by Prof. G. W. Schwert of the 
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1. Some early examples for the U.S. are Fama and Schwert (1977), Lintner (1975) and 
Nelson (1976). There is also evidence that the negative correlation holds for many other 
countries; on this, see Cohn and Lessard (1981) and Gultekin (1983).
2. Friedman and Schwartz (1982) and Shiller and Siegel (1977) have previously noted 
the absence of the Fisher effect prior to 1950.
3. For example, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) use the nominal interest rate, not inflation, 
in their investigation and Fama’s (1981) measure of expected inflation rises one-to-one 
with the nominal Treasury bill yield.
4. One could, of course, turn to primary sources such as the Course of the Exchange or 
the Bankers* Magazine to obtain finer frequencies of share prices. The amount of work 
in such an undertaking seemed to be inordinate, however, in comparison to the added 
value of such regression estimates in this chapter. In addition, as Mirowski (1981) 
stresses, there are considerable gaps in even popular biweekly publications such as the 
Course of the Exchange. Finally, unless the researcher is interested in only univariate 
estimation, it is virtually impossible to find corresponding data for interest rates, 
inflation, industrial production, etc. at frequencies of less than one year.
5. See Working (1960).
6. As shown below, the equations which include the dividend yield term support the 
results using only the capital gain component. The main reason for this is that the 
dividend yield series is rather smooth relative to the capital gain and, therefore, does 
not affect the variability of the total return greatly.
In addition to recent research which describes this smoothness statistically, (cf. Marsh 
and Merton (1987)), Gayer et al (1953) also present dividend yield data for selected 
companies and years in the U.K. between 1811 and 1850. Most of these companies kept 
their payout ratio constant for 5 or 10 years at a time and then changed the rates in full 
or half percentages; if this behaviour is descriptive of the fuller sample here, the 
constant term in the equity premium regressions should be biased most from the absence 
of the dividend yield portion of returns, while the a1 and a2 coefficients of interest 
should be relatively unaffected.
7. The changing autocorrelation properties of inflation over the full sample period can 
be seen in the following regression:
(2) *t = " -006 Constant + .009 Gold + 1.10 xt-1 - 1.45 Gold*^.,
(0.4) (0.4) (3.9) (3.1)
Sargan Test: 0.9 Sample: 1705-1983
(F(12,oo)0 05 = 1.75) Estimation Method: I.V.
where * is the inflation rate, Constant is a constant term and Gold is a gold standard 
dummy variable equal to 1 on the gold standard and 0 otherwise.
It appears that prices followed a random walk during the gold standard, at least in terms 
of their own autocorrelation properties, while there was substantial positive 
autocorrelation in inflation when the U.K. was off of the gold standard.
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8. In our case, under the null hypothesis where a1 = a1 = 0, ut should follow an MA(1) 
process with a parameter of 0.27. Noting that this process can be reformulated as an 
infinite order autoregressive structure, all variables are transformed using the 
approximation
(3) x’t = xt - .268xt+1 + .0718xt+2 - .0192xt+3 + .0052xt+4
Lagged, untransformed variables may then be used as appropriate instrumental variables.
9. The one case is for ERS over 1830 to 1913.
10. Sentana and Wadhwani (1989) use a number of different proxies for a2t in their 
study of Japanese share prices in recent years. Even though lagged squared excess 
returns are a rough proxy of the true measure of volatility, the variable seems to fare 
equally as well as more sophisticated parametric and non-parametric alternatives in their 
paper.
11. The actual growth rate is used and, assuming Rational Expectations, is instrumented 
for standard errors-in-variables considerations.
12. The estimated coefficients of Column 2 in Table 8b do not confirm the results in 
Column 2 of Table 8a. This is not surprising since the interest rate used in the former 
table is a perpetuity which includes an expected inflation term which spans multiple 
periods into the future. Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the same inflation rate 
to deflate both long and short interest rates. The table is shown here, however, for
completeness and in order to demonstrate that the depressing effect of interest rates on
excess returns during the gold standard holds from 1705, as well as from 1830.
13. Of course, if one relaxes the assumption of Rational Expectations and relies instead 
on Adaptive Expectations, then the Modigliani-Cohn story might account for a negative 
relationship between expected inflation and stock returns as well (see, e.g., Attanasio 
and Wadhwani (1989)).
14. See Mirowski (1981) for further details.
15. See Mirowski (1981), p.566.
16. See Gayer et al (1953), Table 7.
17. See Gayer et al (1953), Diagram 93.
18. The time variable coefficient value was 3.03 with a standard error of .93. The R- 
squared statistic equalled .60 and the constant was statistically significant.
19. This method is used in preference to an estimation based on the correlation between 
industrial production and real GNP before 1938 and after 1946, since there are 
substantial differences between the two periods. The earlier period is adversely 
influenced by the post-World War I inflation and the subsequent depression of 1921 and 
the 1930’s. In contrast, the post-Worid War II years were marked by an acceleration in 
the growth rate of real economic activity.
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20. The details of the regression are as follows: Sample size equal to 42, R-squared 
equal to .87, a constant coefficient equal to 1.113 and a new issues (X) coefficient equal 
to .687 with a standard error of .042. The estimates imply that new issues were usually 
priced at a premium to secondary market paper when market rates were above 3.6% 
and at a discount when below 3.6%.
Differences between primary and secondary market rates should not arise in perfect 
markets with homogenously traded goods. However, debt at this time had certain lottery 
and redemption privileges attached to it which varied substantially from issue to issue. 
As well, it was a new financial instrument with considerable counterpart risk, since 
sovereigns had traditionally defaulted on obligations when repayment became difficult. 
Therefore, changing political circumstances may also have introduced a wedge between 
primary and secondary market rates.
21. This applies to the years 1700-1701, 1703, 1709, 1716, 1720, 1723-1725 and 1728.
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Table 1: The Effect of Inflation on Excess Returns
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  (5 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERS ERS ERS ERS ERS
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3  1830/1913
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 0 . 2 2  0 . 4 4  0 . 1 3  - 1 . 6 8  0 . 3 4
o f  I n f l a t i o n  ( 0 . 9 )  ( 1 . 6 )  ( 0 . 3 )  ( 2 . 0 )  ( 2 . 2 )
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e t h o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 4 2  1 . 6 7  1 . 4 1  1 . 0 9  N/A
( 6 )  ( 7 )  ( 8 )  (9 )  ( 1 0 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERL ERL ERL ERL ERL
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3  1 7 0 5 / 1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3  1705/1913
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 0 . 2 9  - 0 . 0 1  0 . 1 6  - 1 . 5 4  0 . 1 9
o f  I n f l a t i o n  ( 1 . 4 )  ( 0 . 0 )  ( 0 . 4 )  ( 2 . 0 )  ( 2 . 1 )
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e t h o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 3 8  1 . 3 6  1 . 7 7  0 . 8 3  N /A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  Rp -  Rr  = a 0 + a ,  Et1Jrt + u t . A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  a r e  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  
F ( 1 2  , 1 2 0 )  005= 1 . 8 3  a n d  F ( 1 2 , ® ) 005= 1 . 7 5 .
Table 2: The Effect of Nominal Interest Rates on Excess Returns
(1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  (5 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERS ERS ERS ERS ERS
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3  1830/1983
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 1 . 3 3  - 3 . 5 0  - 2 . 9 2  - 1 . 9 7  - 1 . 6 7
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 2 . 9 )  ( 3 . 3 )  ( 1 . 7 )  ( 2 . 0 )  ( 4 . 0 )
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e th o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 6 2  1 . 1 0  1 . 2 9  1 . 1 2  N/A
( 6 )  ( 7 )  ( 8 )  ( 9 )  (1 0 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERL ERL ERL ERL ERL
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3  1 7 0 5 / 1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3  1705/1913
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 0 . 7 0  - 1 . 6 6  - 6 . 0 9  - 1 . 6 5  - 2 . 9 4
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 1 . 7 )  ( 1 . 8 )  ( 1 . 6 )  ( 1 . 6 )  ( 3 . 6 )
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e th o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 4 0  1 . 0 7  1 . 4 7  1 . 1 8  N/A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  -  Rp, =  a„ + o ,  e m r r  + ' V  A11 S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  a r e  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  
F ( 1 2  , 1 2 0 )  005= 1 . 83  a n d  F ( 1 2 , « ) 005= l . 7 5 .
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T a b l e  3 :  T h e  E f f e c t  o f  N o m i n a l  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  o n  E x c e s s  R e t u r n s  
U s i n g  E n d - o f - P e r i o d  a n d  T o t a l  E x c e s s  R e t u r n s
E n d - o f - P e r i o d  E x c e s s  R e t u r n s
( 1 )  (2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERS ERS ERS ERS
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 8 8 0 / 1 9 1 3  1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 7  1 8 8 0 / 1 9 8 7
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 3 . 5 9  - 3 . 0 6  - 1 . 8 3  - 1 . 5 2
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 3 . 1 )  ( 2 . 1 )  ( 1 . 7 )  ( 3 . 2 )
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e th o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  0 . 9 9  1 . 6 8  1 . 7 5  N /A
T o t a l  E x c e s s  R e t u r n s
( 5 )  ( 6 )  ( 7 )  ( 8 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERS ERS ERS ERS
V a r i a b l e
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 9 1 9 / 1 9 8 3  1 9 1 9 / 1 9 4 9  1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3  1 9 1 9 / 1 9 8 3
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 1 . 0 9  - 2 . 9 6  - 1 . 4 1  - 1 . 5 8
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 1 . 6 )  ( 1 . 6 )  ( 1 . 4 )  ( 2 . 6 )
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  I . V .  I . V .  OLS
M e th o d
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 5 5  1 . 5 6  1 . 2 1  N /A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  Rct -  Rp =  a 0 + a ,  E^Rp, + ut . A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  a r e  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  
F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 ) 005= 1 . 8 3  a n d  F ( 1 2 , « ) 005= l . 7 5 .
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Table 4: The Effect of Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates on
Excess Returns
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (4 ) (5 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
ERS ERS ERS ERS ERS
S a m p l e  P e r i o d 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3 1950/1983
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  N o m in a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
- 1 . 6 3
( 2 . 9 )
- 3 . 8 2
( 3 . 8 )
- 2 . 9 5
( 1 . 7 )
- 0 . 9 4
( 0 . 6 )
- 2 . 9 7
( 2 . 4 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  I n f l a t i o n
0 . 2 7
( 0 . 9 )
0 . 5 3
( 2 . 1 )
0 . 1 5
( 0 . 3 )
- 1 . 1 0
( 0 . 9 )
0 . 5 2
( 0 . 6 )
E s t i m a t i o n
M e th o d
I . V . I . V . I . V . I . V . OLS
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 5 8 0 . 8 2 1 . 2 8 1 . 2 1 N/A
( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 ) (1 0 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
ERL ERL ERL ERL ERL
S a m p l e  P e r i o d 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3 1950/1983
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  N o m in a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
- 0 . 6 4
( 1 . 3 )
- 1 . 6 6
( 1 . 8 )
- 6 . 0 0
( 1 . 5 )
1 . 0 8
( 0 . 4 )
- 2 . 4 6
( 1 . 5 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  I n f l a t i o n
- 0 . 0 6
( 0 . 2 )
- 0 . 0 0
( 0 . 0 )
0 . 0 7
( 0 . 2 )
- 2 . 2 2
( 1 . 5 )
0 . 3 2
( 0 . 3 )
E s t i m a t i o n
M e th o d
I . V . I . V . I . V . I . V . OLS
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 3 8 1 . 0 7 1 . 4 7 0 . 7 2 N /A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  Ra  -  Rp, = cr0 ♦ a ,  Ev1Jrt + a 2 E ^ R p  + u t . A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  
a r e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 , 
F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 ) 005= 1 . 8 3  a n d  F ( 1 2 , o o ) 0 05= i . 7 5 .
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Table 5: Some Further Experiments Using Nominal Interest Rates
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
ERS ERL ERS ERL
S a m p l e  P e r i o d 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 1 3 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 1 3
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  N o m i n a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
- 1 . 2 5
( 1 . 7 )
- 1 . 8 7
( 1 . 8 )
- 1 . 4 2
( 2 . 8 )
- 1 . 6 8
( 1 . 8 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  I n d u s t r i a l  
P r o d u c t i o n  
G r o w t h  a t  t + l
N/A N /A 0 . 1 7
( 0 . 3 )
0 . 0 6
( 0 . 2 )
C o e f f i c i e n t
o f  a2t-i
0 . 4 3
( 0 . 5 )
0 . 6 9
( 0 . 7 )
N /A N/A
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
I . V . I . V . I . V . I . V .
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 6 4 0 . 8 6 1 . 5 7 1 . 0 6
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  REt -  Rn  = a 0 + a ,  E^Rp, + a 2 Et1X + u t . A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  
a r e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3  , 
F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 )  005= 1 . 83 a n d  F ( 1 2 , c o ) 005= 1 . 7 5 .
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T a b l e i 6 :  F i s h e r  E q u a t i o n s
(1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
Rf Rf Rp
S a m p l e  P e r i o d 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3
C o e f f i c i e n t 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 8
o f  I n f l a t i o n ( 2 . 8 ) ( 0 . 7 ) ( 5 . 4 )
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
I . V . I . V . I . V .
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 7 0 0 . 3 9 1 . 5 0
( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
Rp Rf
S a m p l e  P e r i o d 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3 1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3
C o e f f i c i e n t 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 1 2 0 . 7 5
o f  I n f l a t i o n  
a t  t + 1
( 0 . 7 ) ( 2 . 2 ) ( 5 . 0 )
E s t i m a t i o n
M e t h o d
I . V . I . V . I . V .
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 1 5 1 . 7 0 1 . 1 5
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  Rr  =  a 0 + a ,  EMJrt + u , .  S h o r t  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  u s e d  
t h r o u g h o u t .  A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  a r e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% 
l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 ) 005= 1 . 8 3  a n d
F ( 1 2 ,  °°) o.o5= ^ * 7 5  •
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T a b l e  7 : F o r e c a s t a b i l i t y  o f I n f l a t i o n
I n f o r m a t i o n
S e t
S a m p l e
P e r i o d
R2
L a g g e d  I n f l a t i o n 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3 0 . 0 0 6
L a g g e d  I n f l a t i o n 1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 0 . 1 8 4
L a g g e d  I n f l a t i o n 1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3 0 . 4 5 4
G e n e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S e t
1 8 3 0 / 1 9 1 3 0 . 3 0 7
G e n e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S e t
1 9 1 4 / 1 9 4 9 0 . 6 0 4
G e n e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S e t
1 9 5 0 / 1 9 8 3 0 . 8 1 3
N o t e :  T h e  ' G e n e r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  S e t '  i n c l u d e s  l a g s  o f  t h e  m oney  
s u p p l y ,  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  s t o c k  r e t u r n s  a n d  
a r m e d  f o r c e s  e m p l o y m e n t .
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T a b l e  8A: T h e  E f f e c t  o f  I n f l a t i o n  a n d  S h o r t  
On a n d  O f f  o f  t h e  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
I n t e r e s t  R a t e s
( 1 ) ( 2 ) (3 ) (4 )
D e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e
ERS ERS ERS ERS
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3 1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3  1 8 3 0 / 1 9 8 3
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  N o m in a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
- 1 . 0 3
( 2 . 0 )
N /A - 1 . 6 7
( 4 . 0 )
N /A
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  N o m in a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
- 1 . 2 8
( 1 . 8 )
N/A - 1 . 2 2
( 2 . 1 )
N /A
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  R e a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
N /A - 0 . 4 4
( 0 . 7 )
N /A - 1 . 8 5
( 3 . 8 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  R e a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
N /A - 2 . 0 0
( 2 . 4 )
N /A - 1 . 2 9
( 1 . 9 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  I n f l a t i o n
N /A - 1 . 0 3
( 2 . 0 )
N /A - 1 . 7 7
( 4 . 3 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  I n f l a t i o n  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
N /A - 0 . 9 3
( 1 . 1 )
N /A - 0 . 8 0
( 1 . 3 )
E s t i m a t i o n
M e th o d
I . V . I . V . OLS OLS
S a r g a n  T e s t 1 . 6 3 1 . 4 0 N/A N/A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  REt -  Rn  = a 0 + a ,  EV1r t t  a 2 E , . ^  + u , .  A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  
a r e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  
F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 ) 0^ = 1 . 8 3  a n d  F ( 1 2 , » ) 005= 1 . 7 5 .
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T a b l e  8B : T h e  E f f e c t  o f  I n f l a t i o n  a n d  L o n g  I n t e r e s t  R a t e s  
On a n d  O f f  o f  t h e  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
(1 ) ( 2 ) (3 ) (4 )
D e p e n d e n t  ERL 
V a r i a b l e
ERL ERL ERL
S a m p l e  P e r i o d  1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3 1 7 0 5 / 1 9 8 3
C o e f f i c i e n t  ->1 .02  
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 2 . 4 )  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
N /A - 1 . 6 6
( 4 . 0 )
N/A
C o e f f i c i e n t  - 1 . 1 5  
o f  N o m i n a l  ( 2 . 2 )  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
N /A - 1 . 4 1
( 3 . 0 )
N/A
C o e f f i c i e n t  N /A - 1 . 0 1 N /A - 1 . 8 0
o f  R e a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e
( 2 . 0 ) ( 4 . 1 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  N /A - 1 . 1 5 N /A - 1 . 3 4
o f  R e a l  
I n t e r e s t  R a t e  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
( 2 . 1 ) ( 2 . 8 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  N /A - 1 . 0 2 N /A - 1 . 6 7
o f  I n f l a t i o n ( 2 . 3 ) ( 4 . 1 )
C o e f f i c i e n t  N /A - 1 . 3 4 N/A - 1 . 2 3
o f  I n f l a t i o n  
o n  G o l d  S t a n d a r d
( 2 . 0 ) ( 2 . 5 )
E s t i m a t i o n  I . V .  
M e t h o d
I . V . OLS OLS
S a r g a n  T e s t  1 . 3 9 1 . 3 2 N/A N/A
N o t e :  t - r a t i o s  a r e  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s .  A l l  r e g r e s s i o n s  a r e  o f  t h e  
f o r m  Re, -  R,, = a 0 + a 1 E ^ jt, + a 2 E^Rp, + i^ .  A l l  S a r g a n  t e s t  v a l u e s  
a r e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  5% l e v e l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  F ( 1 2 , 2 2 ) 005= 2 . 2 3 ,  
F ( 1 2 , 1 2 0 ) oos= 1 . 8 3  a n d  F ( 1 2 , o o ) Q05= 1 . 7 5 .
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Appendix I
T a b l e  1 :  D a t a  S o u r c e s  a n d  C o n v e r s i o n F a c t o r s
S o u r c e D a t e C o n v e r s i o n
F a c t o r
t o  1 7 5 0 = 1 0 0
S t o c k  P r i c e
M i r o w s k i 1 7 0 0 - 1 8 1 0 1 . 0 0
G a y e r  e t  a l 1 8 1 1 - 1 8 5 0 1 . 4 5
H a y e k 1 8 5 1 - 1 8 6 7 1 . 0 8
S m i t h  a n d  H o r n e 1 8 6 8 - 1 9 3 3 1 . 8 2
LCES 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 5 4 2 2 . 9 8
CSO 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 7 5 . 7 7
C o n s u m e r  P r i c e
S c h u m p e t e r 1 7 0 0 - 1 7 9 9 1 . 1 1
R o u s s e a u 1 8 0 0 - 1 9 1 2 1 . 1 2
C a p i e  a n d  W e b b e r 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 7 9 8 . 7 7
CSO 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 7 3 2 . 7 4
( 1 9 8 5 = 1 0 0 )
I n d u s t r i a l  P r o d u c t i o n
H o f f m a n 1 7 0 0 - 1 9 3 1 4 1 . 6 7
Lom ax 1 9 3 2 - 1 9 3 8 3 6 . 0 6
M u l l i n s 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5
UN 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 4 7 6 1 . 3 1
CSO 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 8 7 1 3 7 . 7 8
( 1 9 8 0 = 1 0 0 )
L o n g  I n t e r e s t  R a t e
M u l l i n s 1 7 0 0 - 1 7 2 8
H om er 1 7 2 9 - 1 9 5 8 1 . 0 0
C a p i e  a n d  W e b b e r 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 8 2 1 . 0 0
CSO 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 0 . 8 8
N a r r o w  M oney
B a n k  of E n g l a n d 1 7 0 0 - 1 8 6 9 1 4 . 2 9
C a p i e  a n d  W e b b e r 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 8 2 5 . 2 0
CSO 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 5 . 2 5
B r o a d  M on e y
C o l l i n s 1 8 4 4 - 1 8 6 9 2 . 3 2
C a p i e  a n d  W e b b e r 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 6 9 2 . 5 4
CSO 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 7 2 . 4 9
75
Year
1700
1701
1702
1703
1704
1705
1706
1707
1708
1709
1710
1711
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
Table 2: List of Historical U.K. Data, 1700 to 1987
Stock Long Consumer 
Returns Interest Price
Rate Inflation
5.922 -14.004
-9.760 5.578 -0.995
6.193 5.235 -5.225
15.015 5.441 4.220
0.000 5.647 -9.632
-14.876 5.647 12.617
-9.503 5.510 -13.736
8.803 5.407 4.401
9.633 5.407 15.135
-0.768 6.111 13.143
-8.305 6.815 10.093
-9.979 7.090 -29.035
3.934 7.090 -4.001
11.745 5.166 5.942
3.245 5.578 1.043
6.550 4.548 -4.966
5.583 4.376 4.082
11.829 4.205 -2.202
6.517 4.205 4.264
-0.851 3.861 4.976
35.115 4.205 -1.961
-50.483 4.548 -8.350
-20.858 3.174 -3.282
3.749 3.174 5.412
8.317 3.174 3.205
16.566 3.174 4.976
-7.332 3.174 -6.002
4.104 3.861 3.046
4.349 3.732 4.966
-1.944 3.240 -9.048
4.247 3300 -7.673
2.927 3.120 1.118
0.575 3.030 4.657
-2.910 3.090 3.538
-9.060 3.190 1.118
4.013 3.190 -2.250
10.970 2.860 6.602
1.929 2.830 -2.153
-1.190 2.860 -2.200
-8.350 3.060 11.632
-3.049 3.000 7.706
0.720 3.030 -8.701
76
M0 Industrial Armed
Production Forces
Employment
3.210 4.110 0.206
3.439 4.314 0.457
3.423 3.936 0.858
3.517 4.135 1.039
3.228 4.159 1.103
3.425 4.214 1.136
3.238 4.004 1.221
3.543 4.031 1.372
3.649 4.496 1.335
2.925 4.167 1.474
2.453 4.110 1.564
2.758 4.110 1.810
3.478 4.110 1.784
2.907 4.206 0.449
3.735 4.251 0.287
2.952 4.314 0.316
3.738 4.406 0.310
3.628 4.455 0.295
3.522 4.443 0.308
3.576 4.374 0.365
4.078 4.412 0.396
3.888 4.393 0.355
4.257 4.524 0.291
4.642 4.507 0.311
4.928 4.294 0.301
4.350 4.461 0.294
4.379 4.431 0.398
4.693 4.412 0.517
4.673 4.335 0.425
4.601 4.348 0.429
4.620 4.418 0.329
4.649 4.374 0.343
4.713 4.393 0.316
4.651 4.507 0.329
4.773 4.381 0.480
4.780 4.490 0.621
4.793 4.478 0.426
4.709 4.406 0.355
4.736 4.557 0.439
4.696 4.501 0.497
4.770 4.412 0.769
4.771 4.328 0.990
1742 0.918 3.000 -5.225 4.838 4.425 0.936
1743 3.295 2.970 -11.241 4.741 4.381 0.994
1744 -2.587 3.240 1.172 4.730 4.518 1.045
1745 -0.911 3.530 9.010 4.521 4.472 1.036
1746 -7.607 3.410 -3.247 4.755 4.518 1.314
1747 -1.437 3.660 4.306 4.598 4.518 1.158
1748 0.000 3.410 2.179 4.504 4.518 1.111
1749 6.676 2.970 -1.036 4.584 4.563 0.450
1750 4.082 3.000 -5.449 4.605 4.605 0.393
1751 2.176 3.030 3.247 4.740 4.605 0.372
1752 4.027 2.860 -3.247 4.702 4.563 0.367
1753 1.122 2.860 0.000 4.598 4.563 0.351
1754 -2.923 2.910 2.176 4.540 4.605 0.365
1755 -7.242 3.140 0.000 4.634 4.563 0.602
1756 -8.253 3.370 16.968 4.761 4.563 0.922
1757 1.552 3.390 -2.763 4.866 4.518 1.206
1758 1.094 3.210 -5.856 4.747 4.518 1.443
1759 -9.108 3.590 -2.000 4.666 4.605 1.585
1760 -1.079 3.770 -4.220 4.728 4.563 1.661
1761 -3.806 3.900 0.000 4.775 4.605 1.655
1762 -5.268 4.290 6.220 4.867 4.563 1.813
1763 21.520 3.370 1.961 4.729 4.563 1.392
1764 -7.624 3.610 3.895 4.811 4.685 0.456
1765 10.559 3.410 0.929 4.742 4.646 0.440
1766 4.741 3.390 1.833 4.668 4.685 0.417
1767 7.951 3.370 -0.912 4.675 4.759 0.405
1768 4.883 3.310 -8.701 4.765 4.759 0.399
1769 -3.528 3.470 0.995 4.742 4.794 0.406
1770 -7.646 3.640 6.785 4.726 4.794 0.423
1771 1.824 3.550 8.925 4.871 4.828 0.619
1772 2.072 3.300 1.678 4.712 4.861 0.468
1773 -7.748 3.470 -2.528 4.757 4.794 0.427
1774 2.093 3.430 -2.593 4.925 4.723 0.410
1775 3.011 3.390 0.872 5.070 4.794 0.407
1776 -0.192 3.510 -5.433 4.999 4.828 0.651
1777 -3.513 3.850 8.004 5.010 4.861 1.063
1778 -14.280 4.510 -5.291 4.943 4.861 1.228
1779 -3.260 4.880 -0.896 5.098 4.828 1.600
1780 -8.647 4.880 4.481 5.074 4.828 1.722
1781 -3.146 5.220 0.857 4.995 4.828 1.767
1782 -2.290 5.260 10.590 5.139 4.924 1.819
1783 8.485 4.760 -2330 4.957 4.924 1.439
1784 -13.085 5.410 -4.904 4.807 4.982 0.446
1785 11.062 4.760 -0.829 4.839 5.038 0.383
1786 14.701 4.060 -1.678 5.012 5.038 0.371
1787 3.361 4.080 3.329 5.051 5.065 0.397
1788 4.584 4.060 -3.329 5.157 5.091 0.370
1789 2.315 3.920 5.827 5.203 5.141 0.417
1790 0.397 3.900 -2.498 5.230 5.165 0.546
1791 6.615 3.580 0.889 5.375 5.211 0.653
77
1792 10.053. 3.330 5.523 5.289 5.277 0.507
1793 -13.834 3.960 5.300 5.337 5.211 1.464
1794 -8.544 4.400 7.765 5.261 5.211 1.982
1795 -1.907 4.520 4.666 5.528 5.298 2.898
1796 1.486 4.800 -3.995 5.257 5.298 2.390
1797 -21.815 5.900 0.000 5.180 5.256 2.472
1798 -2.522 5.940 7.836 5.433 5.298 2.509
1799 15.645 5.070 28.148 5.507 5.397 2.512
1800 11.702 4.710 7.244 5.674 5.416 2.335
1801 0.102 4.920 -27.033 5.794 5.378 2.194
1802 9.354 4.230 -10.922 5.586 5.416 1.770
1803 -16.334 4.990 3.180 5.618 5.452 1.696
1804 -2.551 5.300 14.975 5.700 5.470 2.449
1805 8.813 5.040 -1.650 5.912 5.452 2.483
1806 7.528 4.870 1.119 5.791 5.505 2.630
1807 3.838 4.920 9.236 5.785 5.554 2.689
1808 2.539 4.550 3.851 5.841 5.505 2.840
1809 6.750 4.490 -2.406 5.804 5.538 2.868
1810 0.667 4.470 -0.479 5.920 5.617 2.850
1811 -6.172 4.670 14.001 6.027 5.676 2.809
1812 -8.870 5.080 2.513 6.045 5.602 2.784
1813 -5.563 4.920 -15.082 6.033 5.602 2.832
1814 4.884 4.920 -9.007 6.109 5.632 2.731
1815 -7.471 4.480 -10.473 6.167 5.718 1.833
1816 -10373 5.020 9.431 6.180 5.690 0.923
1817 6.961 4.100 2.632 6.144 5.784 0.630
1818 19.543 3.870 -1.073 6.107 5.797 0.613
1819 -0.537 4.170 -16.974 5.980 5.758 0.548
1820 -4.682 4.420 -15.341 5.895 5.784 0.602
1821 4.323 4.070 -10.579 5.988 5.834 0.600
1822 7.789 3.790 2348 5.739 5.881 0.484
1823 5.507 3.800 4.671 5.831 5.938 0.490
1824 18.180 3.300 1.664 5.980 6.002 0.523
1825 -6.165 3.540 8.597 6.013 6.072 0.568
1826 -14.973 3.790 -12.775 6.058 5.981 0.568
1827 2.064 3.610 0.000 6.014 6.118 0.562
1828 3.679 3340 -4.433 6.021 6.181 0.571
1829 -0.989 3.340 -1.742 5.953 6.146 0.562
1830 -1.865 3.490 -0.956 6.010 6.223 0.539
1831 -10.711 3.760 2.698 6.029 6.231 0.524
1832 0.477 3.580 -2.698 5.892 6.231 0.515
1833 1.471 3.420 -1.865 6.065 6.295 0.510
1834 1.768 3.320 4.563 6.095 6.354 0.505
1835 2.709 3.290 0.000 5.979 6.397 0.460
1836 22.454 3.350 9.400 6.099 6.496 0.472
1837 -16.595 3.300 -4.145 5.982 6.438 0.471
1838 7.866 3.230 0.816 6.017 6.527 0.501
1839 -4.363 3.280 8.870 5.886 6.615 0.528
1840 1.228 3350 -1.561 5.817 6.592 0.529
1841 -4.280 3.380 -5.631 5.771 6.586 0.536
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1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
2.506 3.270
7.764 3.170
14.393 3.030
10.454 3.120
-5.633 3.130
-12.452 3.440
-15.214 3.510
-8.148 3.240
-1.336 3.110
2.568 3.090
4.995 3.020
2.925 3.070
-10.480 3.270
0.777 3.310
1.674 3.220
0.168 3.270
-0.292 3.100
-0.404 3.150
1.959 3.190
7.666 3.280
13.189 3.230
16.906 3.240
0.930 3.330
5.636 3350
-15.759 3.410
-5.651 3.230
-3.477 3.200
4.351 3.230
10.686 3.240
11.973 3.230
12.246 3.240
2.722 3.240
-2.966 3.240
-5.951 3.200
-6.788 3.160
-5.412 3.150
-8.232 3.150
-8.048 3.080
16.476 3.050
-1.077 2.780
-3.710 2.910
-5.350 2.840
-4.858 2.690
-1.596 2.720
1.256 2.790
-3.347 2.680
3.120 2.560
12.496 2.810
0.100 2.670
-1.822 2.700
-8.616 5.867
-5.520 6.079
2.798 6.145
1.847 6.214
-0.956 6.465
5.395 6.203
-14.036 6.190
-5.125 6.188
0.000 6.250
-4.245 6.238
3.222 6.320
17.487 6.384
11.024 6.250
0.000 6.196
-0.841 6.282
2.439 6.270
-13.489 6.350
3.564 6.415
4.250 6.398
-4.250 6.282
4.250 6.367
0.802 6.358
-1.678 6.355
-1.638 6360
2.515 6.322
-1.692 6.509
-2358 6.518
-7.260 6.473
2.821 6.548
4.439 6.619
10.683 6.661
-0.758 6.645
-4.873 6.647
-3.317 6.680
-1.736 6.695
-4.439 6.658
-8.555 6.653
-2.995 6.699
3.947 6.635
-2.966 6.624
2.014 6.629
0.000 6.615
-6.167 6.615
-7.574 6.632
-5.937 6.590
-2.358 6.585
3.612 6.580
0.000 6.585
3.486 6.643
-1.117 6.684
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6.539 0.575
6.598 0.559
6.715 0.548
6.769 0.553
6.774 0.602
6.735 0.609
6.839 0.630
6.865 0.572
6.870 0.555
6.908 0.551
6.976 0.576
7.058 0.594
7.058 0.802
7.040 1.008
7.134 1.087
7.177 0.638
7.114 0.663
7.205 0.683
7.279 0.773
7.259 0.772
7.199 0.751
7.247 0.743
7.279 0.729
7349 0.702
7.388 0.679
7373 0.678
7.426 0.673
7.441 0.640
7.509 0.635
7.571 0.655
7.599 0.649
7.630 0.617
7.652 0.611
7.638 0.605
7.650 0.598
7.675 0.616
7.622 0.634
7.576 0.603
7.737 0.573
7.744 0.568
7.809 0.564
7.832 0.560
7.809 0356
7.773 0.574
7.751 0.592
7.797 0.610
7.871 0.606
7.933 0.601
7.927 0.596
7.930 0.613
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
-1.233 2.650 -4.795
1.029 2.610 0.000
3.322 2.520 -10.231
9.890 2.390 -2.758
19.051 2.280 1.333
9.874 2.250 1.425
-0.539 2.280 5.195
2.599 2.360 7.462
-1.258 2.540 8.012
-5.336 2.670 -5.643
-1.844 2.660 0.000
-2.391 2.750 0.000
-5.889 2.830 -3.623
5.889 2.780 3.623
1.456 2.830 7.831
-1.823 2.970 4.155
-6.224 2.900 -10.869
-0.392 2.980 4.526
8.222 3.080 6.343
4.599 3.150 5.021
-0.138 3.280 1.955
-1.325 3.390 1.918
-1.485 3.460 0.000
-12.173 3.820 15.978
-4.407 4.310 17.212
-6.039 4.580 18.695
-0.308 4.400 14.382
1.309 4.620 5.672
0.414 5.320 14.192
-38.299 5.210 -9.422
13.050 4.430 -21314
20.598 4.310 -5.106
-1.307 4.390 0.778
10.008 4.430 0.410
5.407 4.550 -2.018
7.946 4.560 -2.867
13.310 4.470 -0.862
-1.841 4.600 -1.258
-21.313 4.460 -3.924
-25.131 4.530 -6.434
-3.000 3.760 -2.850
19.744 3.380 -2.990
23.361 3.080 1.478
8.004 2.890 1.011
14310 2.940 2.864
-6.899 3.280 5.132
-19.671 3.380 0.873
-4.445 3.720 1371
-20.067 3.400 14.786
5.407 3.130 8.061
80
6.721 7.879 0.607
6.721 7.852 0.623
6.756 7,918 0.617
6.809 7.949 0.633
6.854 8.005 0.648
6.827 8.006 0.641
6.829 8.041 0.656
6.886 8.084 0.690
6.922 8.080 0.985
6.942 8.063 1.055
6.953 8.081 0.987
6.952 8.080 0.822
6.932 8.074 0.796
6.922 8.139 0.770
6.950 8.178 0.744
6.990 8.197 0.719
6.985 8.138 0.712
7.010 8.153 0.725
7.028 8.190 0.718
7.053 8.223 0.731
7.073 8.238 0.728
7.116 8.335 0.725
7.312 8.264 1.455
7.464 8.273 4.445
7.600 8.196 6.224
7.691 8.157 7.542
7.923 8.099 7.868
8.095 8.221 3.786
8.139 8.235 1.343
8.078 7.849 0.860
8.019 8.068 0.682
7.970 8.147 0.603
7.973 8.212 0.595
7.983 8.198 0.600
7.971 8.070 0.596
7.973 8.323 0.590
7.989 8.279 0.569
7.972 8.369 0.563
7.984 8.318 0.551
7.966 8.209 0.545
7.975 8.210 0.538
8.066 8.265 0.536
8.088 8.356 0.538
8.088 8.437 0.549
8.137 8.521 0.573
8.198 8.580 0.616
8.223 8.556 0.703
8.247 8.514 0.773
8.339 8.540 3.636
8.466 8.638 5.414
1942 10.008 3.030 0.680 8.655 8.664 6.527
1943 17.435 3.100 -0.680 8.822 8.685 7.567
1944 11.333 3.140 1.038 8.958 8.640 7.863
1945 3.509 2.920 1.380 9.074 8.614 8.056
1946 9.844 2.600 0.000 9.154 8.582 4.284
1947 3.077 2.760 0.703 9.195 8.638 2.277
1948 -3.077 3.210 6.257 9.129 8.721 1.452
1949 -6.454 3.300 2.846 9.136 8.786 1.213
1950 3.279 3.550 3.077 9.140 8.852 1.106
1951 14.953 3.790 8.670 9.169 8.883 1.280
1952 -18.232 4.230 8.762 9.208 8.844 1.337
1953 6.454 4.080 2.992 9.252 8.905 1.318
1954 27.193 3.760 1.946 9.303 8.956 1.277
1955 15.415 4.170 4.495 9.355 9.008 1.214
1956 -7.671 4.740 4.504 9.396 9.010 1.164
1957 4.175 4.980 3.681 9.430 9.033 1.036
1958 -3.458 4.980 2.727 9.464 9.023 0.913
1959 31.880 4.825 0.635 9.496 9.072 0.832
1960 24.168 5.458 1.027 9.543 9.141 0.757
1961 0.376 6.270 3.400 9.583 9.144 0.684
1962 -11345 5.979 4.239 9.597 9.152 0.635
1963 10.434 5.588 1.875 9.621 9.187 0.613
1964 9.045 6.060 3.260 9.675 9.266 0.606
1965 -2.806 6.433 4.728 9.739 9.293 0.599
1966 -1.614 6.818 3.861 9.784 9309 0.591
1967 6.728 6.730 2.280 9.813 9.315 0.586
1968 26.626 7.459 4.707 9.865 9.389 0.567
1969 -9.860 8.941 5.228 9.901 9.422 0334
1970 -15.090 9.233 6.208 9.936 9.428 0.519
1971 6.748 9.041 9.029 10.014 9.422 0.510
1972 26.582 9.198 6.881 10.066 9.440 0.513
1973 -14.546 10.909 8.707 10.178 9.526 0.506
1974 -55.047 15.173 14.879 10.285 9.505 0.481
1975 21.354 14.601 21.701 10.418 9.451 0.466
1976 16.829 14.227 15.314 10.532 9.483 0.465
1977 20.626 12.192 14.709 10.635 9.533 0.457
1978 5.819 12.022 7.972 10.774 9.562 0.444
1979 -0.817 11.346 12.569 10.900 9.599 0.435
1980 -2362 11.929 16.541 10.976 9.531 0.445
1981 11.025 13.012 11.209 11.025 9.496 0.460
1982 10.289 11.741 8.241 11.054 9.515 0.447
1983 18.660 9.539 4.529 11.114 9.550 0.444
1984 21.047 9.441 4.827 11.168 9.562 0.448
1985 16.144 9.380 5.917 11.213 9.610 0.447
1986 24.777 8.717 3.343 11.252 9.632 0.440
1987 21.761 8.364 4.075 11.297 9.670 0.435
Note: Stock returns and the inflation rate are calculated as differences of logarithms. 
MO and industrial production are both set to a base year 1750 = ln(100). Armed 
forces employment is expressed as a ratio to total population.
81
Diagram 1
Stock Pr i ce Index
B ase  Y »ar 1 7 3 0 -  l nQ 700}
10
9
9
7
6
3
4 in»im i i a i m i m r»rm m i m i » i i i m i n i i i m B ii im inrnm »itTi
1700 1730 1500 1530  7900  7930 1957
Diagram 2
Reai Stock Pr i ce Index
5 a s  a  Y aar i7 3 0 » in £ l0 0 22
6
a
6
4
2
5
9
S
4
2
4
a
6 mntiMmmmai
7730
82
Diagram 3
Di  v  i d e n d  Y i e l d
10
1950
Diagram 4
Consumer Price index
q&ba Y ear 1 750—I 1 0 0 5
7 . 5
1700 175 0  1900  1SSO 1900  1950 1997
83
Diagram 5
Long Interest Rate
3* Conso i
5
4
13
12
1
10
3
a
7
6
5
4
3
2
1330 1350
Diagram 6
Shorn i nterest Rate
T rtr«»  M ontn Conm arc I a  i Pops®''
1 6
1 3
1 4
1 3
12
11
10
m i m i iii iii m i i ii iii m i iii iii iii in i ii i n i mi  ii n ii m i in i in ii r
1930
8 4
Diagram 7
N a r r o w  Money S u p p l y  (IN/102)
B&sa v a a r  1 7 3 0 -  I n r  'lOCT)
1 -I
TO
a
7
6
4
3
2
17DO 1730 7BOO 1B3D T9DO 193Q 19B7
Diagram 8
Reai Industri a I Producti on
b & b «  v a a r  t 7 3 0 —  I r<; TOCT)10
8 5
Diagram 9
Army a n d  N a v y  E m p l o y m e n t
n o i a t i v o  t o  r o t a i  P o p u l a t i o n
5
2
5
3
0
3
1
3
2 im n » n i i i i » i n » i i » n m n « i i i i n in n m » n i»iinim Mn i
1BQQ 1BSO
8 6
Chapter III: Stock Prices and Financial Crises
I. Introduction
The present chapter examines financial market crashes and crises from a historical 
perspective, rather than focusing strictly on the 1987 event as did Chapter I. A 
statistical methodology is used, as in the rest of the thesis, in contrast to the 
descriptive and anecdotal approach common to the study of these historical 
incidents.1 The chapter examines market crises using British time series data from 
1700 to the present, and then employs various models using macroeconomic variables 
to extract a measure of relative speculative behaviour. While the analysis is 
somewhat rough and ready, due to the use of annual data and disagreements 
amongst economists on what constitutes a market crash or crisis, it does provide a 
starting point for more detailed studies in the future.
In brief, the chapter concludes that macroeconomic variables are important for 
driving stock price fluctuations, but can by no means account for the bulk of such 
movements. The efficient and non-efficient market models developed here appear 
to operate equally well during crisis and non-crisis years, with only a handful of 
exceptions related to periods of market crashes. These exceptions account for less 
than one fifth of all observed financial crises since 1700 and have mostly been 
described in the historical literature as arising from excessive speculative activity.
There may, therefore, be some support for the existence of speculative bubbles or 
other non-efficient market behaviour unrelated to macroeconomic variables. The last 
statement remains tentative, however, because the evidence is indirect and may 
equally be a function of model misspecification or omitted fundamentals. In any case, 
the ability of lagged variables to explain stock returns is direct evidence of non­
efficient market behaviour related to macroeconomic variables.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. The next section distinguishes two views of 
market crashes based on fundamental and non-fundamental factors, while Section III 
explores some definitional considerations. In Section IV, the impact of
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macroeconomic variables is assessed for normal stock market behaviour. Three such 
models are presented: one based on news to the market, one unrestricted 
multivariate autoregression and one restricted model with an error correction 
mechanism; the first model adheres to the efficient markets hypothesis but the latter 
two deviate from this theory by using lagged variables to predict stock returns. 
Sections V and VI set out a chronology of financial crises and then apply the 
estimated models to periods of crisis which have experienced marked prior equity 
price appreciation. Finally, Section VII concludes the chapter.
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II. Market Crises: Theoretical Approaches
The very source and definition of market crises is a subject of much debate. On the 
one hand, there are supporters of extreme versions of the efficient markets theory 
who claim that equity price movements can be wholly explained on the basis of a 
continuous stream of news to the market. Crashes therefore occur due to the arrival 
of relatively more important bits of news and are intrinsically no different than any 
other news-generated fluctuations.2
To demonstrate this point of view mathematically, note that one period expected 
equity returns are defined as
where Rt is the total return, Pt is the market price, Dt is the dividend paid on the 
stock and E is the expectations operator utilising the information set at time t.
Substituting recursively for Pt, one obtains
( l )
and gathering terms yields
(3)
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Given the existence of effective arbitrage, in equilibrium
(4) E(Rt+i) = E(rt+1 + ot+1)
where rt is the risk free rate of interest and at is the risk premium which 
compensates investors for relatively high stock market risk. Substituting (4) into (3), 
and taking first differences, gives
Equity prices therefore fluctuate due to shocks which change expectations of either 
future dividends, discount rates or the risk premium. Traditionally, these elements 
have been referred to as economic fundamentals, in contrast to other factors related 
to market psychology or irrational behaviour.
On the other hand, supporters of the market irrationality explanation of equity price 
fluctuations tend to identify crashes with reckless investment practices and the 
dashing of previous over-optimism.3 To accommodate non-fundamental elements, the 
previous analysis can be amended as follows:
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Rewrite equation (1) as 
(6 )  E (R B, t l ) ~  E { P ,t l  '  P' +ptP , t l  + B ,t l  }
where Bt is a rational bubble term which is usually motivated as an expectation of 
capital gain in excess of that justified by the present value of future dividends.
Substitute as before to obtain
Providing that the present value of p is zero, Pt and PtB are indistinguishable in an
movements are eventually compensated by short and sharp downward price revisions: 
in essence, a bubble and a crash. The p term in equation (7) is, therefore, a function 
of non-fundamental expectations and is broad enough to accommodate speculative 
tendencies arising from irrationality or emotional contagion across investors.
As discussed in Chapter I above, a realistic formulation of p with a ready application 
to financial crises is
(7) P ,B -  P , + E(/9)
where
oo i
( 8)
empirical sense.4 However, the time path of p may be such that sustained upward
(10)
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or t^+l t^+i
The first equation occurs with probability x, while the second occurs with probability 
(1-ir). x is defined as the unconditional probability that the bubble continues while 
(1-ir) is the associated probability of a crash; is IID with mean equal to zero. The 
term ( l+ r t+at)jr‘1 is greater than ( l+ r t+crt) during the duration of the bubble in 
order to compensate for the risk of the bubble bursting.
Alternatively, a broader interpretation of the p term in equation (7) ties market 
behaviour more strongly to a social and psychological structure responding to 
changing economic conditions. The essence of this school of thought can be 
succinctly described by a process of "(p)rosperity, boom, crisis, slump, and recovery 
succeed(ing) each other with a regularity that suggest(s) inevitability".5 The stock 
market is characterised here as an intrinsic element of cyclical fluctuations in the 
general economy and, due to uncertainty and the liquid nature of the market, is a 
medium for amplifying pervading waves of mass euphoria and depression.
Kindleberger (1978) catalogues dozens of these speculative episodes since the early 
18th century in Europe and the United States. In general, following Minsky (1977), 
he argues that market crises are the ultimate consequence of the credit structure in 
advanced capitalistic economies. Firms go through several stages of liquidity and 
financial structure over the business cycle, with financial fragility increasing at each 
stage as debt loads are increased. The boom conditions set off by a positive 
economic shock are reinforced by investment and speculative behaviour until it 
becomes apparent that expectations are excessive with respect to sustainable real 
growth. The process then unwinds with bankruptcy, credit contraction and downward 
revaluations of asset prices. Once the nadir is reached, the cycle turns up once more 
based on healthier firm balance sheets and the progressive lack of investor inhibition 
regarding reinvestment in securities.6
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In conclusion, several approaches can therefore be differentiated in any discussion 
of financial market crashes or crises. The efficient markets school argues for rational 
investor behaviour and the importance of economic fundamentals, while the non­
fundamentals approach stresses the roles of self-fulfilling expectations and social 
interaction; the latter approach can also be distinguished between independently 
generated rational bubbles and broader speculative tendencies which arise out of the 
economic cycle. In this chapter, such non-efficient market behaviour is classified into 
two categories, according to whether or not it is linked to macroeconomic 
information. Lastly, there may be a role for irrationality in the market; however, it 
is difficult to test for such aberrant behaviour using traditional economic techniques.
In what follows below, it will be seen that these broad crash determinant stories are 
all partially supported. In some circumstances, it seems that pre-crash returns can 
be explained by an efficient market model, while in others, it appears that non­
efficient market behaviour linked to macroeconomic variables is more appropriate. 
Finally, when neither of these two classes of models are helpful, it may be that 
rational bubbles, speculation or irrationality unrelated to the real economy are 
motivating the pre-crash share price increases. The historical narrative record and 
the nature of the data used here both conspire against reaching sharp conclusions.
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III. Market Crises: Definitional Considerations
Thus far, we have discussed stock market price determinants and crashes in a loose 
generic sense. There are considerable differences, however, on the definition of the 
point where relatively ordinary price movements degenerate into market crashes.7 
Common terms used when describing events akin to the 1987 price revaluation 
include bubble, crash, crisis, distress, deflation, mania and panic.
Bubble and mania are synonymous and have been discussed above as either 
mathematical constructs or terms used to describe excessive valuation of assets 
relative to long term sustainable levels. The terms crash, panic and (sharp) deflation 
typically refer to situations where relatively large price revisions occur over a 
relatively short time span.
Crisis and distress refer primarily to the follow on effects of the crash. First, there 
is typically a flight to liquidity by investors and a commensurate raising of risk 
premiums on all lesser liquid assets. Secondly, this increased demand for liquidity 
may prompt illiquidity within the banking and financial system as calls on loans, 
credit rationing and bank runs become widespread. Lastly, general economic activity 
may be affected by instability in the credit system, increases in the cost of capital and 
wealth effects issuing from the price revaluation.8
The view taken here is that all of these events either describe or impact upon the 
stock market through the functioning of arbitrage relationships between credit and 
other financial assets and through the linkages between investor sentiment in industry 
and the stock market. Therefore, an encompassing approach will be taken here by 
examining all such incidents described in the historical literature. A consequence of 
this approach is that the terms defined above will be used interchangeably 
throughout the chapter.
Before setting down a crisis chronology and examining any common tendencies, it 
is appropriate to examine the extent to which macroeconomic variables drive the 
equity market in every day circumstances and then move from there to an
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examination of such influences at times of crisis. The base models developed will be 
used to test the extent to which the efficient markets view is appropriate, recognising 
of course that unexplained residuals can stem from inadequate model specification, 
unobserved fundamentals or non-fundamental speculative tendencies in the market.
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IV. Stock Returns and Macroeconomic Information
This section examines the explanatory power of various macroeconomic magnitudes 
for stock returns in the United Kingdom since 1700. The variables examined are the 
growth rates of real industrial production and the real monetary base, consumer price 
inflation, long and short term interest rates and the ratio of armed forces 
employment to the general population.9 These measures will be correlated to various 
definitions of equity returns using three different modelling strategies: a vector 
autoregression (VAR) news generating process, an unrestricted multivariate 
autoregression employing lagged, current and leading values and a restricted error 
correction model. As will become apparent, all three approaches yield similar results 
in terms of the influence of macroeconomic information on the stock market.
Table 1 describes the data and suggests a useful partition that will be employed 
elsewhere in the chapter. The most important split in the series comes after 1913, 
with the end of the classical gold standard and the start of World War I. A second 
split occurs after 1949 with the end of post-war price controls and the beginning of 
the reintroduction of market forces to financial markets. Following 1913, it can be 
seen that the levels of inflation and interest rates increased markedly, as well as the 
volatility of equity returns and interest rates. The use of the 1913-1987 sample 
disguises the weak and volatile nature of industrial production in the wartime and 
interwar period but is necessary in what follows in order to preserve the degrees of 
freedom required for a robust VAR investigation. The last point to note is the 
negative average equity premium; this occurs due to the absence of a full sample 
dividend yield series which would restore the equity return series to its correct 
positive value.10
Tables 2 to 4 present the results from the first model, a VAR news generation 
mechanism which is consistent with efficient market prescriptions. Relative to the 
other models to come, this approach uses a limited set of information; it therefore 
unsurprisingly produces the weakest results in favour of the fundamentals view of 
equity pricing. Briefly, the approach is as follows. First, a VAR system is constructed 
using the five macroeconomic variables and squared stock returns to proxy for risk.
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Secondly, the residuals from each VAR become the news variables which are entered 
into the equity return equations shown in Tables 2 to 4.11
Throughout the three tables, one sees that interest rate shocks are the predominant 
elements correlated with equity returns, followed by industrial production and 
inflation shocks. All coefficients are of the appropriate signs except for the poorly 
determined armed forces variable, which is positive in the earliest period.12,13 The 
size of the coefficients generally rise from the early to the later period, with the 
exception of the inflation term in the real return equation and interest rates. In spite 
of this, the adjusted R squared value declines over time. Altogether, macroeconomic 
news accounts for up to one third of equity price variability and depends on a news 
generation process using information no more than two years old, as evidenced by 
the rapidly declining adjusted R squared values as further lags are added to the 
VARs. We see, therefore, that in a limited information model, the efficient markets 
theory produces sensible coefficients but leaves the bulk of market fluctuations 
unaccounted for across both crisis and non-crisis years.
The other end of the modelling spectrum is investigated in Table 5, which excludes 
full sample results because of their similarity to those shown in the table. Following 
Cutler et al (1988), adjusted R squared values are given for multivariate 
autoregressions of equity returns on macroeconomic variables.14 The first column 
shows the results using lagged values only and the other two columns progressively 
add current and next period variables. The aim here is to set a notional upper limit 
to the explanatory power of macroeconomic factors by including current and future 
values, in contrast to the sparseness of the news regressions above. Since lagged 
variables are used to predict stock returns, this model and the restricted error 
correction model to come are evidence of non-efficient markets behaviour linked to 
macroeconomic variables.
Once again, the short equity premium produces the weakest results, especially for 
regressions including only lagged variables. The inclusion of leading variables makes 
very little difference to the explanatory power, except in the case of the short equity 
premium prior to 1913. In contrast to the news regressions, macroeconomic
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information now accounts for up to one half of equity price variation. This 
explanatory power is likely overstated due to the use of averaged variables but is 
understated to the extent that other important variables, in particular dividends, are 
excluded from the regressions.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of a restricted equation augmented with an error 
correction mechanism. The integration results shown in Table 6 indicate that all of 
the variables aside from armed forces employment are integrated of order one. It is 
therefore appropriate to use first differences of the variables in the restricted 
equation, as has previously been done with the other two models. The cointegrating 
equations also suggest that long term bilateral equilibrium relationships exist between 
stock prices and these variables, with the exceptions of long interest rates and the 
armed forces ratio to total population. As seen in the sixth row of the table, all of 
the variables are jointly cointegrated with stock prices.15
Table 7 indicates that the estimated coefficients of the final restricted regression are 
well specified and that the equation passes standard diagnostic tests.16 The steps 
taken to impose linear and exclusion restrictions on the general specification may be 
retraced by examining the table from left to right and by studying the F test statistics 
at the bottom. Note that the data favour a specification in second differences, 
indicating that the equity return series is correlated to acceleration terms as well as 
to the long term level effects embodied in the error correction term.
The exclusion of the armed forces employment and industrial production variables 
in acceleration form may be an indication that the stock market responds more 
closely to financial factors expressed in this way, like money supply, interest rates and 
inflation, rather than to variables more closely linked to the real economy; if this is 
generally true, the Fisher/Minsky/Kindleberger means of shock transmission at times 
of accelerated activity may operate primarily through the financial system rather than 
the real economy. Another point to note is the gold standard dummy variable which 
accommodates the switch in monetary institutions that took place this century. It 
mainly acts to segregate the effects of inflation on equity returns into a completely 
neutral gold standard period and a strongly negative period off of the gold
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standard.17
The restricted equation coefficients indicate that accelerations in interest rates and 
inflation are detrimental for equity returns, while acceleration in the real money base 
is positively correlated. The existence of effective arbitrage and the theoretical 
literature on the costs of inflation support the first finding, while the second can 
possibly be explained as a short term response to easing of monetary conditions. The 
error correction term is well specified in all of the equations shown in Table 7 as the 
value -.07 and implies that equity returns converge to long term equilibrium with the 
macroeconomic variables after periods measured in decades. Finally, the R bar 
squared value, though small in magnitude, is comparable to the VAR results 
discussed above.
All in all, we have developed three different models of equity returns in this section. 
Each specification has its own merits in terms of theoretical plausibility and empirical 
fit and the hope is that the three approximate the spectrum of modelling possibilities 
in a parsimonious manner. The models will now be used to investigate whether 
macroeconomic information is the predominant factor in explaining equity returns 
prior to crises or whether there is a large residual which may be attributable to 
rational bubbles or other non-efficient markets behaviour divorced from the 
macroeconomy. In addition, since the restricted model incorporates only financial 
factors, it may be possible to indicate wh'ere prior returns are generated by real or 
financial variables by comparing the restricted model results with the more fully 
encompassing VARs.
99
V. Financial Crisis Chronology
The preceding section concluded that efficient and non-efficient market models of 
equity pricing can account for up to one half of market fluctuations. While this 
establishes the importance of macroeconomic factors, it still leaves a rather large 
unexplained residual. In addition, it does not directly examine periods when market 
crashes have occurred, dissimilar as they seem to be to more stable periods. This 
section will therefore outline a chronology of financial crises and discuss the 
preceding economic and market activity that may have prompted the crashes.
Table 8 lists the years, sources and purported causes underlying British crises since 
1700. As the definitional section above made clear, there is little agreement on the 
essence of a crash and so any reference to a crash or panic that was found in the 
relevant sources is included in the table. Even if some of these years did not produce 
market movements on the scale of October 1987, the fact that crises, crashes or signs 
of distress were noted is sufficient to consider whether there were measurable 
predeterminants underlying the events. For, if a rational bubble story of crashes is 
correct, it is reasonable to think that there is a sustained period of excessive 
speculative activity prior to a crash or crisis.18
As can be seen from the sources column, there is not a great deal of overlap 
between different accounts. Morgenstem (1959), in particular, lists a number of stock 
market crashes which are not mentioned elsewhere but he unfortunately does not 
provide original sources. It is also difficult to give an exact date for each crisis 
because of conflicting narrative accounts, sometimes even from the same source.19 
One should therefore not be overly confident that any individual account is 
authoritative.
The origins of the crises seem to fall into at least four categories: threat of war, 
international transmission, excessive speculation and feedback from the real 
economy.20 While the first two are presumably verifiable on the basis of historical 
record, the latter two are somewhat subjective; the third explanation, especially, 
could be attributed without evidence to almost any market crisis. It is therefore
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necessary to examine the prior movements of the market to determine whether a 
potential rational bubble or other non-efficient market behaviour divorced from the 
real economy existed in prices prior to a crash.21
A number of points can be made about the a priori evidence from Table 9.22 First, 
relatively few of the crises were preceded by substantial price appreciation. Of the 
41 listed crisis years, only 12 show 1, 2 or 5 year prior returns which are statistically 
different from the sample averages at conventional significance levels.23 A number 
of crises, for example those of 1816, 1878 and 1904, are actually preceded by 
substantial and sustained price declines; in this vein, the importance of inflation 
adjustment is seen in the cases of 1921 and 1974. Second, the equity return from the 
crisis to the following year, shown in the first column and demonstrating the relative 
magnitude of the crash, is usually substantial and negative. The most eventful years 
in terms of market decline appear to be 1720,1797,1866,1921,1929,1940,1973 and 
1974; looking back to Table 8, it appears that the there is, however, no common 
causal element linking these years. A last point to note is the weak effect seen in the 
returns series for some years; either the crash was of small magnitude or else the 
market rebounded substantially within the crisis year.
In general, it appears from this simple examination that the rational bubble theory, 
like that based on the use of macroeconomic variables in efficient and non-efficient 
market models, can have at most only partial application to financial crashes. We 
turn now to a more sophisticated examination of the cases where prior speculation 
may have been in existence in order to measure the relative importance of 
macroeconomic factors during the years prior to market crashes.
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VI. Estimated Models and Market Crises
The segregation of returns prior to crises into elements related to, and separate 
from, macroeconomic variables employs the three models developed in Section IV 
above. Three points should be stressed in what follows. First, the failure of 
macroeconomic factors to account for excessive equity*retums prior to crisis years 
can be attributed to either non-efficient market explanations unrelated to the real 
economy, or else to misspecified or missing variables in the estimation equation.
Second, the models being used should not be interpreted as belonging to the 
investors’ information set at the onset of each crash; rather, the fitted equations 
represent long term relationships which the crisis and non-crisis years alike should 
match if they are generated by the same underlying data generation process. A more 
detailed study utilising higher frequency data will be required to investigate models 
which satisfy information orthogonality with respect to returns.
Third, the residual returns which are generated by the estimated models test a null 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the model residuals 
generated over the full sample compared to those prior to times of financial crisis, 
against an alternative that such prior returns are significantly greater than the sample 
average. The test is therefore robust to examining rational bubbles, which are 
generally thought to be positively trending, but is not appropriate for testing non­
efficient market behaviour divorced from the real economy, such as noise trading, 
which does necessarily produce positive autocorrelation of returns.
Tables 10 and 11 present the results for the macroeconomic news model.24 The 
returns shown are estimation residuals aggregated over 1, 2 and 5 years before a 
given crisis year; they are therefore directly comparable to the actual returns in 
Table 9. Of the 15 cases selected from that table,25 roughly one half show evidence 
of residual returns that are significantly greater than the average produced by the 
news model; the macroeconomic news model therefore fails to account for the 
substantial rise in the market prior to the crises in these years. Only the crises of 
1720,1763,1836 and 1973 follow the expected rational bubble pattern, however, with
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the strength and significance of the residual return increasing from 5 or 2 years 
before the crash to the event itself. All of the others either peak more than two years 
before the crash or are too small in magnitude; in either case, the rational bubble 
theory is not easily supported without substantial modification to account for time 
lags in speculative response to the bull market peak.
Table 12 extends the same analysis to the unrestricted multivariate autoregression 
model, which falls under a non-efficient market paradigm.26 Less than half of the 
potential rational bubble generated crashes now display residual returns which are 
excessive from the point of view of the estimated model. In addition, those residuals 
which are greater than the average do so at a lower level of significance. The years 
which follow an expected rational bubble pattern, with significance levels increasing 
as the crash draws nearer, are restricted, as before, to 1720, 1763, 1836 and 1973. 
The 1987 crash is notable not only for the fact that it culminated the greatest bull 
market since 1700, as seen in Table 9, but also that this run is largely explained by 
the estimated model. In support of the results from Chapter I, it is therefore difficult 
to resort to a bubble explanation for most of the price appreciation prior to 1987.27
Turning now to Table 13, one sees that the restricted model produces the same 
general conclusions as the other two models. Approximately two thirds of the years 
exhibit evidence of significant residual activity, although typical rational bubble 
behaviour is limited to 1720,1763,1825 and 1973. In common with the nominal news 
model, 1987 appears to be a crisis year where excessive returns developed two years 
prior to the crash. Given that the other models indicate that 1987 was not unusual 
in real terms, it may be that the possible rational bubble suggested by this table and 
by the nominal returns analysis of Table 11 was generated by real macroeconomic 
factors which are excluded from the models underlying these tables.
Tables 10 to 13 have uncovered a number of crisis years when the macroeconomic 
models are not able to account for prior returns. In years such as 1715, 1847 and 
1895, when prior residual returns are statistically excessive only under the restricted 
(financial) model and the nominal news model, but not when generated by the other 
models, it may be that real macroeconomic factors are determining the equity return
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process.
In the case of 1836, the residual returns are higher than normal only under the news 
and unrestricted multivariate autoregression models. This result may indicate that the 
returns are generated by financial factors which the restricted model is able to 
explain.
The last permutation, where excessively positive returns are found under all three 
models, applies most strongly to 1720, 1825 and 1973 and, with provision for lags in 
response to speculative activity, 1866 and 1873. In these cases, the way is open for 
explanations ranging from rational bubbles to irrational mania and delusion. It is 
noteworthy that the efficient market model, using only macroeconomic news, and the 
non-efficient market models which incorporate lagged variables, are in broad 
agreements on the years which are unexplained by macroeconomic information.
VII. Conclusions
The conclusions of the chapter can be summarised as follows.
First, there seems to be a structural break in the British economy’s underlying data 
generation process after 1913. This may be related to the expiration of the classical 
gold standard at that time and the subsequent introduction of substantive government 
fiscal and monetary policies. In any case, it is important to account for structural 
change in institutions over the period 1700 to present in any examination of the stock 
market.
Second, macroeconomic factors account for up to one half of fluctuations in equity 
market returns; the unexplained residual element from all of the models is, therefore, 
rather large. The unrestricted multivariate autoregression model provides the best 
data fit, albeit at the cost of theoretical rigour, while the poorest fit comes from the 
news model using long variable lags. In general, most macroeconomic information 
is embodied in variables with lags no longer than two periods. The success of models 
which use lagged variables to explain equity returns suggests that the efficient 
markets hypothesis cannot fully explain such returns.
Third, a comprehensive list of financial crises of all types reveals that these are 
triggered by a number of factors. Those preceded by substantially positive equity 
returns are relatively few, amounting to approximately one third of the total since 
1700. When the estimated models are applied to explaining this subset of crises, 
there is strong evidence for possible rational bubble-like activity unrelated to 
macroeconomic variables in only three years: 1720, 1825 and 1973. The other crisis 
years for which prior returns are high are explained by real or financial factors or 
else reach a peak in returns more than two years before the crisis.
The dichotomy between the fundamental and speculative explanations of market 
crises is not, therefore, completely resolved. On the one hand, the macroeconomic 
variables models account for less than half of the fluctuations in the equity market. 
On the other hand, there seem to be only a handful of potential rational bubbles
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over the three centuries under examination which cannot be explained by the 
macroeconomic models. A more detailed study utilising disaggregated and higher 
frequency data will, therefore, probably be needed to eventually resolve the issues 
examined here.
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1. Three important exceptions are Zamowitz (1989), Garber (1989) and the contributors 
to the Capie and Wood (1986) compilation of papers on financial crises.
2. See Fama (1970) on the traditional definitions of market efficiency with respect to 
news and Hardouvelis (1987) and Jain (1988) for empirical estimates of the reaction of 
stock prices to macroeconomic news.
3. See Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) for a detailed exposition 
of this theory of asset pricing.
4. Indeed, Summers (1986) shows that the power to distinguish between random walk 
pricing processes generated by a fundamentals model and a pricing profile generated by 
an autoregressive bubble process is very weak.
5. Ashton (1959), p. 136.
6. One empirical application of Minsky’s theory for the recent evolution of the Canadian 
economy is found in Seccareccia (1988).
7. It may seem somewhat odd that rapid upward revisions to price levels are not treated 
with the same seriousness by economists that similar downward movements provoke. 
Within the stock market, there are always two sides to any bargain and, following a price 
change, the ex post gain of one investor (the seller or purchaser of the stock) is had at 
the expense of the other (the buyer or seller of the stock); this state of affairs obviously 
holds for both upward and downward price movements.
The asymmetry of interest on this question is probably related to the knock-on economic 
effects of crashes on confidence, monetary stability and investor wealth. As well, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note that subjective valuations of capital gains and losses 
differ, with the perceived marginal cost of the latter higher than the perceived marginal 
benefit of the former; investors therefore tend to focus more attention on market 
downturns. Lastly, downward revisions to aggregate investor wealth may run up against 
collateral or other liquidity constraints which prompt investors to sell further assets and 
therefore reinforce the original price decline. On upward ticks, the regret felt on the 
part of the investor on the "wrong” side of the bargain is in terms of unrealised 
accretions to wealth; the only liquidity constraint here is the opportunity cost of foregone 
investments which could have been funded from the higher ex post equity valuation.
8. An early distinction between panics and crises is found in Powell (1913), where the 
latter is characterised by financial illiquidity in the financial system and the former 
describes the emotional panic experienced during the crisis. Schwartz (1986, p. 11) 
suggests a division between financial and pseudo-financial crises (or distress) by arguing 
that the former is short-lived and is "fueled by fears that means of payment will be 
unobtainable at any price", while the latter may be drawn out over time and is "a 
consequence of restricted growth of bank reserves but is not precipitated by the public’s 
behaviour". Hoppit (1986) likewise makes a distinction for 18th century British crises 
between those related to public finance, typically of a local nature with a London locus, 
and those impinging more directly on private (business) finance. As the 18th century 
progressed, crises apparently became more far reaching in effect due to the growth of 
the provincial banking system and of the financial and economic connections between 
London and other regions.
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9. The data are described fully in Appendix I above and are all expressed in natural 
logarithms, with the exception of interest rates. It has been necessary to use annual 
averages in order to obtain a full sample from 1700 to the present; as a result, the 
estimated regressions specify correlations between averaged variables and do not 
examine the random behaviour of the underlying data generation process.
10. Most recent research indicates that dividends are a relatively smooth series over 
time, in contrast to the volatility of equity prices, cf. Marsh and Merton (1987). If this 
observation is assumed to hold for the full sample, it is likely that the absence of the 
dividend-price ratio does not alter our results substantially. As noted in Appendix I 
above, consistent dividend yield data are available only from 1919.
11. Formal LM(2) tests for autocorrelation of these residuals show that a null hypothesis 
of a random process against an AR(2)/MA(2) alternative cannot be rejected. As shown 
in the Memorandum items in Tables 2 to 4, the highest F-test value of 1.34 was that for 
short interest rate news, a value which is insignificant at conventional levels.
12. This variable is both a proxy for government expenditure, and therefore pressure on 
financial markets for funds, and for wartime effects on the stock market. Prior to the 
most recent period, British governments financed wartime expenditure by issuing debt 
since conventional means of raising revenue, in the absence of widespread taxation, were 
inadequate during times of stress, cf. Dickson (1967). The manpower variable is used 
here in preference to a series based on actual expenditure because of data limitations.
13. The changing coefficients on the inflation variable before and after 1913 may be 
related to the shift in monetary institutions which occurred at that time. See Chapter II 
above for a fuller discussion of this and related issues.
14. In contrast to Cutler et al (1988), all of the included variables are stationary, a 
prerequisite for applying standard asymptotic theory to VARs. Column 1 regresses stock 
returns on lagged macroeconomic values and squared returns, column 2 adds current 
macroeconomic values and column 3 adds one period ahead macroeconomic values.
It should be noted that the absence of a dividend yield series substantial biases 
downward the explanatory power of the equations, given the result in the Cutler et al 
paper that the dividend yield is usually the most important explanatory factor for 
historical U.S. real returns. It is therefore likely that the explanatory power of the 
macroeconomic variables would be considerably higher if additional data were available.
15. Further investigation of the relationship between interest rates and stock prices 
revealed that cointegration is supported for 1705 to 1913 (t-statistic of -3.00 significant 
at 5% level) but is weaker for 1914 to 1987 (t-statistic of -2.63 significant at 10% level). 
The error correction mechanism from the cointegrating regression using all five variables 
is employed in the real stock return restricted equation below. Real returns are used in 
preference to nominal returns due to the stronger evidence for integration and 
cointegration.
16. The Chow test statistics support previous evidence indicating that there is a structural 
break after 1913. The full sample restricted equation is used, nevertheless, in order to 
examine crashes over time with a common model. The structural change has been
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accommodated by using subsample means and standard deviations to calculate 
significance levels.
17. The gold standard dummy variable takes the value 1 from 1700 to 1797,1821 to 1914 
and 1925 to 1932. The negative effect of inflation acceleration largely stems from the 
sharply different data generation processes at work before and after 1913: inflation was 
strongly mean reverting in the earlier period and highly persistent in the latter. The gold 
standard effect is not a proxy for a wartime effect, since appropriate dummy variables 
used to account for both interstate and global wars are not significantly different from 
zero at the 10 percent level. See Appendix I above for further details of these dummy 
variables.
18. Weil (1989) notes, however, that theoretical bubbles can be generated which lead 
to price declines, rather than increases. The intuition behind the result is that the 
presence of the bubble depresses the value of the fundamentals term by raising the 
discount rate to such an extent that total fundamental plus bubble return is declining 
over time. The notion seems to be impractical on a real world basis since it calls for 
negative interest elasticities of demand by savers. In addition, as a practical matter, the 
fact that annual values are used in this chapter means that bubbles which last for less 
than one year are generally undetectable.
19. For example, see the separate Kindleberger (1978) dates for the 1857 crisis.
20. It should be noted that there are multiple causes of many, if not most, of these 
market crises. The selection shown in the third column of Table 8 are merely those 
stressed by the relevant source.
21. It is also of interest to note that crises triggered by political factors are often 
unexpected and, therefore, not necessarily accompanied by prior speculation in the 
equity market. The crashes of 1761, 1914 and 1940 bear out this point.
22. Both nominal and real returns are shown in Table 9 for a number of reasons. First, 
standard economic theory implies that real magnitudes motivate investor behaviour. 
Second, given that crashes sometimes occur on a shorter time scale than the data at 
hand, the inflation element at a time of crisis may be irrelevant relative to the size of 
the equity price change. Third, as Table 1 demonstrates, there was a marked change in 
the inflation process after 1913 which upwardly biases nominal returns. The first and 
third reasons argue for analyzing real returns while the second supports examining 
nominal returns. In any case, the results using both approaches are broadly in 
agreement. It should also be noted that the relatively high volatility of real returns may 
be related to the influence of grain prices in the consumer price deflator.
23. Means and standard deviations were calculated for three periods, pre 1913, post 1913 
and full sample, to account for changing economic structure. As well, previous year 1, 
2 and 5 year equity returns were employed where the crisis occurred in the first half of 
the year or where it appeared that the peak of a potential speculative bubble occurred 
prior to the crisis year. In no case did these permutations alter the choice of years 
exhibiting statistically significant prior returns.
24. The full sample models for real and nominal stock returns are used to generate the 
residual returns.
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25. The cases all demonstrate prior returns which are significantly greater than the 
sample average at the 10% level. As well, the crises of 1810, 1895 and 1901 have prior 
returns which are marginally significant at that level.
26. The analysis is identical for both nominal and real returns since each equation is a 
linear transformation of the other. The full sample model includes only one and two 
period lagged variables to generate the residual returns.
27. The large size of the residual does not, however, rule out the total absence of 
excessive speculative activity.
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Sample Data
Variable 1700 
to 1913
1914 
to 1987
1830 
to 1913
1914 
to 1949
1950 
to 1987
Nominal 0.6 4.8 0.8 2.7 6.8
Stock Return (8.9) (15.6) (7.6) (14.1) (16.8)
Real 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.6 0.2
Stock Return (10.4) (17.0) (8.0) (153) (183)
Long Equity -3.1 -1.2 -2.2 -1.1 -13
Premium (9.1) (16.0) (7.7) (143) (17.6)
Short Equity N/A -0.1 -2.5 03 -03
Premium N/A (16.1) (8.0) (14.4) (17.8)
Inflation Rate 0.0 4.4 0.0 2.1 6.7
(7.1) (6.9) (53) (8.0) (4.9)
Long Interest 3.7 6.0 3.1 3.8 8.1
Rate (0.9) (33) (03) (0.7) (3.4)
Short Interest N/A 4.9 33 23 7.3
Rate N/A (3.8) (1.2) (1.8) (3.8)
Industrial 2.0 1.8 2.6 1.3 23
Production
Growth
(7.6) (7.8) (4.7) (10.7) (3.6)
Note: Numbers on the first line of each set are sample means and those on the second 
are standard deviations. All variables are in nominal terms, with the exception of 
industrial production, the equity premiums and real stock prices. The long and short 
equity premiums are calculated as stock returns less long and short interest rates.
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Table 2: Pre-1913 Stock Market Returns and Macroeconomic News
VAR
Lags
Industrial Real Interest Army & Navy 
Production Money Rate Employment
Inflation
Rate
R-bar
Squared
Real Stock Returns: 1705-1913
1,2 0.15 0.07 -12.86 0.01 -0.74 .352
(1-5) (1.7) (5.8) (0.2) (7.2)
1,23 0.16 0.05 -13.58 0.01 -0.76 334
(1.5) (1.1) (5.7) (0.2) (7.0)
Long Equity Premium: 1705-1913
1,2 0.15 0.07 -13.86 0.01 0.26 .199
(1.5) (1.7) (6.5) (0.2) (2.7)
1,2,3 0.16 0.05 -14.58 0.01 0.24 .163
(1.6) (1.1) (6.4) (0.2) (23)
Short Equity Premium: 1830-1913
1,2 0.57 0.19 -1.73 -0.07 0.46 .093
(23) (1.4) (1.5) (0.6) (2.0)
1,23 0.54 0.19 -1.54 -0.05 0.51 -.010
(2.1) (13) (13) (0.4) (2.1)
Memorandum: LM(2) Test for Whiteness of News
Real Returns and Long Equity Premium
1,2 0.63 0.93 0.44 0.46 0.15
1,23 0.27 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.22
Short Equity Premium
1,2 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.05
1,23 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.12
Note: All variables are expressed as natural logarithms; industrial production and real 
money (MO) are first differences of the original data in levels. The interest rate used in 
the short premium regressions is the 3 month commercial paper rate while the 3% 
consol rate is used elsewhere. R-bar squared is calculated as 1 - {(T-1)/(T-K)}{1-R2}, 
where T is the sample size, K is the degrees of freedom and R squared is from the 
original regression.
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Table 3: Post-1913 Stock Market Returns and Macroeconomic News
VAR
Lags
Industrial Real Interest 
Production Money Rate
Army & Navy 
Employment
Inflation
Rate
R-bar
Squared
Real Stock Returns: 1914-1987
1,2 0.55 0.34 -8.93 -0.10 -0.38 .078
(1.7) (0.6) (3.2) (0.9) (0.4)
1,23 0.58 0.29 -9.05 -0.07 -0.47 -.041
(1.6) (0.4) (2.8) (0.6) (0.5)
Long Equity Premium: 1914-1987
1,2 0.55 034 -9.93 -0.10 0.62 .097
(1.8) (0.6) (3.8) (1.0) (0.7)
1,23 0.58 0.29 -10.05 -0.07 0.53 -.033
(1.7) (03) (3.4) (0.7) (0.6)
Short Equity Premium: 1914-1987
1,2 0.75 0.18 -437 -0.06 0.27 .046
(2.4) (03) (2.9) (0.6) (0.3)
1,23 0.81 0.06 -3.74 -0.01 -0.04 -.096
(23) (0.1) (2.0) (0.1) (0.5)
Memorandum: LM(2) Test for Whiteness of News
Real Returns and Long Equity Premium
1,2 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.66 0.11
1,23 0.08 0.20 0.16 038 0.29
Short Equity Premium
1,2 0.11 031 0.60 0.82 0.16
1,23 0.12 0.27 0.04 0.46 036
Note: All variables are expressed as natural logarithms; industrial production and real 
money (MO) are first differences of the original data in levels. The interest rate used in 
the short premium regressions is the 3 month commercial paper rate while the 3% 
consol rate is used elsewhere. R-bar squared is calculated as 1 - {(T-1)/(T-K)}{1-R }, 
where T is the sample size, K is the degrees of freedom and R squared is from the 
original regression.
113
Table 4: Stock Market Returns and Macroeconomic News - Full Sample
VAR
Lags
Industrial Real Interest 
Production Money Rate
Army & Navy 
Employment
Inflation
Rate
R-bar
Squared
Real Stock Returns: 1705-1987
1,2 0.31
(2.9)
0.07
(1.5)
-8.84
(6.2)
-0.02
(0.7)
-0.70
(6.0)
.247
1,2,3 031
(2.9)
0.06
(13)
-8.90
(6.1)
-0.02
(0.8)
-0.70
(5.9)
.231
Long Equity Premium: 1705-1987
1,2 0.31
(3.1)
0.07
(1.6)
-9.84
(73)
-0.02
(0.8)
030
(2.8)
.185
1,23 031
(3.1)
0.06
(1.4)
-9.87
(7.1)
-0.02
(0.8)
030
(2.7)
.160
Short Equity Premium: 1830-1987
1,2 0.69
(4.0)
0.11
(0.7)
-3.42
(3.9)
-0.06
(1.1)
036
(13)
.130
1,23 0.66
(3.7)
0.10
(0.6)
-3.27
(3.2)
-0.05
(0.9)
037
(13)
.066
Memorandum: LM(2) Test for Whiteness of News
Real Returns and Long Equity Premium
1,2
1A3
039
033
0.64
0.16
0.28
0.10
0.10
0.03
0.13
0.15
Short Equity Premium
1,2
133
0.42
030
0.14
0.11
134
0.14
0.10
0.03
0.06
0.09
Note: All variables are expressed as natural logarithms; industrial production and real 
money (MO) are first differences of the original data in levels. The interest rate used in 
the short premium regressions is the 3 month commercial paper rate while the 3% 
consol rate is used elsewhere. R-bar squared is calculated as 1 - {(T-1)/(T-K)}{1-R2}, 
where T is the sample size, K is the degrees of freedom and R squared is from the 
original regression.
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Table 5: Stock Returns and Unrestricted Autoregression
VAR Lagged Variables Lagged and Current Lagged, Current
Lags Only Variables and Leading
Pre-1913 Equations
Real Stock Returns (1705-1913)
2 .154 .548 .563
3 .145 .551 .565
4 .125 .558 .568
Long Equity Premium (1705-1913)
2 .162 399 .420
3 .173 .403 .422
4 .177 .412 .426
Short Equity Premium (1830-1913)
2 .063 .242 .484
3 .058 .197 .441
4 .061 336 .431
Post-1913 Equations
Real Stock Returns (1914-1986)
2 .236 .443 .438
3 .234 .419 .430
4 .184 379 385
Long Equity Premium (1914-1986)
2 .153 374 368
3 .163 347 359
4 .101 .303 .309
Short Equity Premium (1914-1986)
2 .163 322 .420
3 .177 .285 .421
4 .113 .217 366
Note: All variables are expressed as natural logarithms and are stationary; the variables 
are interest and inflation rates, growth in real MO and industrial production, army and 
navy employment relative to total population and squared one year stock returns. 
Current and leading values of the squared stock return are not included in the 
regressions. The interest rate used in the short premium regressions is the 3 month 
commercial paper rate while the 3% consol rate is used elsewhere. R-bar squared is 
calculated as 1 - {(T-1)/(T-K)}{1-R2}, where T is the sample size, K is the degrees of 
freedom and R squared is from the original regression.
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T a b l e  6 :  I n t e g r a t i o n  a n d  C o i n t e g r a t i o n  R e s u l t s : 1 7 0 5  t o  1 9 8 7
V a r i a b l e  O ne U n i t  R o o t  Two U n i t  R o o t s C o i n t e g r a t i o n  
w i t h  
S t o c k  P r i c e s
N o m i n a l R e a l
L o n g  I n t e r e s t  R a t e - 1 . 9 4 - 1 2 . 0 1 1 - 1 . 8 6 - 2 . 1 4
A rm ed  F o r c e s  t o  
P o p u l a t i o n  R a t i o
- 5 . 1 6 1 - 9 . 5 3 1 1 . 9 1 - 1 . 9 3
L e v e l  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  
P r o d u c t i o n
0 . 5 4 - 1 7 . 4 2 1 0 . 2 5 - 3 . 7 2 1
C o n s u m e r  P r i c e  
L e v e l
2 . 5 7 - 1 0 . 7 6 1 - 2 . 6 0 5 - 2 . 6 0 5
L e v e l  o f  R e a l  MO - 1 . 3 8 - 1 4 . 6 0 1 - 0 . 0 7 - 3 . 8 1 1
A l l  A b o v e N/A N /A - 4 . 1 2 1 - 4 . 1 2 1
S t o c k  P r i c e  L e v e l 1 . 9 1 - 1 2 . 9 7 1 N /A N/A
R e a l  S t o c k  P r i c e  
L e v e l
- 2 . 0 0 - 1 2 . 9 9  1 N /A N/A
N o t e :  , a n d  10 a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%, 5% a n d  10% l e v e l s
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  c u m u l a t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t a b l e  g i v e n  i n  F u l l e r  
( 1 9 7 6 ,  p . 3 7 3 ) .
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T a b l e 7 :  R e s t r i c t e d  E q u a t i o n  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s
V a r i a b l e  L ag G e n e r a l R e s t r i c t e d  G o l d  S t a n d a r d F i n a l
E q u a t i o n
F i r s t  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  V a r i a b l e s
G o l d  S t a n d a r d  
O f f  On O f f  On
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  (5 )
C o n s t a n t  0 . 0 3  0 . 0 1  0 . 0 1  0 . 0 1  0 . 0 1
( 1 . 6 )  ( 0 . 7 )  ( 0 . 7 )  ( 0 . 6 )  ( 0 . 6 )
I n t e r e s t  R a t e  - 1  - 8 . 3 4  - 8 . 1 4  - 8 . 3 3  - 6 . 6 5  - 1 . 0 9  - 6 . 9 6
( 5 . 1 )  ( 5 . 3 )  ( 5 . 5 )  ( 4 . 0 )  ( 0 . 3 )  ( 4 . 9 )
- 2  7 . 7 6
( 3 . 1 )
- 3  0 . 2 7
(0 . 2)
R e a l  M oney  - 1  0 . 0 3  0 . 0 6  0 . 0 6  0 . 0 1  0 . 0 5  0 . 0 5
S u p p l y  G r o w th  ( 0 . 5 )  ( 2 . 1 )  ( 2 . 1 )  ( 0 . 1 )  ( 0 . 4 )  ( 1 . 9 )
- 2  - 0 . 1 1
(2 . 1)
- 3  - 0 . 0 5
(1 . 0)
I n f l a t i o n  - 1  - 0 . 0 7  - 0 . 1 7  - 0 . 1 7  - 0 . 6 6  0 . 6 9  - 0 . 6 1  0 . 6 4
R a t e  ( 0 . 5 )  ( 1 . 9 )  ( 1 . 9 )  ( 3 . 3 )  ( 3 . 1 )  ( 4 . 3 )  ( 3 . 8 )
- 2  0 . 1 2
( 0 . 9 )
- 3  - 0 . 1 5
( 1 . 3 )
I n d u s t r i a l  - 1  - 0 . 3 1  0 . 0 2
P r o d u c t i o n  ( 2 . 7 )  ( 0 . 3 )
G r o w th
- 2  - 0 . 3 6
( 3 . 2 )
- 3  0 . 0 3
( 0 . 3 )
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Table 7: Restricted Equation Regression Results continued
V a r i a b l e  L ag  G e n e r a l  R e s t r i c t e d  G o l d  S t a n d a r d  F i n a l
E q u a t i o n
F i r s t  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  V a r i a b l e s
G o l d  S t a n d a r d  
O f f  On O f f  On
A rm ed  F o r c e s  - 1  - 0 . 0 4  - 0 . 0 2
t o  P o p u l a t i o n  ( 1 . 2 )  ( 0 . 9 )
R a t i o
- 2  0 . 0 2
( 0 . 4 )
- 3  0 . 0 2
(0 . 6 )
S q u a r e d  - 1  0 . 3 3  0 . 3 6  0 . 3 5
R e t u r n s  ( 1 . 2 )  ( 1 . 8 )  ( 1 . 7 )
- 2 - 0 . 3 5
( 1 . 2 )
- 3 0 . 3 3
( 1 . 3 )
E r r o r  - 1  
C o r r e c t i o n
- 0 . 0 7
( 2 . 7 )
- 0 . 0 7
( 3 . 0 )
- 0 . 0 7
( 3 . 0 )
R - b a r  S q u a r e d 0 . 1 6 7 0 . 1 4 2 0 . 1 4 6
LM(2) F - t e s t 0 . 2 0 0 . 4 1 0 . 4 8
Chow t e s t  a t  1 9 1 3 2 . 6 7 2 . 3 1 2 . 2 9
- 0 . 0 7  - 0 . 0 7
( 2 . 8 ) ( 2 . 8 )
0 . 1 7 3  0 . 1 7 8
0 . 3 4  0 . 4 2
2 . 3 0  2 . 2 9
( a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%)
R e s t r i c t i o n  F - t e s t s  ( n o n e  o f  w h i c h  c a n  b e  r e j e c t e d  a t  
5% s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s ) :
a )  S e t  a l l  l a g  3 c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  z e r o  F ( 6 , 2 6 3 )  = 0 . 6 7
b )  S e t  a r m e d  f o r c e s  r a t i o  F ( 8 , 2 6 3 )  = 0 . 8 0
c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  z e r o  p l u s  a )
c )  S e t  s q u a r e d  r e t u r n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  F ( 8 , 2 6 3 )  = 0 . 8 6
t o  z e r o  p l u s  a )
d )  S e t  l a g  1 a n d  l a g  2 c o e f f i c i e n t s  F ( 1 2 , 2 6 3 )  = 1 . 6 9
e q u a l  t o  e a c h  o t h e r  p l u s  a )
e )  S e t  a r m e d  f o r c e s ,  s q u a r e d  r e t u r n s ,  F ( 1 5 , 2 6 3 )  = 1 . 6 1
a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  t o  z e r o  p l u s  d )
118
Table 8: Crisis Chronology, Sources and Triggers
Year Date Source Trigger or Origin
1710 October A/H Prior speculation; Jacobite fear
1715 September A/H Threat of Jacobite rebellion
1720 September A/H,K South Sea Co. speculation
1726 October A/H Threat of Spanish war
1745 September A/H Threat of Jacobite rebellion
1761 August A/H Threat of Spanish war
1763 July/September A/H Transmission from Continental exchanges
1773 January A/H,K CoUapse of investment and exports
1778 January A/H French join American Revolution
1788 N/A A/H Cotton trade depression
1793 February A/H,K Threat of French war
1797 February A/H,K French land at Fishguard
1810 Summer K,G Napoleonic blockade
1816 September K,G Cyclical economic contraction
1825 December K South American shares speculation
1836 December G,K Speculation in foreign securities
1847 October K Railway shares speculation
1857 August/October K Transmission from New York exchange
1866 May K,B Bank collapse
1873 Sept/October M,K Weak transmission from overseas
1875 Summer M,Au Political
1878 October M Bank failures
1880 First Half M,Au Weak transmission from overseas
1882 First Half M,Au Weak transmission from overseas
1884 N/A M Weak transmission from overseas
1887 First Half M N/A
1890 November K,M Speculation in Argentine securities
1893 May M Strong transmission from overseas
1895 September M South African gold shares speculation
1901 Summer M,Au Weak transmission from overseas
1904 Summer M,Au Strong transmission from overseas
1907 October M,G1 Weak transmission from overseas
1912 October M,W Weak transmission from overseas
1914 July M,S War threat; overseas transmission
1921 Spring K,M End of postwar boom
1929 October M Strong transmission from overseas
1931 September K,C Sterling crisis
1940 May R Threat of German invasion
1973 October E/S Arab oil boycott
1974 AU Year R Political and financial distress
1987 October FT Transmission from overseas
Note: A/H is Ashton (1959) and Hoppit (1986), Au is author’s estimate from monthly 
equity price indices, B is Batchelor (1986), C is Capie et al (1986), E/S is Ellinger and 
Stewart (1980), FT is Financial Times (1987), G is Gayer et al (1953), G1 is Galbraith 
(1955), K is Kindleberger (1978), M is Morgenstem (1959), R is Riley (1983,1984), S is 
Seaboume (1986) and W is Weissman and Williams (1980. The weak and strong 
attributes of international transmission are given by Morgenstem (1959).
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T a b l e  9 : C u m u l a t i v e  A v e r a g e S t o c k R e t u r n s  D u r i n g  a n d  P r i o r  t o  C r i s e s
R e a l  R e t u r n s N o m i n a l  R e t u r n s
D u r i n g P r i o r D u r i n g  P r i o r
1 Y e a r  2 Y e a r s  5 Y e a r s 1 Y e a r  2 Y e a r s  5 Y e a r
1710 1 9 . 1 - 1 8 . 4 - 3 2 . 3 - 2 9 . 2 - 1 0 . 0 - 8 . 3 - 9 . 1 - 0 . 1
1715 9 . 7 1 1 . 5 1 3 . 7 4 6 . 5 s 5 . 6 6 . 5 9 . 8 1 5 . 5
1720 - 4 2 . 1 3 7 . 1 1 3 1 . 2 10 5 7 . 2 s - 5 0 . 5 3 5 . 1 1 3 4 . 3 s 5 8 . 2 s
17 2 6 1 . 1 - 1 . 3 1 0 . 3 - 3 . 9 4 . 1 - 7 . 3 9 . 2 0 . 4
17 4 5 - 4 . 4 - 9 . 9 - 1 3 . 7 1 6 . 4 - 7 . 6 - 0 . 9 - 3 . 5 1 . 4
1 761 - 1 1 . 5 - 3 . 8 - 0 . 7 3 . 5 - 5 . 3 - 3 . 8 - 4 . 9 - 1 1 . 3
1763 - 1 1 . 5 1 9 . 6 10 8 . 1 0 . 3 - 7 . 6 2 1 . 5 s 1 6 . 3 2 . 3
1773 * - 5 . 2 0 . 4 - 6 . 7 - 1 2 . 1 - 7 . 7 2 . 1 3 . 9 - 2 . 4
1778 * - 9 . 0 - 1 1 . 5 - 6 . 3 - 4 . 7 - 1 4 . 3 - 3 . 5 - 3 . 7 - 6 . 3
1788 - 3 . 5 7 . 9 7 . 9 2 8 . 0 2 . 3 4 . 6 7 . 9 2 0 . 6
1793 * - 1 9 . 1 4 . 5 1 0 . 3 1 7 . 6 - 1 3 . 8 1 0 . 1 1 6 . 7 2 4 . 0
1797 * - 2 1 . 8 5 . 5 - 1 . 1 - 3 2 . 0 - 2 1 . 8 1 . 5 - 0 . 4 - 1 2 . 7
1 810 - 2 0 . 2 1 . 1 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 0 - 6 . 2 0 . 7 7 . 4 2 1 . 3
1 816 4 . 3 - 1 9 . 8 - 1 6 . 8 - 4 . 8 7 . 0 - 1 0 . 4 - 1 7 . 8 - 2 7 . 4
1 825 * - 1 4 . 8 1 6 . 5 10 1 7 . 4 4 8 . 4 s - 6 . 2 1 8 . 2 10 2 3 . 7 3 1 . 1
1836 - 1 2 . 5 1 3 . 1 1 5 . 8 1 9 . 5 - 1 6 . 6 2 2 . 5 s 2 5 . 2 10 2 8 . 9
1847 * - 1 7 . 8 - 4 . 7 3 . 9 3 9 . 9 10 - 1 2 . 5 - 5 . 6 4 . 8 2 9 . 5
1857 1 3 . 2 - 2 . 3 0 . 2 - 3 5 . 0 - 0 . 3 0 . 2 1 . 8 - 4 . 9
1866 * - 1 8 . 3 7 . 3 9 . 9 4 6 . 8 10 - 1 5 . 8 5 . 6 6 . 6 4 4 . 3 10
1873 1 . 9 3 . 5 5 . 0 3 2 . 1 - 3 . 0 2 . 7 1 5 . 0 4 2 . 0 10
1 875 - 5 . 1 - 2 . 6 - 0 . 7 1 1 . 9 - 6 . 8 - 6 . 0 - 8 . 9 1 8 . 0
1878 - 5 . 1 0 . 3 - 0 . 7 - 6 . 4 - 8 . 0 - 8 . 2 - 1 3 . 6 - 2 9 . 3
1880 1 . 9 1 2 . 5 7 . 5 1 . 8 - 1 . 1 1 6 . 5 8 . 4 - 1 2 . 0
1882 - 5 . 3 - 5 . 7 - 3 . 8 4 . 0 - 5 . 3 - 3 . 7 - 4 . 8 - 4 . 6
1884 6 . 0 1 . 3 - 4 . 0 4 . 7 - 1 . 6 - 4 . 9 - 1 0 . 2 1 . 5
1887 * - 1 . 0 7 . 2 1 3 . 2 3 . 4 - 3 . 3 1 . 3 - 0 . 3 - 1 4 . 3
1890 - 0 . 7 - 3 . 4 9 . 1 1 4 . 8 - 1 . 8 0 . 1 1 2 . 6 1 3 . 6
1893 * 1 . 0 3 . 6 2 . 9 1 1 . 5 1 . 0 - 1 . 2 - 3 . 1 1 2 . 7
1 895 1 7 . 7 1 2 . 6 2 6 . 2 3 0 . 1 1 9 . 1 9 . 9 1 3 . 2 1 1 . 2
1 9 0 1 * 0 . 3 - 9 . 3 - 1 4 . 1 6 . 3 - 5 . 3 - 1 . 3 1 . 3 2 9 . 7
1904 2 . 3 - 2 . 3 - 4 . 7 - 1 5 . 5 5 . 9 - 5 . 9 - 8 . 3 - 1 6 . 7
1907 4 . 6 - 6 . 0 - 1 2 . 4 - 1 4 . 7 - 6 . 2 - 1 . 8 - 0 . 4 - 2 . 8
1912 - 3 . 2 - 2 . 1 - 2 . 5 - 0 . 9 - 1 . 3 - 0 . 1 4 . 5 6 . 1
1914 - 2 0 . 6 - 1 . 5 - 4 . 7 - 5 . 4 - 4 . 7 - 1 . 5 - 2 . 8 9 . 9
19 2 1 * - 2 8 . 9 - 1 3 . 8 - 3 . 3 - 3 8 . 3 0 . 4 1 6 . 6 5 9 . 1 s
1929 - 1 7 . 4 - 0 . 6 1 3 . 6 11 j 104 1 . 4 - 2 1 . 3 - 1 . 8 1 1 . 5 3 4 . 8
1 9 3 1 - 0 . 2 - 1 8 . 7 - 3 6 . 1 - 1 1 . 7 - 3 . 0 - 2 5 . 1 - 4 6 . 4 - 2 7 . 0
1 9 4 0 * - 3 4 . 9 - 5 . 8 - 2 6 . 4 - 2 0 . 0 - 2 0 . 1 - 4 . 4 - 2 4 . 1 - 8 . 7
1973 * - 2 3 . 3 1 9 . 7 10 1 7 . 4 3 . 0 - 1 4 . 5 2 6 . 6 s 3 3 . 3 s 3 5 . 0
1974 * - 6 9 . 9 - 2 3 . 3 - 3 . 6 - 4 2 . 2 - 5 5 . 0 - 1 4 . 5 1 2 . 0 - 6 . 2
1987 - 1 4 . 8 1 7 . 7 10 3 9 . 1 5 7 9 . 7 1 - 9 . 9 2 1 . 8 s 4 6 . 5 1 1 0 2 . 4
N o t e :  * i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  i s  s h o w n .  , a n d  a r e  
1%, 5% a n d  10% o n e - t a i l  t e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
r e a l  a n d  n o m i n a l  r e t u r n  m e a n s  a n d  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  1 7 0 5  
t o  1 9 8 7 .
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Table 10: Unexplained Real Return from News Model
P r i o r
1 Y e a r  2 Y e a r s  5 Y e a r s
1 7 1 5 1 . 3 8 . 4 9 . 2
1 7 2 0 3 8 . 0 1 3 5 . 1 1 4 3 . 6 1
1763 1 0 . 1 6 . 7 - 3 . 3
1 8 1 0 - 2 . 0 5 . 1 4 . 6
1 8 2 5  * 8 . 9 1 0 . 9 2 7 . 1 10
1 8 3 6 1 6 . 2 5 1 4 . 1 1 0 . 0
1 8 4 7  * - 9 . 9 - 7 . 4 1 9 . 6
1 8 6 6  * 2 . 4 4 . 9 4 3 .  9 1
1 8 7 3 - 1 . 4 3 . 7 2 4 .  3 10
1 8 9 5 1 0 . 6 10 1 6 . 5 10 2 2 . 0
1 9 0 1  * - 3 . 6 - 4 . 4 1 7 . 8
1 9 2 1  * - 1 . 7 9 . 4 2 9 . 3
1 9 2 9 - 5 . 9 4 . 2 2 6 . 8
1 9 7 3  * 2 2 . 8 10 2 1 . 2 1 8 . 6
1 9 8 7 1 7 . 5 3 0 . 5 6 4 . 3 s
T a b l e  1 1 :  U n e x p l a i n e d N o m i n a l  R e t u r n f r o m  New s M o d e l
P r i o r
1 Y e a r 2 Y e a r s 5 Y e a r s
1 7 1 5 1 . 2 3 . 7 1 . 6
1 7 2 0 3 5 . 2 1 3 1 . 1 1 4 3 .  0 1
1 7 6 3 1 2 . 6 s 1 0 . 0 - 2 . 1
1 8 1 0 - 2 . 8 3 . 9 8 . 4
1 8 2 5 * 8 . 0 9 . 5 1 8 . 4 10
1 8 3 6 1 3 . 6 s 1 3 . 3 s 4 . 8
1 8 4 7 * - 9 . 9 - 3 . 7 1 5 . 9 10 
3 6 . 5 11 8 6 6 * 1 . 6 1 . 9
1 8 7 3 - 0 . 3 5 . 8 2 4 . 0 s
1 8 9 5 6 . 5 9 . 6 7 . 8
1 9 0 1 * - 4 . 3 - 6 . 8 1 2 . 5
1 9 2 1 * - 1 . 6 1 0 . 4 4 7 . 6
1 9 2 9 - 4 . 3 6 . 5 2 8 . 1
1 9 7 3 * 2 7 . 7 s 3 1 . 1 4 2 . 3
8 4 . 0 11 9 8 7 2 0 . 3 3 9 . 1 10
N o t e :  * i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  i s  s h o w n .  1, a n d  a r e  
1%, 5% a n d  10% o n e - t a i l  t e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
m o d e l ' s  r e s i d u a l  m e a n  a n d  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  f r o m  1 7 0 5  t o  1913  
a n d  1 9 1 4  t o  1 9 8 7 .
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Table 12: Unexplained Returns from Unrestricted Model
P r i o r
1 Y e a r  2 Y e a r s  5 Y e a r s
1 7 1 5 - 3 . 4 - 7 . 3 - 2 5 . 0
1 7 2 0 3 0 . 2 1 2 7 . 35 3 9 . 9 5
1 7 6 3 1 3 . 3 10 1 0 . 7 4 . 4
1 8 1 0 - 4 . 2 - 2 . 2 - 3 . 9
1 8 2 5  * 8 . 1 1 1 . 9 2 6 . 9 5
1 8 3 6 1 6 . 95 1 8 . 2 10 1 2 . 1
1 8 4 7  * - 6 . 6 2 . 4 1 9 . 7
1 8 6 6  * 4 . 6 5 . 0 4 3 . 3 1
18 7 3 0 . 6 8 . 4 3 1 . 8 5
1 8 9 5 7 . 9 1 0 . 3 9 . 3
1 9 0 1  * - 2 . 6 - 3 . 6 2 1 . 2 10
1 9 2 1  * - 1 . 8 2 . 0 3 1 . 1
1 9 2 9 - 1 . 6 1 0 . 7 3 4 . 2
1 9 7 3  * 2 1 . 1 10 2 2 . 1 4 1 . 2
1 9 8 7 1 2 . 1 2 6 . 7 2 9 . 8
T a b l e  1 3 :  U n e x p l a i n e d  R e a l R e t u r n  f r o m R e s t r i c t e d  M o d e l
P r i o r
1 Y e a r 2 Y e a r s 5 Y e a r s
1 7 1 5 7 . 5 5 . 4 4 6 . 15
1 7 2 0 3 7 . 0 1 3 4 . 3 1 6 2 . 0 1
1 7 6 3 2 1 . 7 5 1 1 . 4 8 . 8
1 8 1 0 - 4 . 4 - 3 . 8 - 1 7 . 5
1 8 2 5 * 1 2 . 9 10 1 1 . 7 2 4 . 5 10
1 8 3 6 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 6 4 . 6
1 8 4 7 * - 4 . 4 3 . 3 3 1 . 5 10
1 8 6 6 * 7 . 0 9 . 2 3 8 . 45
1 8 7 3 3 . 2 3 . 7 2 5 . 2 10
1 8 9 5 1 0 . 8 2 3 . 15 2 1 . 7
1 9 0 1 * - 7 . 6 - 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 7
1 9 2 1 * - 1 7 . 0 - 1 0 . 3 3 . 3
1 9 2 9 0 . 4 1 5 . 4 4 7 . 8
1 9 7 3 * 2 1 . 5 10 2 3 . 3 3 3 . 8
1 9 8 7 1 3 . 8 3 6 . 3 10 4 4 . 1
N o t e :  * i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r  i s  s h o w n .  1, a n d  a r e  
1%, 5% a n d  10% o n e - t a i l  t e s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  
m o d e l ' s  r e s i d u a l  m e a n  a n d  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  f r o m  1 7 0 5  t o  1 9 1 3  
a n d  1 9 1 4  t o  1 9 8 7 .
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Chapter IV: Stock Prices and Tobin’s Q
I. Introduction
Previous chapters have examined the autocorrelation properties of equity prices and 
the correlations of such variables with macroeconomic variables. In general, while 
significant relationships are found, thus underlining the importance of the real 
economy for stock price fluctuations, there is also widespread evidence of non­
efficient market behaviour which remains broadly unexplained.
This chapter now turns to an examination of the effect of stock prices, via Tobin’s 
Q, on corporate investment. The Q theory of investment has often been employed 
as an explanatory factor in the markets for physical capital and corporate control; 
in fact, it is widely thought that the stock market has its greatest impact on the 
economy through these sectors. The Q theory was of particular interest following the 
1987 crash because of the rough positive correlation between movements in the stock 
market and corporate investment in the 1980s, therefore giving some reason to 
speculate a priori that investment might be equally affected following the equity 
market downturn.
With research now clearly focused on understanding the stock market, due to the 
crash, it is probably appropriate to ask whether the Q theory is still robust to the 
challenges issued from new theories and econometric techniques. A vast literature 
has developed in the last 5 years, for example, which questions the random walk 
theory and its implication that stock prices are not mean reverting over time.1
Following this line of inquiry, the present chapter surveys the most widely used 
macroeconomic Q measures in order to address two issues. First, it considers whether 
standard empirical studies of investment using Q satisfy basic statistical properties 
of stability, appropriate specification and minimal explanatory power. Secondly, given 
that these static formulations are inappropriate, it considers the relative merits of two 
types of dynamic models.
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The chapter reaches a number of conclusions. First, static Q theory is not empirically 
valid. Second, a dynamic approach, incorporating lags of Q transformed to first 
differences, resolves these empirical problems. Third, an error correction model is 
superior to a VAR representation of the dynamic process. Fourth, Q is more highly 
correlated to investment than are real stock prices, the primary determinant of 
fluctuations in Q; this offers support for empirical applications of Q theory using a 
reformulated approach. However, the generally low explanatory power of investment 
equations using Q alone suggests that other relevant variables may add additional 
information, an issue which is directly examined in Chapter V below. Fifth, there 
appear to be substantial differences between the relationship of stock prices and 
investment in Japan and West Germany, in comparison to the U.S. and the U.K.; this 
issue is also taken up in the next chapter.
The outline of the rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section II, the theoretical 
arguments made in support of the Q theory of investment are presented, along with 
several criticisms. Reference is made to Appendix II which outlines the functional 
forms of the 52 Q measures used here. Section III examines the Qs in some detail 
using various descriptive statistics and orders of integration tests. The analysis is 
focused on four countries in Section IV where standard Q investment equations are 
examined for structural stability, autocorrelation in residuals and explanatory power. 
These results are contrasted with two other models: an error correction mechanism 
and a vector autoregression. Section V, following on recent work by Barro (1989), 
examines the influence of real stock prices on investment and compares these results 
with those of Section IV. Finally, Section VI concludes the chapter with a summary 
of the investigation.
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II. Theoretical Issues
The Q theory of investment has recently become an alternative to the traditional cost 
of capital approach for analyzing private business investment.2 The primary 
advantage of the theory is that it implicitly accounts for the expectations used by 
economic agents when making a decision to invest. Since the theory uses a 
cost/benefit framework which compares asset replacement cost to the market value 
of the firm, and the latter incorporates expectations of the future profitability of the 
firm by informed market participants, Q is a forward-looking variable. The cost of 
capital approach, in contrast, does not include expectations directly.
Following Dinenis (1985), the Q relationship is derived by maximizing the firm’s 
objective function subject to a capital accumulation constraint. Assume first that the 
firm maximizes the present value of net after-tax receipts, that the production 
function is characterised by constant returns to scale technology, that adjustment 
costs to changing the capital stock are an increasing and convex function of 
investment, and that factor and product markets are perfectly competitive. The firm 
will maximize
(1) V, -  E ( j f ^ l  + r , ) - ^  R ,+j)
subject to
(2) K, -  It + (1 - QK,.! 
where,
(3) Rt = (1 - + Aj -  ( l -  zt) p tI t ,
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(4) H  = Pt(ot - at) - Wtit
and
ot = f U p iy  o’ > 0 , o” < 0 ^  = tflp K ,) a* , a” > 0
V is the net after tax present value of the firm, E is the expectations operator, r is 
the investors’ required rate of return (or subjective discount rate), R is the net after 
tax value of the firm in every period, K is the capital stock, 8 is the depreciation 
rate, I is investment, r is the corporate tax rate, tt is profits, A  is the value of 
depreciation tax allowances on installed capital, z is the present value of future tax 
deductions per unit of new capital, p is the investment deflator, P is the output 
deflator, o is output, a is the adjustment cost to changing the capital stock, W is the 
input deflator, and i is input.
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1) and forming the Lagrangian yields the following first 
order conditions:
(6) K:
(5) i:
(7) I:
(1 ~ r t) °i* =
n -  E ( j ! / 1 - r ,) 'fl+1)d  -  *)*(• -  rt+j)P ,tj(o K’ -  aK’))  
(1 - rt)Ptaj’ + (1 - zt)pt - 0 = 0
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where n is the Lagrangian multiplier. Equation (5) states that the marginal 
productivity of the inputs is equal to their real marginal costs, Equation (6) says that 
n is the net addition to the present value of the firm due to a unit of new capital 
and Equation (7) implies that the firm will invest until the marginal costs and 
benefits of such investment are equal.
Defining marginal Q as q = n/p and substituting the equation into (7), we have
p (q - 1 + zt)
(8) -  - V - r . j p , -
and, given linear homogeneity of at with respect to its determinants I and K,
(9) ^  = h(q()
That is, the investment-capital ratio is a function of marginal Q. In empirical work, 
this Q measure is unobservable and so, invoking the conditions established by 
Hayashi (1982) and formally derived for this specification by Dinenis (1985)3, 
marginal Q can be set equal to average Q and we have
( 10) =
Ueda and Yoshikawa (1986) and Dinenis (1985) offer theoretical justifications for 
lagged Q terms affecting investment and have some success incorporating these 
terms empirically. Allowing for such lags in adjustment, delivery and implementation 
motivates the use of dynamic terms in the empirical investigation below, where Qt_ 
k are added to Equation (10).4
As noted in Appendix II, the simplest formulation of Q in empirical work is the 
market value of corporate debt and equity divided by the replacement cost of the 
corporate sector capital stock. More complex formulations are standardised in 
Appendix II, and these equations and the Q pseudonyms outlined there may be 
useful for interpreting later sections in this chapter. Note also that Equation (10) is
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referred to below as the traditional Q model.
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the Q theory. The first objection stems 
from the theoretical argument that marginal Q is the appropriate decision variable 
at the margin and, since most existing Q measures are calculated in average terms, 
the practical implementation of the theory is flawed.5
A second criticism of the Q theory concerns the measurement of the capital stock 
and the market value of the firm. The perpetual inventory method with straight-line 
depreciation, although widely used, is incorrect since varying rates of capital 
scrapping and depreciation imply that the forces shaping investment and the capital 
stock are different.6 The existence of accounting depreciation rates which diverge 
from true economic rates and aggregation problems when dealing with a non- 
homogeneous capital stock are additional complicating factors.
A potentially more serious problem concerns the measurement of the market value 
of the firm, since a growing literature stresses the irrationality of speculative 
markets.7 If it is true that the market does not value the business sector at the 
appropriate price, then there is an inefficiency in the allocation of resources in the 
economy but not necessarily an abrogation of the Q theory. The linkage between the 
theory and investment behaviour is weakened only if agents do not incorporate 
equity market prices into their decision framework.8
A final set of criticisms fall into the category of financial and tax factors affecting the 
firm. The taxation elements vary considerably across countries and assets and are, 
therefore, less amenable to generalisation across Q variables.9 Although these 
elements ensure that Q more faithfully reflects the true incentives facing agents, this 
chapter suggests that the value of incorporating tax factors into investment equations 
varies considerably across countries.
In terms of financial factors, the endogenous nature of the choice of finance and the 
linkage between investment and finance must be considered. The value of the firm 
can be weighted by source of finance and the risk implicit in any particular financial
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policy, since Q measures of equal numerical value that are generated by divergent 
financial policies may have different implications for the firm’s financial planning 
policy and horizon.10
Overall, the Q theory provides the framework for creating a relatively easily 
calculated measure of the costs and benefits of investment.11 As shown in the 
following sections, once dynamic elements are introduced, Q variables are generally 
significant explanatory factors in corporate investment equations.
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III. Statistical Properties of Q - International Comparison
This section presents summary statistics for the Q measures that are used in the rest 
of the chapter. Q values are presented for Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, West 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (and are 
shown in Diagrams 1 to 11 in Appendix II).
For analytical purposes, the Qs may be subdivided into various categories according 
to whether the Qs are average or marginal, tax adjusted or non tax adjusted, or 
derived at the macro or micro level of the economy. Certain tax adjusted Qs have 
been altered from the data given in published sources so that they can be 
consistently compared with the non-adjusted values.12
Table 1 shows the means and coefficients of variation of the Qs for identical 
subperiods within each country. The first point to note is that Q varies considerably 
from its equilibrium value of one; the main explanation for this is the presence of 
tax terms which introduce a wedge between market valuation of the firm and the 
replacement value of its assets.
A more serious shortcoming of the Q measures can be seen by comparing the 
coefficients of variation, which vary widely within each country. The usefulness of 
many of the Qs as indicators of movements in investment may, therefore, be 
hampered because of the relatively high ratio of noise to signal. In any case, the 
differences in means and coefficients of variation indicate that the Q measures within 
each country are rather dissimilar.
The fact that any particular Q may deviate from unity and exhibit relatively high 
volatility does not imply that Q theory is abrogated. A more important test of the 
theory is whether the measure is mean reverting over time. This is an important 
property since the theory postulates that fluctuations of Q above and below its 
equilibrium value will elicit investment responses in the physical capital market and 
on the stock market which will push the value of Q back to equilibrium. Classifying 
Q as a random walk is, therefore, tantamount to refuting standard Q theory as
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currently implemented.
Table 2 indicates that a unit root in Q can only be rejected for Japan and Canada 
(Other ql3). All of the other Q measures follow time series patterns which are 
insignificantly different from random walks, as do the I/K measures for the U.S., 
U.K., Japan and West Germany. Table 3 demonstrates that stationarity is achieved 
in all of the series after first differencing, except for U.S. q7 which requires second 
differencing. It appears from these two tables that Q and I/K are generally 
integrated of order one, 1(1), while the Japanese Q are I(0).13 Q does not therefore 
generally revert to a mean value over time, although d(Q) does have this property.14
These results suggest that cointegration between Q and I/K, and therefore the 
existence of a long run relationship between the two, can be examined by using the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller methodology.15 Table 4 accordingly shows the cointegration 
adjusted t-statistics for Japan, the U.K., the U.S. and West Germany; in column 5, 
additional Japanese results are given to accommodate the fact that Q is 1(0) there.
The conclusions of the table are somewhat mixed. Cointegration between I/K and 
d(Q) cannot be rejected for Japan; as well, many of the U.S. Qs are cointegrated 
with I/K. For the U.K. and West Germany, however, many of the Qs are not 
cointegrated with I/K, although most of them are marginally significant. As well, 
with the exceptions of U.S. ql3 and Japan ql and q4, none of the tax adjusted 
measures are cointegrated. Contrary to theoretical requirements, it therefore seems 
that the more sophisticated tax adjusted Q measures are also those which statistically 
reject an equilibrium relationship with investment.
In conclusion, this section has a number of implications for modelling strategies 
involving Q. First, given the differences in mean values and volatility, it is difficult 
to specify a unique Q for use in empirical work; different formulations of Q are 
therefore needed to test model specification robustness in any investigation. Second, 
aside from Japan and Canada, Qs should be transformed to first differences in order 
to induce stationarity; this point also holds for I/K.16 Third, the existence of 
cointegration between Q and I/K suggests that an error correction model (ECM) 
may be one (previously ignored) approach to modelling Q theory.
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IV. Comparative Investment Models: Four Country Analysis
This section compares an error correction specification of Q theory with the 
traditional Q formulation and a VAR alternative. The traditional Q model is used 
to conform to accepted theoretical prescriptions and the VAR is employed to free 
the data from any imposed structure; the two models therefore represent opposite 
ends of the modelling spectrum.
The lack of success of traditional specifications of the Q theory is apparent from 
Tables 5 to 9. Table 5 shows coefficient estimates for the traditional static 
application of Q theory. The other tables show Durbin-Watson statistics, F-tests for 
the null hypothesis that the regressor coefficients are jointly zero, R-squared values, 
Chow F-tests for mid-sample structural change and LM(2) tests for autocorrelated 
residuals.17 Each triplet of equations presents I/K on Q regressions in the first row, 
an unrestricted VAR of d(I/K) on lagged values of d(I/K) and d(Q) in row three 
and an unrestricted ECM similar to the VAR but incorporating an error correction 
term in row two. Column 7 tests the significance of the error correction term and 
column 8 does the same for the reverse regression of d(Q) on d(I/K).18
Looking to Table 5 and the first row of each Q variable in the other tables, one sees 
numerous insignificant or incorrectly signed coefficients, low DW values, low R- 
squared explanatory power, autocorrelated residuals and occasional structural breaks. 
These results indicate that the traditional Q specification is inappropriate. The major 
flaws are the exclusion of dynamic behaviour in the equations and the failure to 
transform Q to a differenced representation.
Turning to the U.K. results first, it appears that the ECM is generally superior to the 
VAR. While the VAR fails to reject the regressor F-test null hypothesis of no 
explanatory power for five of the Qs in Table 6, the ECM fails only for q4. The 
Chow and LM tests reject the null hypothesis of structural break and error 
correlation for each specification, thus supporting the need for including dynamics 
in the models, and the error correction term is either strongly or marginally 
significant in two-thirds of the equations; those rejecting the additional term are
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almost all tax adjusted Qs. There is also some support for thinking that the dynamic 
profile of Q is unaffected by the error correction term in column 7. Again, q4 is the 
exception and this result may be due to the dominance of tax terms in the variation 
of this Q over time.
The U.S. equations in Table 7 broadly reflect the U.K. results. The VAR 
specification indicates marginal residual autocorrelation in q4 and ql5 while the 
ECM is universally free of such problems. As well, the regressor F-test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of no significance more often for the VAR model than for the 
ECM. Six of the Qs indicate that an error correction term is not required and the 
reverse regression F-test shows that Q dynamics are unaffected by the long run 
relationship between Q and I/K. Once again, the Q variables rejecting the error 
correction specification are predominantly tax adjusted measures. As in Table 6, 
there is a substantial increase in the explanatory power of the equations relative to 
the traditional Q specification in row one.
The results for West Germany in Table 8 again support the error correction 
specification. The VAR model fails to reject the regressor F-test null hypothesis for 
q ll  while the ECM rejects for all three Qs. The error correction term is also 
marginally significant for the Q equations and, as with the other two countries, this 
term does not affect the time profile of Q. The increase in R-squared relative to the 
traditional Q equation is less marked than in the U.S. and the U.K..19
The error correction term in each of the ECM above can be interpreted as the 
degree to which the equation reverts to its long run equilibrium every period. For 
the United States, the coefficient estimates imply that I/K reverts to its equilibrium 
over a period of 3 to 7 years, while the German results indicate that this process 
takes place over 6 to 9 years. The U.K. implied reversion time varies widely across 
Qs, from 1 to 13 years, but the coefficients consistently increase in magnitude from 
the 1950s to the present; it therefore seems that equilibrium-inducing forces are 
much stronger in recent years.20
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Turning now to Japan, this country presents a special problem for examining the 
ECM relative to a VAR. Since Tables 2 and 3 showed that Q is 1(0) while I/K is 
1(1), it is not possible to obtain the error correction term for inclusion in an 
investment equation. Therefore, Table 9 examines the implications of regressing 
d(I/K) on Q itself rather that d(Q), since d(I/K) and Q are both 1(0). The first row 
of each set shows the d(I/K) on Q equation and the second row shows an 
unrestricted VAR of d(I/K) on lags of d(I/K) and Q. Column 7 gives the F-test for 
adding current Q to the VAR and column 8 tests the restriction that Q can be 
transformed to d(Q).
The regressors F-test null hypothesis of no significance is not rejected for the 
contemporaneous Q equation, indicating that dynamics terms are important for 
empirically implementing Q theory; this is supported by the F-tests of column 7 
which imply that current Q is generally significant only when lagged Qs are included 
in the equation. The regressors F-test for lagged Q fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of no significance for more than half of the Q variables. The last column indicates 
that restricting Q to a d(Q) form is not rejected and this latter formulation may be 
preferred for reasons of parsimony. Overall, the Japanese results are considerably 
weaker than those for the other three countries.
In summary, it appears that the ECM is preferable to an unrestricted VAR, and the 
latter model, in turn, is superior to the traditional Q equation. However, the low R2 
values for even the ECM variation indicate that the Q approach may not be optimal 
for explaining investment fluctuations over time.
Tax adjusted Qs seem to diminish the degree to which Q and I/K interact over the 
longer run, as evidenced by the general absence of cointegration shown in Table 4 
and the insignificance of the error correction terms for these Qs in Tables 6 to 8. It 
may be that theoretical rigour demands the inclusion of tax variables which are 
imperfect representations of investors’ decision sets; for example, expected tax rates 
serve as proxies for current tax rates in Q investigations.
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Finally, the deviations from equilibrium embodied in the error correction terms, 
while generally significant, are nevertheless of long lasting duration. These delays in 
reestablishing equilibrium may be partially attributed to decision and implementation 
lags in investment and/or to the difficulty that investors may have interpreting 
movements in the equity market on a short term basis.
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V. Stock Prices, Q and Investment
Previous sections have shown that static Q theory is inappropriate and have 
suggested that a particular dynamic respecification is in order. An alternative 
approach is to replace Q itself with one of its subcomponents which has better 
explanatory power. Although Qs are constructed with a number of different 
components, it is likely that stock market prices are the most volatile element. This 
section, therefore, looks at the importance of real stock price (R) fluctuations for 
investment and then compares the explanatory power of these prices with the 
respective Q variables.21
Table 10 repeats the integration tests of Tables 2 to 4, with the conclusion that real 
stock prices are 1(1). The cointegrating equations indicate that real stock prices and 
investment are cointegrated in the U.S., the U.K. and West Germany (prior to the 
1980s).22 It should be noted that the sample sizes in the table are chosen, first, to 
exploit the maximum possible data range and, second, to match the sample ranges 
of the Q variables analyzed above.
As in Tables 6 to 9, Table 11 summarizes traditional static equations, VARs and 
ECMs. Problems with error autocorrelation and structural break are seen in the first 
row of each triplet and, as before, this is corrected with the introduction of lagged 
regressors. The VAR fails to reject the regressor F-test null hypothesis of no 
significance for West Germany and the earlier Japanese sample period, while the 
ECM improves upon this by rejecting the test for the most recent German sample. 
The error correction term is strongly significant for the U.S., the U.K. and the earlier 
German period, mimicking the cointegration equations, and there is weak evidence 
that the long run relationship between R and I/K affects the dynamic movement of 
R over time.23
In general, movements in real stock prices contribute significantly to explaining 
investment. In order to compare the explanatory power of stock prices with Q, 
Tables 12 and 13 detail F-test results for joint encompassing tests; the equations 
regress d(I/K) on current values of d(Q) and d(R) and single lagged values of all
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three. Table 12 accommodates measurement error and response delays in I/K, Q and 
R by including current and lagged values, while Table 13 includes only variables in 
the investors’ information set at time t. Contrary to the results of Barro (1989), there 
is conclusive evidence here that Q is a more important determinant of investment 
than R.
Turning to Table 12 first, all countries except West Germany support the 
encompassing nature of the Q variables. Even when the Q specification does not 
encompass R (ie: the statistics are not significant), the F-test values are generally 
higher towards supporting Q, rather than R, as the encompassing variable. The 
anomalous cases which designate R as the encompassing variable, (U.S. q7, ql5 and 
ql6 and the German Qs), are difficult to explain in terms of sample size, tax 
adjustment or micro/macro coverage.
The results for Table 13 are somewhat weaker than Table 12, indicating that the 
relative explanatory power in R is concentrated in the lagged rather than the 
contemporaneous variable; this result may seem odd given the strong role of 
expectations in driving stock price movements. Once again, most F-tests for including 
Q in the joint regression are larger than those for including R. The only tests which 
consistently suggest that R is encompassing are those for U.S. ql5 and ql6. This 
latter finding is directly related to the failure of these Qs to predict investment at all, 
as evidenced by their poor explanatory power shown in Table 7. Other (West 
Germany) q l l  and U.S. qlO also marginally support R as the encompassing variable.
Overall, Q is superior to R as an explanatory factor for corporate investment. 
Although the static Q theory has major empirical shortcomings, the results of this 
and previous sections do not support using R in place of Q, as implied by Barro 
(1989), but rather suggest that a dynamic respecification may be appropriate. Finally, 
there exist marked differences in the correlation between stock prices and investment 
in Japan and West Germany, relative to the U.S. and the U.K..
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VI. Conclusions
The preceding analysis has underlined the importance of reformulating Q to explain 
corporate investment. The random walk behaviour of Q and I/K  and the 
cointegration generally found between the two variables suggests the potential 
importance of error correction modelling techniques. Statistical comparisons of such 
a model with the traditional Q formulation and an unrestricted VAR reflect the 
value of this reformulation.
Although Q is a superior determinant of investment relative to real stock prices, it 
seems that the tax adjusted figures are less successful than the simpler Qs. 
Theoretical injunctions and empirical findings therefore seem to be strongly at odds 
on this issue. A plausible explanation of the discrepancy is that true investment 
incentives are not properly captured with the real world variables. In any case, 
average Qs are everywhere substituted for the theoretically appropriate marginal Qs.
The success of the error correction model should not, however, be overemphasised, 
given its rather low explanatory power. As the next chapter of this thesis notes, there 
are numerous other explanations of investment which have a better predictive track 
record. As well, the long lasting deviations from the Q and I/K equilibrium are 
difficult to fully justify and the error correction model is not successful for all of the 
Qs examined here. Finally, the differences shown between the Q and R correlations 
with investment in Japan and West Germany, relative to the U.S. and the U.K., 
indicate the possible importance of institutional or other factors which vary across 
countries.
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Appendix II - Q Variable Glossary
I. Common Glossary
The empirical derivation of Q varies considerably from study to study and it is 
sometimes difficult to distil the essential differences between Q values that purport 
to measure the same phenomena. This glossary alleviates some of the confusion that 
can emerge in a comparative exercise involving Q by standardizing all of the 
terminology and variables.
The most commonly used Q components are as follows:
E - market value of equity 
D - market value of debt 
K - replacement cost of the capital stock 
6 - depreciation rate of the capital stock 
V = E + D - market value of the firm
b = D /V  - fraction of new capital that is debt financed
e = E/K
d = D/K
q = V/K - the simple Q measure
P - output price deflator 
p - investment price deflator
A - present value of tax deductions for installed capital 
a = A/K
s - present value of tax incentives and deductions for new capital per unit of 
investment (U.K.)
z - present value of tax deductions for new capital per unit of investment 
k - investment tax credit rate (U.S.) 
j - rate of first year investment write-offs (U.K.)
N - value of inventories multiplied by time dummies for periods of tax relief (U.K.) 
c - capital gains tax rate
m - dividend income tax rate 
r - corporate income tax rate
<f> - capitalization factor - tax disincentive for dividend payout 
R - maximum interest rate deduction - tax free reserves (Japan)
S - amount of corporate enterprise tax (Japan) 
e  = (l-m)<£/(l-c) - relative tax weighting of dividends and 
capital gains for the investor
The market variables E and D are usually calculated by taking dividend and interest 
payments by firms and capitalising them using yields on equity and debt; net financial 
assets are sometimes deducted from the resulting V value. In many cases, the market 
value of D is approximated by its book value. The capital stock is typically measured 
net of depreciation while the associated investment measure is usually in gross 
terms.24 The simple Q measure, while only a rough approximation to the actual 
relative price signals underlying the investment decision, is nevertheless used as the 
empirical Q value in approximately half of the studies surveyed here.
Tax components vary across countries according to the relevant national institutional 
arrangements but are broadly used in the same way when calculating Q. Depreciation 
allowances are separated for new and installed capital in order to replicate the 
implicit value of the firm embodied in future tax deductions accruing to existing and 
potential capital stock. Tax factors which impinge on the firm in an indirect manner 
through distribution policy are incorporated in e.
II. Methods of Constructing Q
Each Q measure is shown below in a single equation form using the variables which 
were defined above in the common glossary. Following each equation is a short note 
on the definitions used for the replacement value of the capital stock, the sector that 
the Q value represents and the sample period for which the Q was constructed. The 
equations are subdivided into national categories and listed alphabetically by source; 
a Q pseudonym is also shown which is used elsewhere in the chapter to identify the 
measures. For the purposes of this section, q denotes the q defined in the common
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glossary while Q defines the equation derived in each of the relevant sources; QT is 
a transformation of Q which is not used in the comparative analysis of this chapter25. 
All variables are contemporaneous unless otherwise indicated.
1. United States
* Abel and Blanchard (1986) - ql6
Q    p
(1 - k - z )£
K (gross): plant and equipment 
Sector: manufacturing 
Sample: 1948:2 to 1979:3
Note: Quarterly values are annualized as in q5 below. The simple q used (denoted 
ql5 here) is the marginal measure where M = Mu, a = 0.5 and n = ns.
* Brainard, Shoven and Weiss (1980) - ql2
Q = Q
K (net): plant, equipment, land and inventories 
Sector: micro data on 187 firms from the Compustat tape 
Sample: 1958 to 1977
Note: V is calculated less net short term assets.
* Chan-Lee (1986) - q4
Q = q
K (net): total assets
Sector: non financial corporations
Sample: 1955 to 1983
Note: q is taken from Council of Economic Advisors estimates.
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* Ciccolo (1975) - q8
Q = q
K: not given 
Sector: not given 
Sample: 1960 to 1974
Note: The equivalent tax adjusted measure from Ciccolo (1979), with sample 1960 
to 1977, is denoted ql3.
* Hayashi (1982) - q6
K: corporate capital stock less land and inventories 
Sector: corporate 
Sample: 1952 to 1978
Note: The q used is q5 from Von Furstenberg (1977).
* Holland (1986) - q9, qlO, q ll
Q = q
K (gross): q9, q ll  - inventories, plant and equipment
qlO - as above plus land and net monetary assets 
Sector: q9, qlO - non financial corporations 
q ll  - manufacturing corporations 
Sample: q9, qlO - 1947 to 1981 
q ll  - 1948 to 1981
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* Lindenberg and Ross (1981) - ql4
Q = q
K (net): total assets, plant and inventories 
Sector: microdata on 246 industrial firms and utilities 
Sample: 1960 to 1977
Note: q is defined as the unadjusted average from the paper. 
* Summers (1981) - q2
- 1 + b + k + z
Q
(T = K( 1-m)
1 - r
K: equipment, structures and inventories 
Sector: non financial corporations 
Sample: 1931 to 1978
Note: The pseudonym for the non tax adjusted q used here is ql.
The q2 measure used elsewhere in the chapter is
(EKMmiC) + b + k + zO = 1~m) . ______________V 1 - T
See Endnote 25 for more information on this adjustment.
* Tobin and Brainard (1977) - q7
Q = Q
K: book value of V adjusted by the ratio of replacement cost to book value
Sector: microdata on 384 industrial firms
Sample: 1960 to 1974
Note: q is defined as the annual average.
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* Von Furstenberg (1977) - q5
Q = q
K (gross): net fixed capital, inventories, land and net non interest bearing financial 
assets
Sector: non financial corporations 
Sample: 1952:1 to 1976:4
Note: The quarterly values are annualized using a simple arithmetic average over the 
four quarters within any given year.
2. United Kingdom
* Bank of England (1987) - q2
O __________ Y________
v  (1 - s)K  + (I -  r)N
K (net): total capital stock
Sector: industrial and commercial companies
Sample: 1966:4 to 1986:4
Note: V is calculated as in ql but without ratio adjustment. The Q values are 
annualized using the same method as U.S. q5. A measure from Chan-Lee (1986), 
denoted as q3 here with sample period 1964 to 1984, differs from q2 by a scale 
factor.
* Dinenis (1985) - q8, q9, qlO, q l l
QT = ( 1  _P r ) p  (q  - a - 1 + s) = q8
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qt - (1 - r )P
a - a 
Q = (1 - s) “ 1,9
( |  + d - a - 1 + s) = qlO
|  + d - a
q = = q11
K (net): total capital stock plus inventories 
Sector: manufacturing business sector 
Sample: 1950 to 1980
Note: The non tax adjusted measure (denoted as ql3 here) is defined as q-a. The 
measures used elsewhere in the chapter are as follows:
Q = _ rjp (Q - a + s) a q8
Q = ( i  -P~r)P (?  + d " a + s) " ql°
q9 , q l l  - as above
See Endnote 25 for more information on this adjustment.
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Flemming et al (1976) - ql
Q = V(1 - s)K  + (1 - r)N
K (gross): total capital stock
Sector: industrial and commercial companies
Sample: 1960 to 1975
Note: V is calculated less net liquid assets and includes the value of bank loans and 
commercial bills. It is adjusted by the before tax ratio of domestic to total income. 
* Holland (1986) - q6
K (gross): inventories, plant and equipment 
Sector: non financial corporations 
Sample: 1963 to 1980
* Oulton (1981) - q7
K (gross): fixed assets and inventories 
Sector: industrial and commercial companies 
Sample: 1960:4 to 1977:2
Note: The Q values are annualized as in U.S. q5. V is augmented by the value of 
profits due abroad and is adjusted by the after tax ratio of domestic to total income 
and the after tax ratio of financial to total assets.
* Poterba and Summers (1983) - q4, q526
Q = q
Ey ~  A ) + b  “ 1 + Z + j
N - i ___________________ = q51 -  T
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x + » - »  + * + i
Q -  1 - r----------- *
K (net): total capital stock plus inventories 
Sector: industrial and commercial companies 
Sample: 1949 to 1980
Note: E is adjusted to correspond to domestic earnings. The q measure (denoted as 
ql2) is calculated as e-a.
The measures used elsewhere in this chapter are
(Ek~ + b + z + j
Q = r - T -  <*5
+ b + z + j
Q .  i S i  ----------- Q4
See Endnote 25 for further details concerning this adjustment.
3. Japan
* Chan-Lee (1986) - q3
Q = q
K (net): depreciable assets 
Sector: manufacturing 
Sample: 1955 to 1981
Note: This q is similar to q2 with the addition of a scale factor.
147
* Hayashi (1985) - ql
T f  V -  A + S -  R j  i pQ - I—izr** - 1 + *) rrhv
K (net): total capital stock 
Sector: manufacturing 
Sample: 1956 to 1981
Note: V is reduced by the value of land and inventories. As well, the non tax- 
adjusted Q value (denoted as q2 here) is defined as q(p/P).
The ql measure used elsewhere in this chapter is
See Endnote 25 for further information concerning this adjustment.
* Holland (1986) - q6, q7, q8, q9
Q -  Q
K (gross): q6 - inventories, plant, equipment, land and net liquid assets
q? - as q6 less land
q8 - as q6 less net liquid assets
q9 - as q6 less land and net liquid assets
Sector: microdata for 848 non financial companies 
Sample: 1965 to 1981
4. Other Countries
i) Finland
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* Holland (1986) - q5, q6
Q = q
K (gross): plant, equipment, inventories and net financial assets 
Sector: manufacturing 
Sample: 1961 to 1980
Note: V adjustment is the same as q2 and q3. q5 is supplemented by the value of K 
less the adjusted E measure.
* Koskenkyla (1985) - ql, q2, q3, q4
Q = Q
K (gross): fixed assets, inventories and net financial assets 
Sector: q2, q3 - manufacturing 
q4 - residual 
ql - aggregate 
Sample: 1961 to 1980
Note: The E used as the numerator of q2 is calculated by multiplying the ratio of 
market to book value for listed firms by the book value of the entire sector. The E 
values in the other Qs are calculated by multiplying this ratio by the capital stock 
less debt and deferred tax credits; V is augmented by the value of deferred tax 
credits for these Qs.
ii) Germany
* Chan-Lee (1986) - q ll
Q = q
K: not given
Sector: private enterprises
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Sample: 1966 to 1980
* Holland (1986) - q9, qlO
Q = q
K: inventories, equipment, plant, net liquid assets and land 
Sector: q9 - manufacturing
qlO - non financial corporation 
Sample: q9 - 1961 to 1981 
qlO - 1961 to 1979 
Note: E is basic capital multiplied by a stock price index.
iii) Sweden
* Holland (1986) - q7, q8
Q = q
K: q7 - inventories, equipment, plant and land
q8 - inventories, equipment, plant, land and net liquid 
assets
Sector: business groups 
Sample: 1966 to 1980
iv) Belgium
* Chan-Lee (1986) - ql2
Q = q
K: not given 
Sector: not given
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Sample: 1964 to 1983
Note: The q value is an index where 1975 = 1.
v) Canada
* Chan-Lee (1986) - ql3
Q -  Q
K: total capital employed 
Sector: non financial corporations 
Sample: 1966 to 1981
vi) France
* Chan-Lee (1986) - ql4
Q -  Q
K: not given
Sector: non financial corporations and quasi-corporate enterprises 
Sample: 1971 to 1983
A number of remarks can be made about the equations outlined above.
First, the equations found in the papers by Summers (1981), Poterba and Summers
(1983), Dinenis (1985) and Hayashi (1985) have been adjusted prior to using them 
here for the reasons outlined in Endnote 25. This adjustment generally entailed 
adding a non-linear component to each Q formula, except for the non tax adjusted 
measures.
Second, two of the Japanese Qs, ql and q2, have been supplemented by two 
transformed measures, q4 and q5. The transformation replaced Hayashi’s equity
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series with that of Holland (1986). This was done due to the lack of correlation 
between the former series and other measures of Japanese equity prices and market 
valuations.
Third, there is considerable variability in the construction of the Qs. The source of 
these differences stem mainly from the treatment of tax variables. It should be 
stressed, however, that different models of optimising behaviour can lead to different 
specifications of Q; this is especially relevant to the case of U.K. q9 and q l l  which 
are based on a unique specification of adjustment costs.
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1. See Poterba and Summers (1987), Fama and French (1988) and Kim et al (1989) on 
this issue.
2. An early exposition of the cost of capital approach can be found in Jorgenson (1971), 
while two recent survey articles are Chirinko (1986) and Galeotti (1984).
3. See Endnote 5.
4. Ueda and Yoshikawa (1986) note that when delivery lags are incorporated into the 
Q theory, I/K depends on expectations of Q, rather than Q itself. If the information set 
of asset-holders includes Q and lagged Q, then these variables properly enter the 
estimation equation. The authors also motivate the success of the accelerator model of 
investment (in Chapter V below) by noting that profits (and output) are dominated by 
permanent components which involve multiple period expectations and, hence, mimic 
the lagged structure of Q under an assumption of non-negligible delivery time.
5. Marginal Q measures an increment to the capital stock at the relevant marginal 
replacement and market prices; the value of installed capital is therefore not of interest 
when deciding to invest in new assets. Average Q, in contrast, aggregates over all 
existing assets. Hayashi (1982) enumerates the three conditions that are required for 
marginal Q to be equal to average Q: the firm faces perfectly competitive markets, its 
production technology is homogeneous of degree one and its capital depreciates at a 
geometric rate.
In terms of empirical research, Connolly and Lacivita (1985) claim to provide evidence 
for different autocorrelation properties between marginal and average Qs, thus 
highlighting the unique nature of each definition. In fact, their analysis confuses marginal 
Q with tax adjusted average Q and, as a result, their paper actually examines only 
average Q values. Abel and Blanchard (1986) calculate a marginal Q measure from first 
principles but discover that it is not significantly different from the average Q found in 
Von Furstenberg (1977).
6. Wadhwani and Wall (1986) discuss the implications of capital scrapping rates for 
measures of the capital stock and Chirinko (1986) provides references to the theoretical 
work on the capital stock measurement problem.
7. Starting with contributions by Shiller (1981), and backed by the earlier judgment of 
Keynes (1936), a number of researchers have examined the issue of excess volatility of 
speculative market prices. Discussion of dynamic pricing behaviour anomalies, such as 
the January effect, the day-of-the-week effect and the tendency of share prices to revert 
to mean values, can be found in Poterba and Summers (1987). In addition, the issues 
concerning market myopia are summarized and empirically tested by Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1987).
A related literature deals with the poor performance of the stock market under 
inflationary conditions; explanations based on economic and tax factors do not seem to 
fully explain the phenomena and some measure of market inefficiency may therefore 
be involved. Modigliani and Cohn (1979), Hendershott (1981) and Brainard, Shoven and 
Weiss (1980) are important references on this issue.
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8. Fischer and Merton (1984) provide an extended discussion of this point and give 
examples of its implications for investment behaviour. The Q theory might also be 
modified to account for the short-term noise in the market that is presumably not used 
by agents when making real decisions. Two examples using spectral filtering to separate 
the signal from the noise in stock prices and Q are found in Engle and Foley (1975) and 
Poterba and Summers (1983).
9. As well, Robson (1988) points out that anticipated tax changes affect the optimal 
timing of investment expenditures in the United Kingdom. Expectations of shifts in the 
tax regime are, therefore, critical components of Q.
10. While acknowledging the theoretical rigour underlying the financial policy neutrality 
theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958), it does seem that the debt to equity ratio 
matters statistically in empirical investment equations. Chapter V of this thesis and 
Auerbach and Reishus (1987) assign an important role to the debt/equity ratio in 
explaining corporate mergers and investment.
11. By implication, the Q measure can also be used for evaluating financial investment 
in the market for corporate control. King (1987) gives the theoretical justification for a 
Q theory of takeovers and examines the empirical case for the United Kingdom.
12. See Endnote 25 for further details on this adjustment.
13. It is somewhat puzzling that the order of integration should differ only for Japan and 
Canada. The latter result may stem from small sample bias but the former seems to be 
a robust finding. A visual examination of Diagrams 1 to 11 in Appendix II does confirm, 
however, that the Japanese Qs appear to mean revert more frequently over the sample 
period than do those of other countries. With a longer series of data, say one hundred 
years or more, more Q variables might exhibit 1(0) behaviour than is the case here.
14. This conclusion is supported by univariate ARIMA specifications of the Q time series 
properties. The Qs can be subdivided into three categories: those characterised by AR(1) 
processes, those emulating an ARMA(1,1) process and those following a higher order 
process. The following summary gives the breakdown of Qs by category:
AR(1) - U.S. q4, q5, q6, q7, ql2; U.K. q2, q7; Japan ql, q2, q3, q4, q5; Other (Finland) 
q2, q3, q5, q6; Other (West Germany) q9, q ll; Other (Belgium) ql2; Other (Canada) 
ql3.
ARMA(1,1) - U.S. q8, qlO, q ll, ql5, ql6; U.K. q4, q5, ql2; Other (Finland) ql, q4; 
Other (Sweden) q7, q8; Other (West Germany) qlO; Other (France) ql4.
Higher Order - U.S. ql, q2, q3, q9, ql3, ql4; U.K. ql, q3, q6, q8, q9, qlO, q ll, ql3; 
Japan q6, q7, q8, q9.
Each of these specifications produces white residuals. It should also be noted that in 
each case, the AR(1) coefficient is insignificantly different from unity. First differencing 
is therefore appropriate to achieve stationarity in the Qs prior to econometric analysis.
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15. Cointegration is a concept applied to economic time series which are individually 
1(d) but jointly I(d-l). It is especially important for the case where series are individually 
1(1), since their representation in levels exhibits infinite variance and therefore violates 
one of the assumptions of classical econometric analysis. The formal derivation of the 
conditions is found in Granger (1981) and critical values for the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller test are in Fuller (1976). A comparison of the various integration tests is found 
in Engle and Granger (1987) where general support is given for the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller approach used here.
16. The use of first differences or deviations relative to trend values of Q has been 
popularised recently as an alternative to employing the level of Q as an indicator of 
investment incentives. Malkiel, Von Furstenberg and Watson (1979) were the initiators 
of this approach and it has been empirically tested by Chappell and Cheng (1982) on 
microlevel data for manufacturing firms.
Prof. L. Summers, in his comments on Barro (1989), questions the use of differenced 
variables by asking what it is that is being examined. To address this point, note that 
the standard Q theory compares Q to I/K, the change in the capital stock as a 
proportion of the total capital stock. In contrast, d(I/K) measures the change in capital 
flows relative to the total capital stock (or accumulated capital flows). Mathematically, 
and ignoring time t subscripts for simplicity,
and from Equation (2),
( 12) K- =  I +  ( 1  -  S) '  I t_j  + ( 1  -  5 ) ^ . 2
By recursive substitution,
(13) nr 1 T L *d(K
The equivalent equation for d(Q) is
(14)
and from Equation (1) and (2),
Thus, the ECM and VAR models used below correlate changes in expectations of future 
profitability (relative to changes in the capital stock) to changes in the flow of capital 
(relative to changes in the capital stock).
17. Coefficient values and standard errors have not been replicated here for the dynamic 
specifications in the interest of keeping the analysis manageable. Given that there are 
44 Q variables, 3 types of models, and a constant and lagged variables in each equation,
I the reader would have to wade through over 450 coefficient estimates. An appendix 
; giving the data base is, however, available upon request from the author.
18. This latter regression examines whether deviations from the long run equilibrium 
relationship between I/K and Q have explanatory value for the dynamic path of Q.
19. The R2 values for all four countries examined here are, in any case, rather low in 
absolute terms; this therefore brings into question the utility of the Q framework for
; explaining investment. The next chapter shows more rigorously that once other 
explanatory factors are introduced to the estimation equation, the Q variable generally 
adds no additional independent explanatory power.
! 20. The error correction term coefficient estimates for an ECM with lag one variables 
! are: U.S. ql (-.29), q2 (-.38), q3 (-.59), q4 (-.51), q5 (-.32), q6 (-.31), q7 (-.52), q8 (-.21),
| q9 (-.40), qlO (-.47), q ll  (-.38), ql2 (-.37), ql3 (-.31), ql4 (-.18) and ql6 (-.14); U.K. ql
! (-.37), q2 (-.77), q3 (-.30), q4 (-.20), q5 (-.26), q6 (-.63), q7 (-.69), q8 (-.14), q9 (-.14), qlO
I (-.14), q ll  (-.14), ql2 (-.21), ql3 (-.15); West Germany q9 (-.27), qlO (-.30), q l l  (-.37).
I Column 7 in Tables 6 to 8 show which of these estimates are significantly different from 
zero. The low values for U.K. q9 and q ll  are likely the result of the dominance of 
taxation terms in these Q variables.
21. The equations for Japan use ln(R) in place of R in order to account for the
, accelerating nature of Japanese stock prices in the 1980s.
22. The Japanese and West German cases appear to differ markedly from the Anglo- 
Saxon experience. The relative degree of managerial autonomy from stock price 
fluctuations, explored in Chapter V, is one explanation of such differences.
23. Again, the weak VAR evidence shown here for Japan and West Germany is 
examined in a different context in Chapter V, in terms of stock price correlations with 
both investment and output.
24. If the gross capital stock is denoted K, then this means that the net measure will be 
calculated as K(l-$). The convention of using the net measure of the capital stock is 
followed throughout this chapter.
25. Starting with Summers (1981), many researchers have adopted the convention of 
altering Q by subtracting the value one from the component q; for our purposes, this 
new value of Q is denoted QT. The transformation is justified by appealing to the long- 
run equilibrium condition where the replacement and market values of capital are the 
same (i.e., the value of q equals one). In a tax-free world devoid of any imperfections 
in measuring the relevant Q components (and with fundamental values faithfully 
reflected in speculative market prices), such an adjustment would simply scale q (and
Q) from an equilibrium value of one to zero. However, when this transformation is used 
in practice, the QT values are distorted because the tax and other components are 
multiplied in a non-linear fashion with q. The non-homogeneous nature of the 
adjustment means that QT must be transformed to a Q form in order to properly 
compare it with other Qs.
26. It should be noted that q4 and qlO are not equivalent measures even though they 
are calculated to capture the same components. This can be shown if we define the 
following:
Z|  — Z + j  J Zj -  s
bj = b ; b2 = d -  a
Substituting these variables into the two Q measures yields:
(17)
(16) Q4 = - a) + - 1 + zt)
QlO = X2(^(e) + b2 - 1 + z2)
Since e and 0 are the most volatile elements of the equations, the inclusion or exclusion 
of a from the two formulas will produce substantially different Q variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Mean and Coefficient of Variation
Q U . S .
Mean C . V .
U.
Mean
K.
C . V .
J a p a n  
Me an  <C . V .
O t h e r  
Me an  <C.V.
1 1 . 1 5 0 . 1 4 0 . 9 0 0 . 3 6 1 . 7 8 0 . 3 1 1 . 5 7 0 . 1 9
2 3 . 5 1 0 . 1 6 NA NA 1 . 6 9 0 . 1 4 1 . 1 2 0 . 0 4
3 1 . 1 1 0 . 1 4 1 . 0 6 0 . 2 0 1 . 6 5 0 . 1 2 1 . 4 7 0 . 1 9
4 1 . 3 2 0 . 1 6 3 . 1 5 0 . 2 8 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 5 1 . 6 4 0 . 2 0
5 0 . 8 9 0 . 1 3 2 . 5 3 0 . 2 3 1 . 1 2 0 . 0 7 1 . 2 9 0 . 0 5
6 1 . 0 4 0 . 1 5 1 . 1 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 0 6 1 . 4 6 0 . 1 4
7 2 . 0 9 0 . 2 1 1 . 1 6 0 . 2 6 1 . 7 3 0 . 1 1 0 . 6 2 0 . 1 2
8 1 . 3 1 0 . 1 8 1 . 6 9 0 . 3 2 0 . 8 1 0 . 2 2 0 . 5 0 0 . 1 1
9 1 . 1 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 9 9 0 . 5 6 1 . 7 1 0 . 2 4 1 . 1 9 0 . 1 1
10 0 . 8 8 0 . 1 5 1 . 8 3 0 . 2 9 1 . 2 0 0 . 1 0
11 1 . 2 3 0 . 2 3 1 . 1 5 0 . 5 2 2 . 6 3 0 . 3 4
12 1 . 3 9 0 . 2 0 0 . 6 0 0 . 4 3 1 . 0 3 0 . 1 3
13 1 . 4 7 0 . 2 3 0 . 5 3 0 . 4 2 1 . 0 4 0 . 1 2
14 1 . 6 4 0 . 1 6 0 . 6 7 0 . 2 4
15 0 . 8 7 0 . 1 0
16 1 . 4 3 0 . 1 0
N o t e : S a m p l e  s i z e s a r e  a s f o l l o w s : U . S .  1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 4 ;  U .K . 1 96 4 - 1 9 7 5 ;  J a p a n
1 9 6 5 - 1 9 8 1 ;  O t h e r  ( F i n l a n d )  q l - q 6  1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 0 ;  O t h e r  ( S w e d e n )  q 7 - q 8
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 8 0 ;  O t h e r  ( W e s t  G e r m a n y )  q 9 - q l l  1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 9 ;  O t h e r  ( B e l g i u m )  q l 2  
1 9 6 4 - 1 9 8 3 ;  O t h e r  ( C a n a d a )  q l 3  1 9 6 6 - 1 9 8 1 ;  O t h e r  ( F r a n c e )  q l 4  1 9 7 1 - 1 9 8 3 .
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Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for 1 Unit Root
Q U . S . U . K . J a p a n O t h e r
1 - 1 . 4 6 - 1 . 5 9 - 3 . 5 2  ** - 2 . 5 4
2 - 1 . 6 1 - 2 . 2 6 - 3 . 1 1  ** - 1 . 8 4
3 - 1 . 0 3 - 1 . 9 0 - 3 . 4 7  ** - 2 . 4 0
4 - 1 . 0 6 - 2 . 0 3 - 2 . 8 0  ** * - 2 . 4 9
5 - 2 . 1 0 - 2 . 2 8 - 2 . 3 9 - 1 . 9 8
6 - 1 . 9 1 - 1 . 7 5 - 3 . 3 1  ** - 2 . 3 1
7 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 5 0 - 3 . 0 4  ** - 2 . 1 4
8 - 1 . 1 8 - 2 . 5 4 - 3 . 1 0  ** - 2 . 0 0
9 - 0 . 9 8 - 2 . 4 1 - 3 . 1 0  ** - 1 . 5 2
10 - 1 . 3 2 - 2 . 3 5 - 1 . 6 1
11 - 1 . 3 2 - 2 . 1 3 - 1 . 9 1
12 - 0 . 5 2 - 2 . 2 5 - 2 . 1 5
13 - 1 . 1 9 - 2 . 1 1 - 3 . 1 7  **
14 - 0 . 2 4 - 2 . 4 8
15 - 0 . 3 6
16 - 1 . 7 4
I / K l to o a - 2 . 5 1 - 1 . 1 2 - 1 . 4 2
T a b l e  3 : A u g m e n t e d  D i c k e y - F u l l e r  T e s t  f o r  2 U n i t  R o o t s
Q U . S . U . K . J a p a n O t h e r
1 - 4 . 1 2 * - 6 . 4 4 * - 3 . 7 0  * - 3 . 3 3 **
2 - 5 . 4 8 * - 3 . 8 8 * - 3 . 9 3  * - 2 . 6 6 ***
3 - 4 . 1 0 * - 4 . 4 8 * - 3 . 4 7  ** - 2 . 7 6 ***
4 - 4 . 0 3 * - 4 . 2 0 * - 4 . 0 2  * - 3 . 3 2 **
5 - 3 . 9 5 * - 4 . 6 4 * - 4 . 1 3  * - 3 . 1 1 **
6 - 4 . 2 6 * - 4 . 2 1 * - 6 . 1 9  * - 2 . 9 0 **★
7 - 2 . 5 5 - 4 . 7 7 * - 5 . 1 9  * - 8 . 8 7 *
8 - 3 . 1 0 ** - 5 . 7 1 * - 5 . 6 4  * - 9 . 3 1 *
9 - 4 . 2 6 * - 6 . 8 6 * - 4 . 8 9  * - 4 . 5 1 *
10 - 4 . 2 0 * - 5 . 8 9 * - 4 . 4 9 *
11 - 4 . 6 2 * - 6 . 7 5 * - 3 . 3 1 **
12 - 4 . 2 4 * - 5 . 3 5 * - 3 . 8 9 *
13 - 4 . 4 4 * - 7 . 0 8 * - 2 . 9 1 ***
14 - 3 . 8 6 * - 2 . 9 6 **
15 - 4 . 1 9 *
16 - 4 . 8 7 *
I / K - 4 . 6 5 * - 5 . 0 9 * - 5 . 5 8  * - 3 . 9 9 *
T h e t e s t  s t a t i s t i c f o r  3 u n i t  r o o t s  i n  U . S .  q7  i s  - 3 . 8 7
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
** -  s i g n i f i c a n t a t  5%
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Cointegration
Q U . S .  U . K .  J a p a n  J a p a n  G e r m a n y
I / K  d ( I / K )
1 - 2 . 7 0 * * * - 2 . 7 6 ***
2 - 2 . 5 4 - 3 . 7 5 *
3 - 3 . 3 3 ** - 3 . 2 2 **
4 - 3 . 4 8 - 2 . 4 1
5 - 2 . 5 4 - 2 . 4 5
6 - 2 . 4 5 - 4 . 3 7 *
7 - 1 . 5 3 - 3 . 3 1 **
8 - 2 . 5 9 - 2 . 2 2
9 - 2 . 3 7 - 2 . 2 1
10 - 3 . 1 0 *★ - 2 . 1 3
11 - 3 . 1 5 ** - 2 . 2 1
12 - 3 . 2 3 ** - 2 . 1 0
13 - 3 . 1 5 ** - 2 . 2 7
14 - 2 . 9 2 * * *
15 - 3 . 2 5 **
16 - 2 . 5 0
- 1 . 0 0 - 6 . 2 6 *
- 0 . 9 7 - 5 . 6 3 *
- 0 . 5 5 - 5 . 7 8 *
- 1 . 5 1 - 5 . 7 8 *
- 1 . 8 3 - 5 . 4 7 *
- 0 . 9 1 - 2 . 8 9 * * *
- 0 . 6 4 - 2 . 7 4 * * *
- 0 . 9 5 - 2 . 9 3 * * *
- 0 . 7 7 - 2 . 7 8 * * *
- 2 . 7 3  ***  
- 2 . 0 1
T h e  t e s t  s t a t i s t i c  f o r  c o i n t e g r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  U . S .  I / K  a n d  U .S .  
d q 7  i s  - 1 . 6 6 .
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
** -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5%
***  _ s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  10%
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Table 5: Static Q Theory Estimated Coefficients
Q U.S. U.K. Japan Germany
a P a P a P a 0
1 9.77 2.17 7.70 0.71 1636 2.90
(15.9) (3.5) (123) (1.2) (6.5) (2.2)
2 9.73 0.72 6.25 1.73 8.42 7.92
(17.3) (3.9) (13.7) (3.9) (13) (23)
3 8.09 3.70 531 2.78 17.69 4.97
(9.7) (4.6) (8.5) (4.1) (5.2) (13)
4 8.94 2.48 6.14 0.51 14.65 3.61
(16.8) (53) (6.4) (1.6) (6.8) (33)
5 8.83 3.78 3.99 1.53 3.34 1036
(9.5) (3.4) (4.8) (4.4) (0.8) (43)
6 9.65 233 6.71 1.55 55.26 -60.5
(15.3) (3.7) (13.6) (3.6) (3.0) (1.9)
7 10.46 0.84 738 0.85 19.41 034
(93) (1.6) (103) (13) (13) (0.1)
8 9.88 1.78 8.46 -0.44 52.77 -45.7
(7.9) (1.9) (103) (1.1) (33) (22)
9 9.96 1.94 734 0.05 21.61 -1.05 1.94 3.57
(19.9) (3.8) (14.7) (0.1) (2.0) (0.2) (23) (53)
10 9.68 2.88 8.91 -0.62 0.97 4.47
(17.0) (3.9) (10.6) (1.6) (0.7) (4.0)
11 1030 1.62 7.77 -0.14 4.72 0.54
(29.7) (4.7) (14.2) (03) (8.3) (2.6)
12 9.26 2.05 5.76 3.65
(11.4) (33) (11.7) (4.0)
13 9.40 1.83 7.95 -0.60
(12.1) (3.4) (13.2) (0.6)
14 8.92 1.95
(9.5) (33)
15 12.98 -1.26
(10.7) (0.9)
16 12.81 -0.63
(103) (0.8)
Note: Equations are of the form I/K = a + 0Q. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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T a b l e  6 :  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  S u mm ary  - U n i t e d  K in g d o m
R e g r e s s o r s U h a t
Q DW F - t e s t R2 Chow LM F - t e s t  F - t e s t
q i 0 . 8 0 1 . 3 3 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 5 3 . 9 6  **
d q l 2 . 7 9 1 2 . 8 2  * 0 . 7 9 0 . 2 2 3 . 4 7 4 . 2 7  1 . 4 6
d q l 2 . 6 0 1 3 . 1 8  * 0 . 7 1 0 . 4 2 2 . 2 6
q2 1 . 2 0 1 4 . 9 7  * 0 . 4 5 2 . 2 5 4 . 9 5  **
d q 2 1 . 8 6 8 . 9 5  * 0 . 6 6 1 * 8 6 0 . 0 3 1 5 . 2 8  * 1 . 3 2
d q 2 1 . 9 0 2 . 9 7 0 . 2 8 2 . 4 2 0 . 7 8
q i 0 . 8 9 1 7 . 1 9  * 0 . 4 8 1 . 0 9 5 . 5 4  **
dq 3 1 . 8 5 3 . 2 3  ** 0 . 5 9 1 . 0 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 8 5  1 . 8 6
dq3 1 . 8 6 3 . 8 7  ** 0 . 5 6 1 . 2 9 0 . 0 6
q4 0 . 2 2 2 . 4 2 0 . 0 8 0 . 9 2 5 7 . 0 5  *
dq4 2 . 0 1 2 . 5 9 0 . 3 7 0 . 3 2 0 . 2 0 3 . 0 6  4 . 1 9
dq4 1 . 9 4 2 . 2 7 0 . 2 8 0 . 4 9 0 . 0 5
q s 0 . 4 5 1 9 . 7 4  * 0 . 4 1 2 . 2 1 2 0 . 2 6  *
dq 5 2 . 1 3 3 . 1 1  ** 0 . 4 1 0 . 3 2 0 . 5 5 4 . 2 5  ** 2 . 4 2
d q 5 1 . 9 4 2 . 4 7 0 . 3 0 0 . 4 9 0 . 1 1
q e 1 . 4 8 1 2 . 6 3  * 0 . 4 4 0 . 5 8 1 . 9 2
d q 6 1 . 7 9 9 . 4 0  * 0 . 7 0 1 . 2 2 0 . 1 6 8 . 1 4  ** 3 . 1 0
d q 6 2 . 0 9 6 . 4 7  * 0 . 5 0 1 . 0 9 0 . 0 6
q7 0 . 7 9 2 . 1 5 0 . 1 3 0 . 3 4 3 . 7 7
d q7 2 . 4 1 9 . 4 6  * 0 . 7 4 0 . 6 6 1 . 8 6 1 3 . 6 9  * 1 . 3 1
dq 7 1 . 7 7 3 . 4 1 0 . 3 8 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 2
q s 0 . 2 5 1 . 2 4 0 . 0 4 1 . 9 6 6 4 . 9 2  *
dq 8 2 . 0 2 3 . 8 6  ** 0 . 4 7 0 . 9 6 0 . 7 0 2 . 9 1  1 . 1 8
dq 8 2 . 0 2 3 . 7 8  ** 0 . 4 0 1 . 2 3 1 . 4 1
q9 0 . 1 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 3 . 0 3 **  8 0 . 8 5  *
d q 9 2 . 0 1 5 . 8 3  * 0 . 5 7 0 . 8 8 0 . 5 0 4 . 1 7  0 . 5 2
dq 9 1 . 9 6 5 . 4 9  * 0 . 4 9 1 . 2 9 1 . 3 5
q lO 0 . 2 9 2 . 5 8 0 . 0 8 1 . 3 7 5 5 . 3 3  *
d q l O 1 . 9 1 3 . 6 0  ** 0 . 4 5 0 . 9 1 0 . 4 4 2 . 8 1  0 . 9 5
d q l O 1 . 9 3 3 . 5 3  ** 0 . 3 8 1 . 2 0 1 . 1 1
q l l 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 0 2 . 1 8 8 0 . 6 4  *
d q l l 1 . 8 8 5 . 3 5  * 0 . 5 5 0 . 8 7 0 . 2 4 4 . 2 7  ** 0 . 3 3
d q l l 1 . 8 7 4 . 9 2  ** 0 . 4 6 1 . 2 9 1 . 1 1
q l 2 0 . 3 7 1 5 . 9 8  * 0 . 3 6 2 . 4 9 2 6 . 7 4  *
d q l 2 2 . 1 4 2 . 9 5  ** 0 . 4 0 0 . 5 3 0 . 2 4 3 . 7 1  1 . 8 1
d q l 2 1 . 9 8 2 . 4 6 0 . 3 0 0 . 8 0 0 . 2 0
q l 3 0 . 2 1 0 . 4 0 0 . 0 1 1 . 6 8 7 3 . 9 8  *
d q l 3 2 . 0 3 5 . 1 4  * 0 . 5 4 0 . 5 8 0 . 3 0 3 . 0 1  0 . 5 2
d q l 3 2 . 0 1 5 . 2 2  ** 0 . 4 8 0 . 8 2 0 . 9 5
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1% 
**  -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5%
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T a b l e  7 :  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s S u m m a r y  -  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
R e g r e s s o r s U h a t
Q DW F - t e s t R2 Chow LM F - t e s t F - t e s t
qi 0 . 6 7 1 2 . 3 8  * 0 . 3 1 3 . 9 9  ** 1 0 . 0 4  *
d q l 2 . 0 7 1 0 . 4 9  * 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 4 3 . 2 0 5 . 2 6  ** 0 . 2 2
d q l 1 . 8 0 9 . 8 0  * 0 . 6 5 0 . 6 4 0 . 0 3
q2 0 . 5 1 1 5 . 3 5  * 0 . 3 6 3 . 0 5  ** 1 4 . 8 2  *
dq 2 1 . 9 4 1 . 1 4 0 . 2 2 0 . 7 0 0 . 1 3 2 . 5 8 0 . 7 7
d q 2 1 . 9 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 7 9 0 . 1 0
qi 1 . 0 5 2 0 . 7 2  * 0 . 4 8 0 . 3 6 4 . 2 6  **
d q3 1 . 5 9 6 . 7 3  ** 0 . 6 9 0 . 6 8 1 . 0 5 6 . 2 4  ** 0 . 2 7
d q3 1 . 4 3 5 . 1 6  ** 0 . 5 6 1 . 2 1 1 . 5 8
q4 0 . 9 8 2 8 . 5 0  * 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 8 6 . 4 6  *
dq 4 1 . 8 6 6 . 5 8  ** 0 . 6 2 0 . 6 3 0 . 9 8 8 . 5 5  * 0 . 0 0
d q 4 1 . 7 1 4 . 4 8  ** 0 . 4 6 0 . 8 9 3 . 8 7
qs 0 . 8 0 1 1 . 2 4  * 0 . 3 3 3 . 6 8  ** 5 . 9 0  *
d q 5 1 . 8 9 5 . 4 7  ** 0 . 6 3 0 . 8 1 3 . 7 0 2 . 2 4 0 . 9 3
dq S 1 . 8 2 5 . 8 5  ** 0 . 5 8 0 . 7 3 1 . 1 3
qe 0 . 4 2 1 3 . 5 6  * 0 . 3 7 2 . 0 2 1 5 . 6 7  *
d q 6 1 . 9 6 0 . 9 0 0 . 2 2 0 . 7 8 0 . 4 6 0 . 8 9 0 . 6 4
d q 6 1 . 8 7 0 . 9 1 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 3 0 . 6 5
q7 0 . 9 5 2 . 4 9 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 8 2 . 3 3
d q 7 2 . 2 3 1 1 . 9 7  * 0 . 8 0 NA NA 1 1 . 9 3  * 0 . 2 0
d q 7 1 . 6 7 5 . 7 3  ** 0 . 5 3 NA 0 . 0 9
qs 0 . 9 8 3 . 5 5 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 2 2 . 5 8
d q 8 1 . 6 7 9 . 7 4  * 0 . 7 6 NA NA 1 . 0 2 0 . 5 4
d q 8 1 . 8 7 1 4 . 0 7  * 0 . 7 4 NA 0 . 3 7
q9 0 . 9 1 1 4 . 6 7  * 0 . 3 3 3 . 0 2 6 . 2 4  *
d q 9 1 . 8 8 4 . 7 9  ** 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 6 0 . 8 6 4 . 9 0  ** 0 . 2 9
d q 9 1 . 9 2 4 . 1 0 0 . 4 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 3 3
q l O 1 . 0 6 1 4 . 8 9  * 0 . 3 3 2 . 9 0 4 . 1 9  **
d q l O 1 . 9 6 4 . 2 7  ** 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 0 2 . 2 0 5 . 8 2  ** 1 . 6 4
d q l O 1 . 9 9 3 . 2 3 0 . 3 5 0 . 6 1 2 . 2 2
q i i 0 . 8 6 2 1 . 7 4  * 0 . 4 2 2 . 5 2 7 . 2 5  *
d q l l 1 . 9 3 9 . 8 9  * 0 . 6 8 0 . 6 2 0 . 4 5 1 0 . 1 2  * 0 . 7 4
d q l l 1 . 8 3 7 . 1 3  ** 0 . 5 4 0 . 9 7 0 . 6 5
q l 2 1 . 0 1 1 1 . 2 1  * 0 . 4 1 0 . 2 6 3 . 1 4
d q l 2 2 . 4 7 1 9 . 6 7  * 0 . 8 3 1 . 6 7 3 . 2 3 7 . 3 9  ** 0 . 3 6
d q l 2 2 . 3 5 1 7 . 3 1  * 0 . 7 3 1 . 2 5 0 . 4 3
q l 3 1 . 1 6 1 1 . 2 3  * 0 . 4 1 0 . 2 7 2 . 2 5
d q l 3 2 . 1 3 1 6 . 1 0  * 0 . 8 0 1 . 9 6 0 . 2 2 3 . 5 3 0 . 6 9
d q l 3 2 . 2 7 1 8 . 7 4  * 0 . 7 4 1 . 9 5 0 . 3 6
q l 4 1 . 0 2 1 0 . 4 6  * 0 . 4 0 0 . 3 2 2 . 8 9
d q l  4 2 . 2 8 1 4 . 6 0  * 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 5 2 . 5 1 1 0 . 5 0  * 0 . 0 0
d q l 4 1 . 9 1 9 . 6 2  * 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 9 0 . 1 6
q l 5 0 . 6 4 0 . 8 7 0 . 0 3 6 . 4 2  * 1 3 . 1 8  *
d q l  5 1 . 7 2 2 . 3 5 0 . 3 7 1 . 3 2 2 . 3 1 1 . 1 9 0 . 3 0
d q l 5 1 . 6 8 2 . 6 2 0 . 3 3 1 . 5 5 3 . 5 7  **
q l 6 0 . 6 2 0 . 5 8 0 . 0 2 6 . 3 2  * 1 4 . 4 4  *
d q l 6 1 . 6 2 2 . 0 1 0 . 3 3 1 . 6 4 2 . 5 3 0 . 3 2 2 . 4 6
d q l  6 1 . 6 1 2 . 5 1 0 . 3 2 1 . 5 4 2 . 0 6
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
** -  sign ificant at 5% 163
Table 8: Regression Results Summary - West Germany
Q
R e g r e s s o r s  
DW F - t e s t R2 Chow LM
U h a t  
F - t e s t F - t e s t
q9 1 . 0 2 2 9 . 8 4  * 0 . 6 1 1 . 8 8 2 . 9 8
dq9 2 . 0 2 4 . 5 9  * 0 . 6 6 1 . 2 8 2 . 4 8 3 . 4 2 0 . 7 1
dq 9 2 . 2 7 4 . 1 2  ** 0 . 5 6 0 . 1 4 2 . 7 9
q lO 1 . 0 4 1 6 . 0 9  * 0 . 4 9 1 . 5 9 3 . 1 1
d q l O 1 . 8 8 7 . 4 7  * 0 . 6 5 1 . 3 8 0 . 2 7 4 . 9 2  ** 0 . 9 4
d q l O 2 . 2 0 6 . 7 1  * 0 . 5 1 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 4
q l l 0 . 8 9 6 . 6 6  ** 0 . 3 4 7 . 7 3  ** 2 . 1 5
d q l l 1 . 5 1 4 . 0 3  ** 0 . 5 7 0 . 8 6 NA 5 . 7 3  ** 0 . 2 1
d q l l 1 . 4 6 2 . 1 6 0 . 3 0 0 . 2 3 3 . 2 1
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t a t  1%
** -  s i g n i f i c a n t a t  5%
T a b l e  9 :  :R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s Su mm ary  f o r d ( I / K ) -  J a p a n
R e g r e s s o r s q d q
Q DW F - t e s t R2 Chow LM F - t e s t F - t e s t
q i 1 . 6 1 2 . 6 5 0 . 1 0 0 . 2 3 3 . 1 4 1 2 . 3 7  * 0 . 1 7
q l  l a g s 1 . 7 4 2 . 8 7  ** 0 . 3 8 0 . 9 7 0 . 3 0
q2 1 . 5 8 0 . 6 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 7 3 . 1 6 9 . 5 4  * 1 . 2 8
q 2  l a g s 1 . 6 9 2 . 1 7 0 . 3 1 0 . 8 5 0 . 4 2
q3 1 . 5 9 0 . 8 4 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 6 3 . 2 3 8 . 4 7  * 1 . 3 6
q3  l a g s 1 . 7 6 2 . 3 0 0 . 3 3 1 . 1 7 0 . 3 2
q4 1 . 6 4 2 . 7 2 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 9 2 . 6 0 6 . 2 0  ** 0 . 1 8
q4  l a g s 1 . 5 5 3 . 9 9  ** 0 . 4 6 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 8
qs 1 . 6 0 0 . 8 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 2 3 2 . 8 3 4 . 8 4  ** 1 . 1 6
q 5  l a g s 1 . 4 6 3 . 1 5  ** 0 . 4 0 0 . 6 2 1 . 2 1
qe 1 . 2 3 0 . 4 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 6 5 1 . 3 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 3
q 6  l a g s 1 . 1 6 3 . 4 7  ** 0 . 3 5 0 . 1 7 3 . 1 5
q7 1 . 2 9 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 8 0 . 9 0 0 . 0 1 3 . 2 3
q 7  l a g s 1 . 4 3 0 . 8 0 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 4 2 . 0 5
qs 1 . 2 4 0 . 7 2 0 . 0 5 0 . 7 8 1 . 4 3 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 5
q8  l a g s 1 . 1 8 3 . 4 1 0 . 3 4 0 . 2 3 3 . 0 0
q9 1 . 2 8 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 4 1 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 2 . 1 2
q 9  l a g s 1 . 4 3 0 . 8 0 0 . 1 1 0 . 0 3 2 . 1 3
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1% 
**  -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5%
T a b l e  1 0 :  A u g m e n t e d  D i c k e y - F u l l e r  T e s t s  f o r  I n t e g r a t i o n  
R e a l  S t o c k  P r i c e s
R S a m p l e  1 R o o t  2 R o o t s  C o i n t e g r a t i o n
U . K . 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 - 2 . 3 3 - 5 . 6 7 * - 2 . 9 3
U . S . 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 - 2 . 0 0 - 4 . 6 5 * - 3 . 0 0
J a p a n 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 1 . 6 2 - 2 . 1 9 - 2 . 5 6
1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 1 - 1 . 4 7 - 5 . 1 2 * - 2 . 0 3
J a p a n 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 - 1 . 4 2 - 5 . 2 7 * - 2 . 5 6
l n ( R ) 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 1 - 2 . 1 9 - 4 . 5 7 * - 2 . 0 3
W e s t 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 6 - 2 . 4 1 - 5 . 1 1 * - 0 . 9 9
G e r m a n y 1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 1 - 2 . 1 3 - 1 0 . 2 3 * - 3 . 9 0
T a b l e  1 1 :  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  S um ma ry  -  R e a l  S t o c k  P r i c e s
R e g r e s s o r s  U h a t
DW F - t e s t  R2 Chow 121 F - t e s t  F - t e s t
U . K .  0 . 4 7  1 7 . 9 7  * 0 . 3 5  1 . 0 5  1 9 . 2 6  *
1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 2 . 0 6 5 . 1 0 * 0 . 5 0 0 . 6 3 0 . 7 7 8 . 3 8  * 1 . 7 3
1 . 9 3 3 . 3 6 ** 0 . 3 3 0 . 5 7 0 . 0 6
U . S . 0 . 7 9 1 0 . 5 4 * 0 . 2 4 1 . 1 3 9 . 0 8 *
1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 1 . 8 5 7 . 3 1 * 0 . 5 8 0 . 9 1 0 . 2 3 9 . 3 6  * 4 . 3 0  **
2 . 0 6 5 . 1 9 * 0 . 4 3 1 . 0 5 0 . 7 8
J a p a n 0 . 4 9 2 2 . 3 1 * 0 . 4 0 4 . 0 6 * 2 5 . 4 8 *
1 9 5 2 - 1 9 8 6 1 . 8 5 3 . 2 9 ★ ★ 0 . 3 9 0 . 9 2 0 . 2 4 1 . 2 8 0 . 3 2
1 . 8 7 3 . 7 5 *★ 0 . 3 6 0 . 9 0 0 . 1 8
1 9 5 5 - 1 9 8 1 0 . 5 8 8 . 4 7 * 0 . 2 5 4 . 3 9 * 1 0 . 5 2 *
1 . 7 3 1 . 9 3 0 . 3 5 0 . 8 9 0 . 8 4 0 . 7 0 2 . 8 3
1 . 7 6 2 . 2 9 0 . 3 3 0 . 9 3 0 . 3 1
W e s t 0 . 3 5 1 6 . 6 9 * 0 . 4 1 4 . 0 5 ** 2 8 . 5 1 *
G e r m a n y 2 . 0 3 2 . 9 3 0 . 4 6 0 . 8 9 1 . 5 7 3 . 4 5 0 . 0 0
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 6 1 . 9 6 2 . 4 6 0 . 3 5 0 . 3 0 0 . 0 3
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 1 1 . 0 1 4 6 . 5 8 * 0 . 7 1 0 . 6 3 5 . 8 5 **
1 . 9 5 7 . 1 6 * 0 . 7 5 0 . 3 0 0 . 4 2 1 4 . 7 5  * 1 . 2 0
1 . 7 9 2 . 5 6 0 . 4 4 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 1
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
**  -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5%
* * *  _ s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  10%
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T a b l e  1 2 :  N o n - n e s t e d  M o d e l  C o m p a r i s o n s :  R e a l  S t o c k  
C u r r e n t  a n d  L a g g e d  V a l u e s  F - t e s t
P r i c e s a n d  Q
Q U . S .  U . K .  J a p a n  
R Q R Q R Q
W e s t  G e r m a n y  
R Q
1 0 . 9 8 2 . 1 2 1 . 1 8 8 . 4 2 ** 2 . 8 8 4 . 4 6 **
2 0 . 7 7 1 . 4 6 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 0 3 . 2 6 4 . 6 2 *★
3 0 . 4 9 1 . 9 3 0 . 3 5 1 . 7 9 2 . 7 2 3 . 2 7
4 0 . 0 9 0 . 8 0 1 . 4 4 1 . 0 0 1 . 4 9 3 . 6 9 **
5 0 . 9 6 0 . 8 7 0 . 2 5 5 . 9 4 * 1 . 7 3 2 . 7 7
6 0 . 2 9 6 . 8 3 * 1 . 2 2 5 . 6 6 ** 2 . 1 8 4 . 2 3 **
7 1 0 . 3 8 * 3 . 1 4 1 . 1 3 5 . 0 1 ** 0 . 9 3 2 . 1 8
8 0 . 0 1 4 . 2 4 0 . 6 2 3 . 6 9 ** 3 . 1 3 5 . 6 0 **
9 0 . 8 1 0 . 5 9 0 . 2 8 5 . 2 3 ** 1 . 4 8 2 . 8 2 5 . 1 0 ** 1 . 7 9
10 2 . 3 7 0 . 4 0 0 . 5 2 4 . 2 1 ** 5 . 6 6 ** 2 . 1 0
11 0 . 6 1 4 . 7 2 ** 0 . 6 5 5 . 8 3 * 4 . 0 9 0 . 0 1
12 0 . 3 7 1 . 7 6 0 . 4 9 1 . 4 0
13 0 . 6 6 4 . 9 4 ** 0 . 0 8 1 . 7 7
14 1 . 9 9 0 . 8 5
15 6 . 4 3 * 3 . 5 7 **
16 6 . 4 6 * 1 . 6 9
T a b l e  1 3 :  N o n - n e s t e d M o d e l  C o m p a r i s o n s :  R e a l  
L a g g e d  V a l u e s  F - t e s t
S t o c k P r i c e s a n d  Q
Q U . S .
R Q
U . K .
R Q R
J a p a n
Q
W e s t  G e r m a n y  
R Q
1 1 . 3 1 4 . 5 3 * 0 . 1 4 1 4 . 6 2 * 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 2
2 1 7 . 8 6 * 0 . 0 6 0 . 3 6 0 . 2 1 0 . 1 4 1 . 4 6
3 0 . 1 3 3 . 6 2 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 8 0 . 7 0
4 0 . 0 1 2 . 7 2 5 . 7 5 * ★ 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9
5 0 . 9 5 1 . 6 2 5 . 3 6 ** 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 4 0 . 2 8
6 1 9 . 2 8 * 0 . 6 8 0 . 0 0 3 . 6 3 4 . 0 1 1 9 . 9 7 *
7 2 . 8 3 0 . 6 0 0 . 0 0 1 . 6 3 6 . 4 6 ** 1 3 . 8 5 *
8 0 . 5 4 4 . 7 6 0 . 6 8 4 . 9 0 ** 3 . 0 8 1 8 . 8 5 *
9 1 . 4 9 1 . 7 0 0 . 0 2 9 . 2 0 * 5 . 9 5 **  1 4 . 4 4 * 0 . 0 4 3 . 9 3
10 5 . 1 2 * 1 . 0 9 0 . 6 5 4 . 5 2 *★ 0 . 0 0 3 . 4 1
11 0 . 3 7 7 . 7 0 * 0 . 0 1 7 . 8 7 * 3 . 6 7 0 . 1 0
12 0 . 0 1 5 . 1 0 ** 8 . 8 5 ★ 2 . 9 3
13 0 . 0 0 6 . 1 1 ** 0 . 3 1 5 . 0 0 **
14 1 . 5 9 1 . 1 0
15 8 . 7 5 * 3 . 7 1
16 1 1 . 5 6 * 2 . 7 9
N o t e :  * -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1%
**  -  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5%
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Diagram 1: Q Variables in the United States
q2
q6
qi3
ql5
q l 6
4.5
4 0
3 0
2 . 5
2 . 0
1 3
1 . 0
0 . 3
0.0
19 ?•
Diagram 2: Q Variables in the United States
qs
q7
qa
qi2
ql4
2 . B  -
2 . 4  -
2 . 0  -
0 .8  -
0.8
0 . 4  .
0 .2  -
0.0
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Diagram 3: Q Variables in the United States
■ - ql
+ - q3
♦ - q4
4 - q9
X - qlO
T - qll
O
9
a
7
6
1 .5
1 . 4
1 . 3
1 . 2
1.1
1 . 0
0.0
0.0
0 . 7
0.0
0.5
0 . 4
0 . 3
0 . 2
0.1
0 . 0
1003
Diagram 4: Q Variables in the United Kingdom
+ - q8
♦ - q9
* - qlO 
X - qll 
■ - ql3
2 . 0  -
0.0
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Diagram 5: Q Variables in the United Kingdom
■ - ql 
+ -  q2 
♦ - q3 
a - q6
x - q7
■ - q4 
+ - q5 
♦ - ql2
Diagram 6: Q Variables in the United Kingdom
169
Diagram 7: Q Variables in Japan
♦ -  q l  
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0
3
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Diagram 8: Q Variables in Japan
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Diagram 9: Q Variables in Finland
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Diagram 10: Q Variables in West Germany
q9
qlO
qll
19€1
Diagram 11: Q Variables in Other Countries
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Chapter V: Stock Prices and Corporate Investment
I. Introduction
Chapter IV came to the conclusion that specifying Q in first differences as an error 
correction model is one solution to the empirical problems thrown up by static Q 
theory. However, the generally low explanatory power of Q equations and the cross­
country differences identified in the chapter suggest that there may be other 
important omitted explanatory variables. The bivariate framework previously 
employed is, therefore, extended in this chapter by including other determinants of 
investment, such as interest rates and real output. As well, cost of capital measures 
and debt-equity ratios are employed to introduce other means by which stock prices 
affect corporate investment.
The present chapter, motivated by the crash of 1987, examines whether exogenous 
events whose only direct effect is to change stock prices can indirectly affect 
corporate investment through the stock price mechanism. Empirically, aggregate 
stock prices are a leading indicator used to predict cyclical changes, even though, 
in the U.S., they are regarded to have predicted "thirteen of the last five recessions". 
However, this does not necessarily provide any evidence for the stock market playing 
a structural role.
It is therefore argued here that the actual ’structural’ effect of share price changes 
on investment will depend on managerial autonomy; in turn, such autonomy depends, 
in part, on the use of the takeover mechanism, the size of the quoted sector, gearing 
ratios, and the role of employees in corporate decision-making. In general, the 
prominence of these institutional factors implies that the importance of the stock 
market will vary considerably across countries. In particular, one expects the stock 
market to be less influential in Japan or Germany, when compared with the U.S. or 
the U.K., respectively. All this is the subject of Section II.
Some evidence is provided in this regard by estimating flexible accelerator 
investment equations which are modified to allow for a richer set of financial factors
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(motivated by a fear of bankruptcy). These estimates (presented in Section III) and 
some non structural VARS, do bear out an a priori view that the stock market is 
more important in the Anglo-Saxon economies.
As well, this fact may go some way to explaining other differences between these 
four countries. For example, it may be one reason why the Japanese and Germans 
invest more, and it may also help explain why higher inflation appears to be 
associated with higher declines in output in the Anglo-Saxon countries. These issues 
are discussed in Section IV, along with other conclusions to the chapter.
174
II. Theoretical Considerations
Ha. Stock Market Influences on Investment
This chapter asks whether exogenous events whose only direct effect is to change 
stock prices can indirectly affect corporate investment through the stock price 
mechanism. The standard theoretical answer to this question is yes (see, e.g., Fischer 
and Merton (1984), who provide the following example).
Consider an initial equilibrium where the expected return on the market and the 
yield on the firm’s marginal new investment are both 15 percent. Suppose that an 
exogenous increase in aggregate risk aversion causes share prices to decline to the 
point where they now yield an expected return of 20 percent, while the marginal 
investment project still continues to yield only 15 percent. Now, managers who act 
in the interests of their existing shareholders will cancel all planned investments 
with expected returns less than 20 percent. This argument would continue to hold 
even if the reduction in share prices were caused by an irrational change in investors’ 
perceptions of the future. Thus, Fischer and Merton conclude that ”... actions by 
rational and informed managers will not offset the effects of irrational investors on 
investment.”
However, the above argument relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. For 
example, it is well known that under conditions of uncertainty, shareholders will not 
generally be unanimous about the best policy for the firm to pursue.1 These 
differences in opinion between shareholders can create some discretionary power for 
management to pursue their own goals. Therefore, it is possible that managers may 
choose to assign less weight to share prices when formulating investment decisions 
than they would if they were acting purely in the interests of the existing 
shareholders.
There are also other possible reasons why managers may not seek to pursue share 
price maximisation. According to Leontief (1946), for example, if employment is set 
as the result of a bargain between firms and unions, rather than on the basis of
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profit (share price) maximisation conditional on wages, both the employer and the 
union can be made better off. Therefore, considerations of internal efficiency suggest 
that managers may deviate from share price maximisation when choosing the 
appropriate level of employment and investment.
Another reason why share prices may be partially ignored by managers is if the 
market is widely perceived to be myopic and, hence, unreliable as a guide to efficient 
managerial decision-making. For example, one industrial survey in the U.K. found 
that 85 per cent of managers felt that the market took too short term a view of their 
investment decisions. Also in the U.K., the Bank of England’s former executive 
director responsible for the securities market and former Chancellor Lawson 
apparently share the view that " big institutional investors nowadays increasingly 
react to short-term pressure on investment performance ... (they) are unwilling to 
countenance long-term investment or a sufficient expenditure on research and 
development".2
The preceding discussion is consistent with the available survey evidence (presented 
below) which suggests that maximisation of the firm’s share price is not perceived 
to be the most important managerial objective. Given this assumption regarding 
managerial behaviour, international differences in the extent of managerial power 
will, therefore, influence the extent to which the stock market affects investment. It 
is to this that we turn next.
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lib. Institutional Differences Across Countries
There is some empirical support for the view that managers pay less attention to the 
stock market in Japan than in the U.S. in the form of survey evidence, which is 
presented in Table 1. Notice that while securing a capital gain for shareholders is 
the second most important objective for American managers, it is the least most 
important objective for their Japanese counterparts. This difference may be at least 
partly explicable in terms of the cross-country institutional factors discussed below, 
which are set out to differentiate Japanese and German institutional behaviour from 
that of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
The first institutional difference is that takeovers are relatively rare in Japan or 
Germany, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon economies. In the case of Japan, a recent 
Hi Tech Dictionary listing under Takeover bids describes American practice and 
goes on to say that "Japanese law was changed in 1972 to permit similar bid 
proceedings in this country, but the idea of taking over a company simply by the 
power of money seems too dorai (dry) to us Japanese, and in practice it never 
happens."3 While cultural differences do not necessarily explain the absence of hostile 
takeovers (the close links between banks and industry, and the fact that banks will 
replace inefficient managers must surely play a part), the empirical absence of such 
takeovers suggests that at the minimum, shareholders do not exercise one of the 
usual methods of ensuring that managers obey their wishes.4
Turning to Germany, hostile takeovers are also relatively rare, but this fact should 
be set in the context of a quoted sector that is, by international standards, very small. 
For example, Table 2 shows that the ratio of market capitalization to GDP is about 
25 per cent in Germany as compared to 80 per cent in Japan, 85 per cent in the 
U.K. and 76 per cent in the U.S.. In addition to the quoted sector being small, it has 
been estimated that only about 30 shares are actually actively traded (see BEQB
(1984)) with the other shares being closely held and, therefore, less vulnerable to a 
takeover anyway.5
i
!
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A second reason why managers might be able to pay less attention to shareholders 
in Japan and Germany, as compared to the U.S. or the U.K., is the fact that 
employees play a much larger role in decision making. In Germany, workers are 
represented on the supervisory council, with all actions of management being subject 
to the broad supervisory powers of this council.6 In addition, the law also requires 
that employee representation in the form of works* councils be instituted in all 
establishments that normally have five or more permanent employees. These works’ 
councils discuss a wide range of issues, including being consulted on investment and 
employment decisions.
Turning to Japan, most informed observers agree that permanent employees do have 
a say in the decisions of the firm - for example, Komiya and Yasui (1984) assert that 
"from the firm’s perspective... permanent employees represent more important assets 
than customers and stockholders ... It is not going too far to say that under Japan’s 
lifetime employment system, a firm’s regular employees are the firm itself."
There is less agreement about the role of employees in decision-making in the U.S. 
or the U.K.. There is now a sub-industry of papers that try to test whether or not 
firms and unions bargain over employment (e.g., Brown and Ashenfelter (1986)). 
Although these papers do not all agree on an answer, the very fact that this issue 
is controversial differentiates these Anglo-Saxon economies from either Germany 
or Japan.
A third reason why managers may be more anxious to maximise the share price in 
the Anglo-Saxon economies is the fact that a part of their remuneration is often 
directly linked to the stock market. Such share option schemes are virtually unknown 
in either Germany or Japan.
Finally, a fourth reason why the stock market may exert a smaller influence in 
Germany or Japan is the well-known fact that gearing ratios are much higher in 
these countries when compared with the Anglo-Saxon economies. Table 3 presents 
evidence on these differences in gearing.7 A higher gearing ratio means that 
managers need not concern themselves too much with the wishes of the shareholders,
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provided that they command the confidence of their bankers.
So, to sum up, the relative absence of takeovers, the higher gearing ratios, the 
greater importance accorded to employees in decision-making and the lesser 
importance of stock market related managerial remuneration, all make it more likely 
that managers are able to pay less attention to the stock market in Germany or 
Japan, as compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries.
So far, reasons have been put forth to explain why the stock market may not 
significantly affect investment in Japan or Germany. However, none of this should 
be interpreted as implying that managers in the Anglo-Saxon countries give as much 
weight to the stock market as textbook models imply.
In fact, survey evidence for the U.K. does suggest that practice departs significantly 
from the textbook ideal.8 This impression also appears to have been borne out by 
the fact that the 1987 stock market crash has failed to affect investment intentions 
in the U.K., with only 4% of business men saying that the crash represented "a 
genuine deterioration in the world economic outlook” - the vast majority of survey 
respondents believing instead that it represented "the inevitable puncturing of a 
speculative boom".9
The arguments presented above provide some reasons to think that managers in 
Japan and West Germany are able to pay less attention to share price movements. 
Little has been said thus far, however, about why managers might wish to ignore 
fluctuations in share prices when formulating investment decisions. This issue will 
now be briefly discussed.
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lie. Managerial Incentives to Ignore Stock Prices
The survey evidence given above supports the view that, contrary to the textbook 
ideal, maximising the share price is not the most important managerial goal. There 
may be several reasons for this including the fact that managers may derive utility 
from the size of the firm per se, and may not want to be deflected from this goal by 
the wishes of stockholders.
Another reason why managers might not want to be overly influenced by the stock 
market is if the market were myopic, in the sense of attaching too high a weight to 
current dividends relative to future dividends (see Nickell and Wadhwani (1987)). 
In this case, a project (e.g. R&D spending) which yields negative returns in the early 
years, but is a positive NPV project overall, will depress the share price today. If 
managers feel that the project is important for the long-term survival of the company, 
they would want to go ahead with it provided that they can ignore their shareholders.
A third relevant consideration already mentioned is managerial remuneration - as 
shown above, managers in Japan are more concerned with fluctuations in earnings 
(to which their pay is linked) than in share prices.
However, it should be stressed that it is possible to conceive of circumstances where 
the relationship between the extent of shareholder control over management and the 
influence of share prices on investment may not be monotonic. In other words, the 
absence of shareholder control may actually strengthen the linkage between 
investment and stock market fluctuations.
To illustrate this, consider the following example where the stock market is 
temporarily overvalued, so that the return on a marginal investment project, rp 
exceeds the required return on equity, rE, but the long-run return on equity equals 
rr If managers only care about their existing shareholders, then, as Fischer and 
Merton (1984) point out, the firm will undertake further investment.
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However, suppose that investment is irreversible so that the firm will be stuck with 
investments which will fail to earn the future long-run required rate of return. In 
this case, rational managers who are not perfectly controlled by existing shareholders, 
but fear the possibility of a future takeover, might be deterred from investing today. 
On the other hand, managers who have some discretion but do not fear future 
takeovers might still invest today because, surely, this is a way of obtaining "cheap 
money" in order to further their ambitions for the growth of the firm.10
So, in the "cheap money" scenario, we appear to have an example where the absence 
of hostile takeovers may actually make investment more responsive to share prices. 
However, this example probably has less relevance to the present international 
comparison, for although we do not see hostile takeovers in Japan or Germany, 
managers still run the risk of being replaced as a result of actions initiated by banks. 
A manager who undertook an investment project just because the market was 
temporarily overvalued would run the risk of being perceived as being plainly 
inefficient when the investment turns sour in the future. So, he too would be 
deterred from responding to the high share price today. Since banks in Japan and 
Germany probably represent a more direct and tangible disciplinary force than the 
fear of a future takeover in the Anglo-Saxon world, it seems that even here the stock 
market will exert a smaller influence in Germany and Japan.11
We now turn to consider whether the econometric evidence is consistent with the 
view that exogenous movements in the stock market are less important in influencing 
corporate investment decisions in either Japan or Germany.
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III. Econometric Evidence
This chapter is primarily interested in whether exogenous changes in stock prices 
affect investment. Therefore, the approach will be to assess whether share prices 
provide any additional explanatory power for investment, once we have controlled 
for the conventional determinants of investment - e.g. output, interest rates, taxes 
etc. Estimates of a simple investment - Q relationship are not reported here, because 
it does not, of itself, answer the question that is of interest. One may, after all, 
observe a positive relationship between investment and Q which disappears once 
output or some other variable has been entered in the regression.12
As a preliminary to examining the formal econometric evidence, and following on 
the analysis of Chapter IV above, Table 4 presents some simple correlations between 
I/K and Q. At first glance, the numbers are actually higher for Germany and Japan 
over the entire period. However, a division of the sample to account for the recent 
international bull market in equities shows that the correlations in these two 
countries are actually negative after 1979. Such instability indicates that the I/K and 
Q correlation is probably not structural and may arise from the fact that other 
relevant determinants of investment are omitted here. For this reason, the next 
section examines a model of investment where Q is only one of many possible 
explanatory factors.
Ilia. The Basic Model
There is a huge literature on investment equations, but for our purposes we shall 
use a modified version of the flexible capital stock adjustment model developed by 
Jorgenson (1963), and used by many others, as the test-bed. Of course, this model 
is not without its problems (for an extensive discussion of them, see, e.g., Nickell 
(1978)). The model specifies the profit-maximising level of the capital stock,
(1) K* = *(C/P, Y) < 0, > 0
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where C is the annual cost of capital, P is the price of output and Y is the level of 
output. Assuming that investment is subject to delivery and installation lags, and 
that the existing capital stock decays at the depreciation rate 6,
T
(2) I. -  XL W j(< -i -  + *K,-1
J=U
where It is gross investment and K ,^, is the level of the capital stock.
The modification to the model made here is to assume that managers maximise 
profits net of expected bankruptcy costs, and so the desired level of the capital stock 
(K*) will depend on variables that affect the probability of bankruptcy.13
Assume that firm i finances its capital stock by, in part, borrowing a sum of money 
which has to be repaid with interest at the end of the first period; denote the total 
sum to be repaid as D f. However, because the return to this investment is uncertain, 
there is some risk that the firm will not make sufficient profits to meet its 
commitments, a situation where profits (tT|) are less than D f - of course, tt1- depends 
on I. Assume also for simplicity that the liquidation value of the capital stock is 
zero, possibly because it is highly product-specific. Denote the value of the firm if 
it stays in existence by Vf.
Now, suppose at the end of the period it becomes clear that irf + V,- < O. Then, in 
a complete information world, shareholders and bondholders will wish to wind up 
the business. Although this may be the optimal course from the point of view of the 
shareholders and bondholders, it is possible that managers might not prefer this 
outcome, and hence the initial investment decision may be partially conditioned by 
its effect on the probability that tt1- + V1- < O.
In addition, in a world with asymmetric information, where shareholders know the 
true value of the firm but bondholders do not, bankruptcy may also occur when Vf 
> O, but 7T- + V,- < Dj, where jr? denotes the actual profit for the year (see, on this, 
Webb (1987)). This occurs because bondholders are imperfectly informed about
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whether or not Vf > 0, and may find it worthwhile to force the firm into bankruptcy 
in an attempt to discover the true state of affairs.
So, to summarise, bankruptcies seem to occur when + V. < 0 or when xf + V. 
< D,. Rescaling by a high Vi/K i, low D f/K f, or high irf/K f all make 
bankruptcies less likely.
Now, for the purposes of the analysis here, it is assumed that the investment decision 
affects profits but, for simplicity, managers take D f/K { and V f/K, as fixed.14 
Therefore, we have
(3) K* = *(D/K, V/K, C/P, Y)
^ D / K  » ^ C / P  <  ^ V / K  » >  ®
instead of Equation (1). So, the optimal level of the capital stock may be influenced 
by the conventional variables, the debt ratio and Tobin’s Q (defined as V/K). 
Further, as a practical matter, banks may look at book values of debt and equity, 
in addition to market values; therefore, the debt-equity ratio at book value (BDE) 
will be included in Equation (3). The modified framework used here accommodates 
the Q theory and the Jorgensonian cost of capital approach as special nested cases.
The cost of capital term (in the absence of taxes, for the moment) is
(4) C = P, (R + 5)
where Pj is the price of investment goods and R denotes the cost of funds. The 
empirical proxy used for R varies considerably across studies. For example, Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967) use a fixed nominal interest rate, Gorden and Jorgenson (1976) 
use the after-tax interest rate on long-term bonds, while Feldstein (1982) uses a 
weighted average cost of capital measure,
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(5) C = ( e+d V d + { e+d } fE
where rD is the real interest rate on debt and rE is the real return on equity.
The appropriate way of measuring the cost of capital is, therefore, a controversial 
area and, since the purpose of this chapter is to determine the effect of the stock 
market on investment, it would be unwise to overly restrict the definition of the cost 
of capital.15 Instead,
(6) C/P = e ^ r ^ D /V j y P )
here, where V = D + E, and each element is entered separately into the investment 
equations.
Finally, an implication of the foregoing analysis is that the debt-capital ratio, D f/Kj, 
only affects the probability of bankruptcy if bondholders know less about the firm 
than shareholders. Since banks have especially close links with firms in Japan and 
Germany, it is unlikely that the probability of bankruptcy would be influenced by 
the debt-equity ratio - indeed, Corbett (1987) argues that the active role played by 
Japanese banks when firms experience financial distress implies that what"... goes 
by the name of debt in Japan appears to have many features of the equity 
relationship”.16 This then implies that rises in debt-equity ratios should not lead to 
higher financial risk and lower investment in Germany or Japan (unlike the 
Anglo-Saxon countries) - this is something that will be tested empirically below.
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Illb. Estimated Model, Methodology, Data and Results
Having allowed for the existence of adjustment costs, habit persistence and decision 
lags, the regression equation takes the form:
(7) «,(L) I/K, = a2 + a,(L) dY, + „4(L) rot
+ a5(L) rEt + a6(L) D /E t + a^L) BDGt 
+ Og(L) Q, + a,(L) P ,/P ,
where all variables have been defined previously, with details regarding sources and 
construction provided in Appendix III.
An issue of some importance is that the coefficients in Equation (7) are unlikely to 
be structural in nature because they reflect, in part, expectational considerations. 
Simultaneity bias may arise because of the absence of valid instruments and the 
’Lucas critique’ implies that the coefficients may be unstable over time. Sims (1980) 
recommends a shift to atheoretical VARs to address these problems. Unfortunately, 
such an approach precludes interpreting the estimated coefficients and, in any case, 
relies on a priori exclusion restrictions with regard to the appropriate right hand 
side variables.17
A more traditional estimation approach is, therefore, followed in the analysis below. 
The issue of simultaneity bias is resolved by relying on ’approximate identification’, 
where variables are excluded from the equation on the grounds that they do not 
matter in a statistically significant fashion. Sargan’s (1958) test of over-identifying 
restrictions is used to test for this directly. The ’Lucas critique’ is a common problem 
for this approach and VARs alike, and is tested by employing Chow tests for 
structural break.
This treatment of expectations still means that any statistically significant relationship 
between investment and the stock market could be proxying for future expectations 
and may, therefore, lack a structural basis. If it is true, however, that the stock 
market matters in Anglo-Saxon countries but not in Japan or Germany, then this
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would be consistent with the market playing a structural role in the former pair of 
countries. The reason for such a conclusion is that the market should be significant 
for all four countries if it is acting as a proxy for expectations, and not just for the 
U.K. and the U.S. alone.
Equation (7) was estimated for all four countries. Initially, because of the dangers 
of overparameterisation of the equations, 7(L) and 9(L) were set to zero, and 
preferred versions of Equation (7) were obtained. Having done so, the excluded 
variables were added in turn. Recall that we are primarily interested in whether the 
stock market matters, i.e. in whether rE, D /E  or Q are significant - and are 
indifferent between which of these actually matters.
The preferred versions of equation (7) for the four countries are reported in Tables 
5, 7, 9 and 11. These equations suggest some support for the basic hypothesis that 
the equity market directly affects investment in the U.S. and U.K. but not in 
Germany or Japan. Specifically, the stock market affects investment through the 
terms in rEt.1 and D /E t in the U.K., while in the U.S., the stock market "matters" 
because of the d(D/E)t.1 term.
Turning to the United Kingdom and Table 5 first, one sees that various cost of 
capital elements are statistically significant, as well as the accelerator (output) terms. 
The equation is reasonably well specified, with a Lagrangian Multiplier test against 
an AR(2)/MA(2) error term (denoted AR(2) here) suggesting no evidence of 
residual autocorrelation, while a mid-sample Chow test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of coefficient stability. As well, the instrumental variable estimates of the 
preferred equation are quite similar to the OLS estimates; Sargan’s test of over­
identifying restrictions is also satisfied. Finally, it is interesting to note that a decline 
in the stock market which causes the debt-equity ratio to rise by 10% reduces I/K  
by 2.1% in the long run.
As noted in Table 6, neither tax adjusted nor non tax adjusted Q variables are 
statistically significant factors when added to the preferred investment equation. 
Even though Chapter IV demonstrated that Q is correlated to investment, it appears
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that this results from the exclusion of other relevant explanatory variables. It will 
be seen below that this conclusion holds for the other countries as well.
A number of other variables were added to the U.K. investment equation in Table
5. The cost of capital was entered as a single entity, rather than using its separate 
components as in the preferred specification. As seen in Table 6, this variable adds 
no additional explanatory power. Another variable which is considered is the level 
of the real money supply, as suggested by Gordon and Veitch (1987). Again, there 
is no additional explanatory power.
Finally, the effect of takeover activity on investment is considered in Table 6. As 
argued above, one possible reason for the influence of the stock market on 
investment is the role of hostile takeovers. Therefore, one might expect managers to 
pay more attention to stock prices when takeover activity is high. The ratio of the 
value of acquisitions to the capital stock is interacted with the two equity terms in 
the preferred equation to test for a positive influence between investment and 
takeover activity via the stock market. While the estimated coefficient has the 
anticipated sign, it is nevertheless statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
The U.S. results in Tables 7 and 8 show that accelerator and equity terms are 
significant factors in explaining investment, although none of the individual cost of 
capital elements remain in the equation. Like the results for the U.K., Tobin’s Q, the 
integrated cost of capital term, the level of real money supply and the takeover 
interaction variables are not significant; in some cases, these variables are also 
incorrectly signed. The preferred equation is properly specified, according to the 
Chow and AR(2) test statistics, and the instrumental variable estimates are very 
close to the OLS coefficient estimates.
The preferred equations in Tables 9 and 11 for West Germany and Japan are rather 
similar. Both include accelerator terms and the real long term interest rate but 
neither show any stock market effect. As before, these equations do not exhibit 
structural break or autocorrelated residuals; they also have very similar OLS and 
IV coefficient estimates and satisfy the Sargan test for over-identification.
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The German equity market terms (D/E, rE and Q) are almost uniformly of the 
wrong sign and are all statistically insignificant. This is also the case for Japan, with 
the exception of d(Q). Even though the three Q terms are collectively insignificant 
at the 5% level, a further test was undertaken to test the robustness of d(Q) in 
Japan. Following Hayashi (1985), who argues that the relationship between Q and 
I/K appears to have broken down after 1974, d(Q) and Qt_2 were interacted with an 
appropriate dummy variable. The results shown in Table 12 support the exclusion 
of these variables from the preferred equation, as does the switch in sign of the 
post-1979 simple I/K and Q correlation shown in Table 4.
Overall, these results are rather supportive of the view that the stock market has a 
direct effect on investment in the two Anglo-Saxon economies, but not in Germany 
or Japan.18 Accelerator terms are the dominant determinants of investment and 
individual cost of capital elements are also important. Q is not important in any 
country, supporting the possibility that its significance as a lone explanatory factor 
in investment equations is due to the exclusion of other relevant variables. In this 
regard, the track record of Q as an explanatory variable is shown clearly in Table 
13 where it is simultaneously the worst and the best of the elements under 
examination.
Finally, it is also of some interest that the debt-equity ratio affects investment in the 
U.S. and U.K. but not in Germany or Japan. This is consistent with the fact that 
banks have a closer relationship with firms in Germany and Japan, implying that 
bankruptcy risk need not rise with the debt-equity ratio.
IIIc. Some ’Non-Structural’ Evidence
Thus far, evidence has been presented based on structural investment equations. 
However, many economists now prefer atheoretical VARS, so, in Table 14, some 
evidence is given on the effect of real share prices on output in each of the four 
countries.
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The log of output is regressed on two lags of itself and lagged values of a host of 
other variables including the interest rate, inflation, competitiveness, real government 
expenditure, the real money supply and world trade. When the insignificant variables 
are deleted, one finds that the stock market has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on output in the U.S. and U.K., and no effect in Japan.19 In Germany, the 
stock market exerts a negative effect on output (if these estimates are interpreted 
literally). In general, the coefficients of the restricted equations are sensible for all 
of the countries, aside from the positive effect of lagged inflation on output in West 
Germany.
So, the non-structural evidence is also consistent with one basic message - the stock 
market matters less in Germany and Japan than in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
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IV. Conclusions and Implications
The fact that the stock market appears to affect investment less in Germany or 
Japan compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries may, in fact, have some important 
implications.
For example, there is some evidence that share prices in the post-World War II 
period fell due to ’irrational' valuation errors produced under inflationary 
circumstances (see e.g. Modigliani and Cohn (1979)). The stock market then acts as 
a channel through which higher inflation reduces investment in the U.S. and the 
U.K.. Table 15 shows that output and inflation are more negatively correlated in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, which is consistent with, but not necessarily evidence of, a 
causal link from inflation to equity prices, and hence to investment and output.
Similarly, if the stock market is myopic, such "short-termism" is less likely to be 
translated into actual investment decisions in Japan and Germany, and this may 
partly explain their higher investment rates (shown in Table 16).
Finally, if the stock market exercises less control over corporate investment decisions, 
managers may pursue a goal of higher growth, even at the cost of profit 
maximisation. It has already been shown in Table 1 that Japanese managers assign 
a higher priority to growth-like objectives than their American counterparts. This 
manifests itself in the fact that the rate of return of capital in Japan is very low by 
international standards and is less than half the cost of capital (see Table 17). For 
Japan, the null effect of the stock market on investment may explain Hardie’s (1982) 
observation that "... it remains one of the oddities of modem Japan that profit- 
making is neither in fact nor in ideology a critical part of what business and 
commerce are for."
As for the theory of investment, this chapter has presented a framework within 
which Tobin’s Q is only one of several possible relevant variables. Moreover, 
empirically, it appears to have little additional explanatory power once other relevant 
variables like output and interest rates are included. As in previous chapters, the
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importance of institutional differences across countries highlights the notion that 
stock prices are influenced by more than the expectations and outturns of economic 
variables.
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Appendix III: Four Country Data Sources
1. K - replacement cost of net capital stock for private sector.
K definition matches that for I below. In the case of Japan, a K series was generated 
using the 1956 K value found in Hayashi (1985), a depreciation rate of .089 and the 
I series. The resulting series correlated well with other estimates from the OECD 
and the Japanese Economic Planning Agency.
private sector:
U.S. non-financial corporations (NFC)
U.K. industrial and commercial companies (ICC)
JA private sector 
GE company sector
2. I - investment.
U.S. NFC non-residential equipment and structure 
U.K. ICC gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF)
JA private sector GDFCF
GE company sector assets net of inventories
source:
U.S. Survey of Current Business 
U.K. Blue Book
JA Bank of Japan Economic Statistics Monthly
GE Statistical Yearbook (Statistisches Jahrbuch. Bundesanstalt fiir Statistik)
3. Q - private sector tax-adjusted (TQ) and non-tax-adjusted (NTQ). NTQ is defined 
as the value of debt and equity divided by K. All three elements are at market or 
replacement cost, with the exception of debt in Germany, the U.K. and the U.S..
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The debt and equity components are outlined as follows: for Japan, NTQ was 
calculated using spliced series from Holland (1984) and Hayashi (1985). For 
Germany, NTQ was formed using data from Holland (1984) and the Bundesbank. 
For the U.K., NTQ was calculated using data supplied by E. Dinenis and updated 
by splicing data from the Bank of England. TQ is the QR measure from Poterba 
and Summers (1983). For the U.S., data from Holland (1984) was updated using 
information from the Survey of Current Business. TQ is the series from Summers 
(1981).
4. rE - dividend yield plus three-year moving average of real growth in dividends.
U.S. S&P 500 Index (Survey of Current Business!
U.K. FT 500 Index (Financial Statistics!
JA, GE - Goldman, Sachs & Co.
5. DOK - value of debt divided by K.
6. D/E - as above divided by market value of equity.
7. rD - government bond yield (long interest rate) - IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS hereafter).
8. P, - investment deflator (IFS).
9. P - GDP deflator (IFS).
10. C - cost of capital:
source:
U.S.:
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U.K.:
JA: C ■ TT^T [(l + '>P^ - 1 + *JA - X! ]
GE:
where
z - discounted present value of depreciation allowances per unit of investment
k - tax credit per unit of investment
D - value of debt
E - value of equity
i - nominal interest rate
DIV/P - dividend price yield
6 - depreciation rate
ir - inflation rate
Pj - investment price
P - output price
r - corporate tax rate
X, - Japanese tax term dealing with reserves:
ri  R
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where
R - tax-free reserves 
aK - nominal capital stock
z - P.V. of depreciation allowances in new investment
X2 - German combined tax term including income tax, franchise tax, property tax 
and land tax. Tax laws are not investment neutral, therefore X2 > 1.
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1. See King (1977) for an extensive discussion of these issues.
2. Walker (1985) and Nickell and Wadhwani (1987).
3. See Nikkei (1984).
4. Note, however, that managers cannot ignore shareholders altogether since the latter 
may exert some influence through the possibility of take-over bids. While the fear of 
takeover will not necessarily induce share price maximisation (as the production plan 
which maximises the share price is not the same as that which minimises the risk of 
being taken over - see King (1977)), it will at least ensure that managers do not entirely 
ignore the wishes of shareholders.
5. Similarly, substantial cross holdings of corporate equity in Japan are used to reinforce 
long-term business relationships and are rarely traded on the market. The oligopolistic 
nature of brokerage in Japan, where four large firms dominate the market, and the 
substantial influence of German universal banks on the German equity markets, are 
other factors which may drive a wedge between stock price fluctuations and corporate 
behaviour in these countries.
6. Since the 1976 Co-determination Act, all corporations employing more than 2000 
workers must have a supervisory council with 50 per cent representation of employee 
representatives.
7. The differences in the Table 3 ratios across countries are substantial and cannot be 
explained away by divergent accounting practices in each country (see Kuroda and 
Oritani (1980) on this issue). Corbett (1987) and BEQB (1984) offer detailed 
comparisons of financing practices in the four countries under study here.
8. Carsberg and Hope (1976), for example, found that only 21 percent of respondents 
allowed movements of the equity market to influence their choice of discount rate. 
Moreover, a majority of these respondents were only influenced by some smoothed 
return on equity measure. In the sample as a whole (including those who did not look 
at the equity market), over half had not even altered their discount rate in the preceding 
three years - this, in a period (1971-1973) when the earnings yield had varied between 
4.95% and 11.55%.
9. See 3i Enterprise Barometer.
10.1 am grateful to Stanley Fischer for making this point.
11. Of course, all this is predicated on firms in Germany and Japan continuing to be so 
dependent on their banks. See Mayer (1988) for an exploration of this and related 
issues.
12. As Chapter IV noted, traditional static Q regressions manifest various signs of 
misspecification - parameter instability, serial correlation and the like. In addition, as will 
become clear below, the Q terms do not survive the introduction of other relevant terms.
13. Such models are now commonly used (see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987) or 
Wadhwani (1987) and references therein). Since costly bankruptcy does not occur in a
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world with complete information and rational agents, as in Haugen and Senbet (1978), 
an assumption of missing markets is also needed to motivate the presence of bankruptcy.
14. It might seem somewhat curious that is fixed when the manager is maximising irf, 
for, under the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the two are intimately related. However, 
this analysis is conducted on the premise that managers do not believe the EMH to the 
extent that it influences their own firm’s share price - this assumption is amply supported 
by the empirical evidence. So, instead, managers just view as a constraint on their 
behaviour.
15. See Auerbach (1983) for a survey of these issues.
16. Corbett (1987), p.54.
17. In any case, the available degrees of freedom in the data would not support VARs 
of sufficient size to include numerous variables and lags.
18. The results are also, broadly speaking, in accordance with the work using micro-data 
of Blundell et al (1987) and Hayashi and Inoue (1987).
19. The lagged output term in the Japanese restricted equation is constrained to a value 
of unity. This is done because the estimated coefficient in the general specification is 
greater than one, implying that output is oscillating away from a long-term equilibrium 
value over time. This constraint has no qualitative effect on the value or significance of 
the estimated real share price variable coefficients.
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Table 1
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGERIAL GOALS
GOALS U.S.A. JAPAN
Return on investment 2.43 1.24
Capital gain for stockholders 1.14 0.02
Increase in market share 0.73 1.43
Efficiency of lo g is t ic  a c t iv i t ie s 0.46 0.71
New product ratio 0.21 1.06
Public image of the company 0.05 0.20
Quality of working conditions 0.04 0.09
Equity/debt ratio 0.38 0.59
Improvement of product portfolio 0.50 0.68
Source: Kagono e t .a l .  (1984)
Table 3
THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE QUOTED SECTOR
Uesc
Germany Japan U.K. 
Number of l is ted  companies (in 1986) 492 1499 2101
Market capitalisation as a % of 
GDP (1986) 25.7Z 87.8Z 85.17.
Market cap italisation  as a Z of private ,  , ,  ,-0 , ,
— i i /  ^a a  /  \ 0«  /  4  J 7 * U 4  » / 4sector net capital stock (1986)
Sources: International Federation of Stock Exchanges Annual Report
(various years), Federation of the German Stock Exchanges 
Annual Report 1986, IMF International Financial S ta t is t ic s ,  
capital stock sources l is ted  in the data appendix.
* -  figure for the U.S. is  for 1985.
.S.A. 
6437*
75.6Z 
39.9Z
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SOME ESTIMATES OF COMPARATIVE GEARING R A T I O N
U- S - A- -JAPAN GERMANY
Book v a l u e
Corbetc  (1987)
f o r  1981 ° * 37 ^- 5 4  0 . 8 3
a) 1965-78  Average* 0 . J5 n . a .  u . 7 0
Marker v a l ue
Corbecc (1987)  o .JO n.a. 0.56
b) 1 9 65 - 8 0  Average* 0 . 2 7  0 . 1 0  0 . 5 3
a . a .
BEQB (1984)
f or  1982 n,a> 0*25 n . a .  0 . 6 0
0 . 6 5
n . a .
0.46
* Au tho rs '  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The r a t i o s  shown are
a)  book v a l u e  of  debt  t o  book v a l u e  o f  d e bt  and e q u i t y
book v a l ue  of  de bt  t o  book v a l u e  o f  d e b t  and marker v a l u e  o f  e q u i t y
Tabl e  4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ( I / K )  AND 0
COUNTRY
GERMANY
JAPAN
U.K.
U.S.
WHOLE SAMPLE 
0.80 
0.69 
0.50 
0.60
PRE-1979
0.77
0.56
0.45
0.59
POST-1979
-0.32
-0.38
0.39
0.23
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Table 5
INVESTMENT EQUATION’S FOR THE U . K. .  1 9 5 5 - 8 6
Dependent V ar i a b l e :  ( I /K)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
( I / K ) t-1
A In Y* 
t
A InY
A In Y
t - 1
t - 2
D , t - 2
(D/E)*
l c E . c - l
( \  
Const ant
R2
CHOW F 
AR(2)
SARCAN TEST
t - 2
OLS IV
0.63 0.65
(6.78) (6.36)
20.84 15.29
(5.18) (2.27)
17.17 15.76
(4.03) (3.26)
20.83 17.47
(3.54) (2.18)
-0.16 -0.13
(-3.80) (-2.39)
-6.16 -6.45
(-2.46) (-1.78)
-0.06 -0.05
(-3.56) (-2.57)
-12.03 -9.20
(-2.92) (-1.86)
-9.46 -8.63
(-3.38) (-2.66)
11.56 10.86
(3.66) (3.05)
0.887 -
1.71
(Fn n.(10,12)-2.75)
(X
0.05
2
0.05
3.39
(2)-5.99)
(X20.05
10.71
( 6 ) - 1 2 . 5 9 )
Notes:
( i )  t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s
( i l )  * -  d e n o t e s  v a r i a b l e s  t r e a t e d  as  e n d o g e n o u s .  A d d i t i o n a l
i n s t r u m e n t s  used a re  two l a g s  o f  wor ld  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  o u t p u t ,
w or l d  t r a d e ,  wor ld  t r a d e  i n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  d e b t - e q u i t y  r a t i o .
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Table b
RESULTS OBTAINED BY ADDING VARIOUS VARIABLES
TO THE U.K. INVESTMENT EQUATION
Adding Non- ta x a d j u s t e d  ' O ' :
Qt - 0 . 3 2  ( - 0 . 6 4 )
Qt - 1  ' ° * 27 ( - 0 . 3 9 )
Qt - 2  ' ° - 24 ( - 0 . 4 1 )
F ( 3 ,  19)  -  1 . 13  ( F0 . 0 5 ( 3 ,  19)  “ 3 *13)
T a x - a d i u s t e d  ' 0 ' : *
TQt - 0 . 0 2 ( - 0 . 1 5 )
T^ t - 1 0 . 1 7 ( 1 . 3 7 )
T^ t - 2 - 0 . 0 9 ( - 0 . 7 0 )
F ( 3 . 19)  -  0 . 68 (F0 > 0 5 ( 3 .  14) -  3 . 1 3 )
T a x - a d j u s t e d  Cost o f  C a p i t a l
TCCt - 1 . 9 3 x 10"2 ( - 1 . 2 1 )
TCCt - i 1 . 9 0 x 10"1 ( 1 . 3 0 )
TCCc - 2 - 1 . 7 8 x 10"1 ( - 1 . 1 6 )
F ( 3 . 13) -  0. .98 (F0 0 5 ( 3 .  13) -  3 . 4 1 )
Re al  Monev Supply
(Ml/P)c 3 . 18 x 10‘ 5 ( 0 . 9 0 )
(Ml/P)t_1 1 . 44 x 10‘ 5 ( 0 . 2 4 )
(Ml/P)t_2 - 1 . 0 4 x 10"5 ( - 1 . 5 7 )
F ( 3 , 19) -  1 . 7 1  (F0 > 0 5 ( 3 .  19) -  3 . 1 3 )
Takeover A c t i v i t y : **
( A / K ) c ( P / E ) t  - 6 7 . 3 3  ( - 1 . 1 8 )
( A / K ) t _ 1Ar£ t _ 1 - 1 . 3 5  ( - 1 . 1 2 )
F ( 2 ,  18)  -  0 . 8 0  (Fq o5 ( 2 ,  18) -  K 5 5 )  
N o t e s :
( i )  t - r a t i o s  i n p a r e n t h e s e s
( i i )• * d e n o t e s  o n l y  a v a i l a b l e  o v e r  1 9 55 - 80
** d e n o t e s  o n l v  a v a i l a b l e  o« p *> iQ^S-84
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Table 7
ESTIMATED INVESTMENT EQUATION' FOR THE U . S . ,  1953- 1986  
Dependent  V a r i a b l e :  ( I / K ) ^
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OLS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES
(I/K) , 0.75 0.75
(11.09) (11.00)
AlnY* 18.26 16.99
(7.81) (4.70)
A In Y 10.05 9.99
(4.20) (4.22)
A(D/E) -4.16 -4.18
(-3.12) (-3.01)
R2 0.898
CHOW 0.71
(F0.05(5’2 4 W -62)
AR(2) 1.58
(X0.05(2)“5-99)
SARCAN TEST -  , 6 . 5 8
(X0.05(6 W 2 -99)
N o t e s :
( i )  t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s
( i i )  * d e n o t e s  v a r i a b l e s  t r e a t e d  as  endogenous
( i l l )  A d d i t i o n a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  us ed :  two l a g s  e a ch  o f  wor l d t r a d e ,
wor l d o u t p u t ,  wor ld  t r a d e  i n  m an u f a c t u r i n g ,  and A In * t _ 2 *
( l v )  R e g r e s s i o n s  i n c l u d e  a c o n s t a n t  term.
2 0 3
Table b
RESULTS OBTAINED BY INCLUDING ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT EQUATION
Adding r :
re 1 . 7  x 10~3 ( 0 . 1 1 )
r - 3 . 4  x 10“ 3 ( - 0 . 2 0 )
c - 1
r 1 . 1 0  x 10"3 ( 0 . 7 1 )
e t - 2
F (3 .  26)  -  . 303  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 ,  26)  “ 2 ' 98)
Adding ( D e b t - C a p i t a l )  r a t i o :
(D/K.) t  - 2 . 2 8  ( - 0 . 8 2 )
(D/ K) t - 1  “4 , 5 L ( - 0 . 7 8 )
{D/K)t _ 2 3 . 8 2  ( 0 . 9 4 )
F( 3,  26)  -  1 . 2 2 1  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 ,  26)  “ 2>98)
Adding Q:
Qt 0 . 1 5  ( 0 . 3 5 )
Qt _ 1 0 . 4 7  ( 0 . 6 4 )
Qt _ 2 - 0 . 6 8  ( - 1 . 1 9 )
F( 3 .  26)  -  0 . 5 4  (FQ Q5( 3 ,  26)  -  2 .9 8 )
Adding T a x - a d j u s t e d  ' O ' :
TQt 0 . 2 7  ( 1 . 0 9 )
TQt _ 1 - 0 . 1 0  ( - 0 . 3 8 )
TQt _ 2 “0 . 2 2  ( - 1 . 2 8 )
F ( 3 ,  18) -  0 . 9 8  ( F0 . 0 5 ( 3 ,  18)  " 3 ,1 6 )
2 0 4
Table 8 (contd.)
Adding Interest Rate:
r Q 2 . 6 5  x 1 0 ' 3 ( 0 . 0 4 )
t
r 2 . 0 8  x 1 0 ' 3 ( 0 . 0 3 )
t - 1
rD 3 . 9 8  x 1 0 ' 3 ( 0 . 0 9 )
t - 2
F (3 ,  26) -  0 . 0 3  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 ’ 26)  “ 2 , 9 8 )
Adding Real  Money S u p p l y :
( Ml/P)^ - 7 . 2  x 10‘ 3 ( - 1 . 8 8 )
( M l / P ) c_ i  1 . 5  x 10‘ 2 ( 1 . 6 3 )
( M l / P ) t _ z - 9 . 6 3  x 10"3 ( - 1 . 3 8 )
F ( 3 .  26)  -  1 . 4 9  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 ’ 26)  " 2 *95)
Adding T a x - a d j u s t e d  Cos t  o f  C a p i t a l : *
TCCc 5 . 6 4  x 10“ 2 ( 1 . 4 4 )
TCCt - l  " 5 *18 x I 0 "2 ( - 0 . 9 9 )
TCCt _2 4 - 18 x L0’ 2 ( 1 *38)
F ( 3 ,  20) -  1 . 37  (FQ q5 ( 3 ,  20)  -  3 . 1 0 )
Adding Takeover  I n f l u e n c e s :
(A/K) . A(P/E) 0 . 6 1
t _ i  ( 0 . 1 6 )
N o t e s :
( i )  t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s
( i i )  * d e n o t e s  1 9 5 3- 8 0  o n l y
2 0 5
Table 9
ESTIMATED INVESTMENT EQUATION FOR WEST GERMANY. 1 96 1- 1986  
Dependent  V a r i a b l e :  ( I / K ) c
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OLS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES
( I / K )  0 . 8 1  0 . 8 1
( 2 6 . 0 8 )  ( 2 3 . 0 6 )
A In Y* 1 4 . 4 1  1 3 . 0 0
( 8 . 1 5 )  ( 5 . 1 6 )
rD t - 7 . 1  x 10"2 - 7 . 2  x 1 0 ' 2
( - 2 . 6 9 )  ( - 2 . 3 7 )
R2 0 . 9 8 2
CHOW i . 4 i
(F0 . 0 5 ( 4 , 1 8 )  “ 2 ' 9 3 )
AR(2) 4 . 2 1
( x0 . 0 5 ( 2 ) " 5 ’ 99)
SARC AN TEST -  . 7 . 1 4
( x0 . 0 5 ( 6 ) “ L2‘ 59)
N o t e s :
( i )  t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s
( 11)  * d e n o t e s  v a r i a b l e s  t r e a t e d  as  endogenous
( i l l )  A d d i t i o n a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  us ed :  two l a g s  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  world
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  o u t p u t ,  world t r a d e ,  wo rl d t r a d e  i n  ma nu fa ct ure s
( i v )  R e g r e s s i o n  i n c l u d e s  a c o n s t a n t  term.
2 0 6
Table 10
RESULTS OBTAINED BY INCLUDING ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
IN THE GERMAN INVESTMENT EQUATION
Adding D e b t - e q u i t v  R a t i o  at  Markec V a l u e ; (Sample:  1 962 -1 98 5 )
(D/E)^ 0 . 1 2  0 . 7 2
( D / E ) t - 1  ° * 05 ( 0 . 2 4 )
( D / E ) t - 2  " ° ' 32 ( - 1 . 4 0 )
F ( 3 ,  17)  -  . 6 9 0  (FQ 0 5 ( 3 .  11)  -  3 . 2 0 )
Adding Q: ( Sample:  1 96 2- 1 98 5)
Qt - 2 . 0 4  ( - 0 . 7 5 )
Qt _ 1 1 . 3 7  ( 0 . 4 0 )
Qt _ 2 1 . 6 4  ( 0 . 5 6 )
F ( 3 ,  17)  -  0 . 3 2 3  (FQ Q5( 3 .  17) -  3 . 2 0 )
Adding r £ : (Sample:  1 9 65 -  1986)  
r r 1 . 1 4  x 10~2 ( 1 . 2 5 )
t
r_  1 . 6 8  x 10"2 ( 1 . 8 0 )
t - 1
r -  3 . 4 2  x 10- 3  ( 0 . 3 2 )
t - 2
F ( 3 ,  15)  -  2 . 1 7  (Fq q5 ( 3 ,  15) -  3 . 2 9 )
Adding TCC: (Sample 1 9 6 3 - 19 81 )
TCCt 6 . 3 8  x 1 0"2 ( 0 . 5 5 )
TCCt _ 1 - 2 . 5 4  x lO- 2  ( - 0 . 2 4 )
TCCt _ 2 - 1 . 4 4  x 10“ 2 ( - 0 . 1 6 )
F ( 3 ,  12)  -  0 . 1 1 9  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 ,  12)  " 3 , 4 9 )
Adding Real  Monev S u p p l y : (Sample:  1 9 6 1 - 1 9 8 6 )
( M l / P ) t  - 6 . 1  x 10- 2  ( - 1 . 0 4 )
(ML/P)t _ i  3 . 1 9  x 10"A ( 0 . 0 4 )
( M1 /P ) c_ 2 4 . 2 3  x 1 0 ' 3 ( 0 . 6 7 )
F ( 3 ,  19)  -  0 . 5 7  ( f0 . 0 5 ( 3 * 19)  “ 3 ’ 13)
Adding D e b t - C a p i t a l  Rat i o  ( A c c o u n t i n g  v a l u e s ) :  (Sample:  1 9 62- 198 5)  
( D / K ) t  0 . 7 2  ( 0 . 0 3 )
( D/ K ) t _ 1 0 . 5 3  ( 0 . 0 1 )
( D/ K ) t _ 2 - 1 5 . 7 7  ( - 0 . 6 9 )
F ( 3 ,  17)  -  0 . 8 7  (Fq 05( 3 ,  17) -  3 . 2 0 )
No te :  t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s e s
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Table 11
ESTIMATED INVESTMENT EQUATION FOR JAPAN. 1954- 1986  
Dependent  V a r i a b l e :  ( I / K ) c
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OLS ESTIMATES IV ESTIMATES
(I/K) 0.76 0.72
(8.02) (6.77)
(I/K) -0.24 -0.23
(-2.74) (-2.54)
A In Y 62.68 71.64
(9.86) (7.83)
rD - 0 . 2 0  - 0 . 2 1
t (-3.55) (-2.76)
R2 0.960
CHOW 2.32
(F0.05(5,23)"2-64)
AR(2) 1.65
SARCAN
(X0.05(2)“5-99)
3 . 7 8
(x0.05(8)“15‘51)
2 0 8
Table 12
RESULTS OBTAINED BY INCLUDING ADDITIONAL VARIABLES
IN THE JAPANESE INVESTMENT EQUATION
Adding (D/E) ac market  v a l u e : (Sample:  1 9 58 -19 85)  
(D/E)^ - 0 . 2 8  ( - 0 . 2 6 )
( D / E ) t _ i  0 . 5 1  ( 0 . 3 4 )
( D / E ) t _ 2 0 . 4 0  ( 0 . 3 4 )
F ( 3 ,  20)  -  0 . 3 3  (Fq 0 5 ( 3 ,  20)  -  3 . 1 0 )
Adding Q: (Sample:  1 9 5 8- 1 9 85 )
Qt  3 . 5 2  ( 1 . 3 5 )
Qt - 1  - 5 . 9 9  ( - 1 . 8 6 )
Qc _ 2 - 0 . 7 5  ( - 0 . 2 9 )
F ( 3 .  20)  -  2 . 2 9  ( Fq . 0 5 ( 3 ,  20)  “ 3 , 1 0 )
Adding Q + (dummv Q) :
A Qt  3 . 4 4  ( 1 . 4 4 )
Qt _ 2 0 . 1 4  ( 0 . 0 6 )
A Qt  x D - 0 . 8 1  ( - 0 . 1 1 )
Qt _ 2 x D - 3 . 5 4  ( - 2 . 0 3 )
Adding D e b t - c a p i t a l  R a t i o :
( D / K) t  8 . 4 2  ( 0 . 9 5 )
( D/ K) t _ 1 - 1 0 . 2 4  ( - 1 . 0 4 )
( D / K) t _ 2 6 . 4 4  ( 0 . 8 7 )
F ( 3 ,  20)  -  0 . 6 6  ( Fo . 0 5 ( 3 ,  20)  " 3 , 1 0 )
Adding T a x - a d j u s t e d  Q: (Sample:  1 9 5 8 -1 98 1 )
TQt  0 . 4 4  ( 1 . 1 1 )
TQt _ 2 - 0 . 4 7  ( - 0 . 9 5 )
TQt _ 2 - 0 . 1 2  ( - 0 . 2 9 )
F ( 3 ,  16)  -  0 . 8 9  (Fq q5 ( 3 ,  16)  -  3 . 2 4 )
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Table 12 (contd.)
Adding T a x - a d j u s t e d  Cost  o f  C a p i t a l : (Sample:  1958-1981)  
TCCc 4 4 . 0 3  ( 0 . 9 0 )
Tc c t _ 1 - 9 . 6 1  ( - 0 . 1 7 )
TCCt _ 2 - 3 4 . 2 2  ( - 0 . 8 0 )
F ( 3 ,  1 6 )  -  0 . 4 9
Adding Real  Money S u p p l y : (Sample:  1 96 1 - 1 9 8 6 )
( Ml / P)^  5 . 1  x 10” 5 ( 1 . 0 1 )
( M l / P ) t _ 1 - 8 . 8  x 10“ 5 ( - 1 . 1 6 )
( M i / P ) t _ 2 7 . 3  x  1 0 " 5 ( 1 . 2 1 )
F ( 3 .  18)  -  1 . 4 7  ( Fo . o5 ( 3 ,  18)  " 3 ‘ 16)
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Table 13: Explanatory Factors in Investment Equations
Cost of
Source Capital Accelerator Liquidity Q Other
1) Jorgenson and 1 2 2/3 4
Siebert (1968)
2) Jorgenson et al 2 3 3/6 5 1/4
(1970)
3) Bischoff (1971) 3 2 3 3 1
4) Gould and Waud 2 1/3
(1973)
5) Engle and Foley 3 2 5 1/5 4
(1975)
6) Kopcke (1977) 2 1 3 - 4
7) Clark (1979) 2 1 - - 2/3
8) Jenkinson 2 3 1
(1981)
9) Hendershott 2 1 3 1
and Hu (1981)
10) Oulton (1981) 2 3 - 1 4/5
11) Kopcke (1982) 4 2 3 3 1
12) Kopcke (1985) 2 3 1 3 3
13) Mullins and 2 1 4 3
Wadhwani (1989)
Note: All papers examine the U.S. with the exception of Jenkinson 
and Oulton for the U.K. and Mullins and Wadhwani for four 
OECD countries. The rankings diminish in importance from 1 to 
n, where n is the number of different models that are compared in 
a particular paper; indicates that the category was not used in 
the comparison. The ’other’ category includes autoregressive 
models of investment, hybrid measures incorporating elements from 
the accelerator and cost of capital frameworks, and real money 
balances. The cost of capital category includes the ranking for each 
separate subcomponent.
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T a b l e  14a The er'fect of the stock. market on oucpuc in the US and UK
Dependent variable: in(Output;c
VARIABLES (1) U.SC. U ) (3) U.S. (4)
l n ( O u t p u t ; c 0 . 4 1
( 1 . 6 5 )
0 . 5 7
( 4 . 2 2 )
0 . 4 4
( 1 . 4 5 )
0 . 6 2
( 6 . 7 9 )
l n ( O u t p u c ) t ? 0 . 4 6
( 1 . 9 4 )
0 . 5 1
( 3 . 5 9 )
0 . 3 0
( 1 . 0 8 )
l n ( R e a l  Share P r i c e ) ^   ^
l n ( R e a l  Share P r i c e ) ^   ^
( Re al  I n t e r e s t  Rate )^  ^
4 . 2 4  x 1 0"2 ] 
( 1 . 9 3 )
- 2 . 9 6  x 1 0 - 2  
( - 1 . 0 4 )
- 6 . 6  x 10“ 3 
( - 1 . 8 9 )
*
1 3 . 8  x 10"2 
1- ( 2 . 7 6 )
1
- 8 . 7 2  x ] 0 - 3  
( - 5 . 5 6 )
5 . 8 0  x 
( 1 . 4 0 )
- 6 . 9 8  x 
( - 1 . 1 7 )
- 3 . 1 2  x 
( - 0 . 3 3 )
10 ]
i o "2 ! 
i o - 3
*
1 5 . 8 0  x 1 0 “ 2 
( 2 . 2 7 )
- 4 . 9 0  x IO"3 
( - 2 . 2 5 )
( Re al  I n t e r e s t  Rat e) ^  ^
( I n f l a t i o n ) ^  ^
- 1 . 4 6  x 
( - 0 . 3 1 )
- 6 . 2 4  x 
( - 1 . 7 3 )
i o ' 3
i o - 3 - 8 . 7 6  x IO"3 
( - 5 . 7 1 )
1 . 1 9  x 
( 0 . 1 3 )
- 1 . 2 8  x 
( - 1 . 5 3 )
i o " 3
i o - 3 - 9 . 9 7  x 1 0~ 3 
( - 2 . 5 7 )
( I n f l a t i o n ) c 1 - 1 . 0 4  x 
( - 0 . 2 1 )
1 0 - 3 - 7 . 6 2  x 
( - 0 . 1 1 )
1 0 - *
l n ( C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ) ^  ^ 3 . 4 5  x 
( 0 . 7 4 )
10 • 0 . 2 4 5
( 0 . 9 9 )
l n ( C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s ) - 4 . 2 9  x 
( - 0 . 7 7 )
1 0 ~ 2 - 0 . 1 9 4
( - 0 . 8 1 )
l n ( R e a l  Government  
E x p e n d i t u r e ) c_^
0 . 1 4
( 0 . 8 2 )
- 1 . 0 6  x 
( - 0 . 0 6 )
i o - 3
l n ( R e a l  Government  
E x p e n d i t u r e ) c_ 2
- 0 . 1 5
( - 1 . 0 4 )
1 . 1 6  x 
( 0 . 0 7 )
i o " 2
l n ( R e a l  Money Supply)   ^
l n ( R e a l  Money Su p pl y ) ^
8 . 4 8  x 
( 1 . 0 3 )
- 9 . 6 4  x 
( - 0 . 7 8 )
1 0~ 2
i o " 2
0 . 2 2
( 0 . 8 5 )
- 0 . 4 3
( - 1 . 4 6 )
0 . 3 6 8 *  
• ( 2 . 0 7 )
ln ( Wo rl d T r a d e ) £ ^ - 8 . 6 2  x 
( - 0 . 0 6 )
1 0 - 3 - 0 . 2 9
( - 1 . 2 3 )
In(Wori d T r a de ) ^  ^ 8 . 5 9  x 
( 0 . 6 2 )
i o " 2 0 . 4 1
( 1 . 6 9 )
0 . 2 3 0
( 4 . 5 9 )
R2 0 . 9 9 8 0 . 9 9 7 0 . 9 9 8 0.997
D.W. 2 . 8 4 3 2 . 1 9 8 2 . 7 7 1 2 . 3 3 7
Sample p e r i o d 1 9 5 3 - 86 1 95 3 -8 6 1 9 5 3 - 86 1 95 3- 86
RESTR.F 0 . 7 1
f o . o5 ( 1 1 ,1 7 ) * 2 ’ 38
0 .7 0
FO.O5( 1 0 ’ : ,7 ) - 2 - 45
N o t e s :  ( i )  RESTR.F i s  an F - t e s t  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  v e r s i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  more g e n e r a l  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n
( i i )  * d e n o t e s  t he  u s e  o f  e . g . ,  A l n ( R e a l  Share P r i c e )
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T a b l e  1 4 b  The effect of the stock market on out-put in Germany and Japan
Dependent variable: ln(0utput)t
JAPAN GERMANY
v a r i a b l e s (1) (2) (3) (4)
l n ( 0 u c p u c ) 
l n ( 0 u t p u t ) c  ^
l n ( R e a l  Share P r i c e )  
l n ( R e a l  Share  P r i c e )  
(Re al  I n t e r e s t  Rat e)  
(Re al  I n t e r e s t  Rate)
1 . 1 8 ( 4 . 9 1 ;
0 . 1 0 ( 0 . 3 0 )
t - 1
t - 2
t - 1
t - 2
( I n f l a t i o n ) t - 1
( I n f l a t i o n ) ^  ^
I n ( C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s )  
I n ( C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s )
t - 1
t - 2
l n ( R e a l  Government  
E x p e n d i t u r e ) t _^
l n ( R e a l  Government  
E x p e n d i t u r e ; t _2
l n ( R e a l  Money Supply)
t - 1
l n ( R e a l  Money S u pp ly ) ^   ^
l n( Wo rl d Trade)
t - 1
1 . 4 3  x 10 
( 0 . 3 3 )
- 2 . 1 6  x 10" 
( - 0 . 4 6 )
- 2 . 1 2  x 10 
( - 3 . 0 0 )
5 . 6 7  x 10 
( 0 . 8 9 )
- 2 . 0 7  x 10' 
( - 3 . 1 7 )
5 . 3 9  x 10 
( 0 . 8 5 )
0 . 1 8  
( 1 . 7 3 )
- 0 . 2 8  
( - Z . 3 0 )
- 0 . 3 9  
( - 1 . 4 1 )
- 0 . 1 0  
( - 0 . 5 8 )
2 . 2 4  x 10 
( 0 . 1 9 )
2 . 2 1  x 10 
( 0 . 1 6 )
- 3 . 5 8  x 10 
( - 0 . 1 9 )
- 2
- 2
- 3
- 3
ln( Wo rl d Trade)
R2
D.W.
Sample p e r i o d
t - 2 - 1 . 0 3  x 1U 
( - 0 . 0 4 )
0 . 9 9 9
1.95
1 95 3 -8 6
1.00
- 5 . 3 1  x 10 
( - 0 . 20)
1 . 6 0  x 10 
( 0 . 6 3 )
- 2 . 1 2  x 10  
( - 4 . 7 9 )
- 3
- 1 . 9 9  x 10 
( - 5 . 1 4 )
0 . 2 3 9
( 3 . 2 9 )
- 2
- 2
- 2
1.66
1 9 3 3- 8 6
0. 22
( 0 . 5 7 )
- 0 . 0 8
( - 0 . 2 3 )
- 2
- 2
2 . 9 9  x 10 
( 0 . 1 5 )
- 4 . 3 5  x 10 
( - 2 . 5 1 )
- 5 . 1 9  x 10 
(0 . 01)
- 3
- 2
- 5
2 . 3 0  x IO"3 
( 1 . 3 4 )
- 2
3 . 2 3  x 10 
( 1 . 0 9 )
7 . 0 7  x 10 
( 1 . 3 4 )
2 . 5 8  x 10 
( 0 . 7 3 )
- 3
- 3
- 3
9 . 0 9  x 10 
(0 . 21)
5 . 0 4  x 10 
( 0 . 9 6 )
- 3
- 2
- 0 . 1 3
( - 0 . 5 2 )
0 . 2 7
( 1 . 86 )
0 . 5 2
( 4 . 4 0 )
0.12
( 0 . 7 7 )
0 . 1 8
( 1 . 2 3 )
- 0.21
( - 1 . 5 5 )
0 . 9 9 9
2 . 3 5
19 53- 86
0 . 3 8
( 4 . 7 2 )
- 4 . 4 5  x 10 
( - 4 . 0 9 )
- 2
4 . 9 3  x 10 
( 2 . 4 5 )
- 3
6 . 2 3  x 10 
( 4 . 3 3 )
0 . 1 6
( 2 . 6 3 )
0 . 4 9
( 7 . 9 2 )
0 . 1 3
(2. 21)
- 0.21
( - 2 . 9 1 )
0 . 9 9 9
2 . 0 3
19 53 -8 6
-2
N ot e s :  As T a b l e  14fr
2 1 3
Xafel e  15
RELATIVE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON OUTPUT
COUNTRY Y2 (* i o - 2 )
GERMANY 0.95 (90.17) - 0 . 1 ( - 0 . 4 5 )
JAPAN 0.97 (132 .29 ) - 0 . 0 4 ( - 0 . 3 3 )
UNITED KINGDOM 1.00 (64 .40) - 0 . 2 1 ( - 3 . 3 6 )
UNITED STATES 1.02 (55 .15) - 0 . 5 4 ( - 2 . 4 9 )
Sample p e r i o d : 1954--1986
E s t i m a t e s  based on an e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  form 
In Yt  -  c o n s t a n t  + In + y 2 P£
( t - r a t i o s  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s )
INVESTMENT-OUTPUT RATIOS
COUNTRY
GERMANY
JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES 
SAMPLE PERIOD
TOTAL INVESTMENT PRIVATE INVESTMENT
GDP
2 3 . 82
2 6 . 4 2
1 7 . 72
1 9 . 3 2
19 50 -1 98 3
GDP
1 9 . 2 2
2 2 . 9 2
8.12
1 5 . 1 2
1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 6
T a b l e  17
A COMPARISON OF THE COST OF CAPITAL AND 
RETURN ON CAPITAL. 1 9 61 - 19 81
COUNTRY COST OF CAPITAL RETURN ON CAPITAL
GERMANY
JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES
2.1
6 . 0
5 . 4
7 . 5
2 . 7
2 . 5
6. 1
6 .9
S o u r c e :  Ho l l a nd  ( 1984)
2 1 4
Conclusions
This thesis has investigated some determinants and consequences of aggregate stock 
market prices. Using data sources spanning 23 countries and almost three centuries, 
it is found that equity prices are correlated with real economic variables. There is, 
however, sufficient evidence of non-efficient market behaviour to reject the general 
applicability of the efficient markets hypothesis. Another broad conclusion is that 
institutional factors, both across countries and over time, contribute to accentuating 
or diminishing the linkage between such prices and the real economy.
In addition, the following detailed conclusions emerge from each chapter.
Chapter I examines stock price behaviour prior to the stock market crash of 1987. 
Using monthly and daily data from 23 stock markets, there is little support for the 
view that the recent crash was caused by a bursting bubble. However, there is 
evidence that equity prices have recently moved in a non-random manner on some 
of these exchanges.
Chapter II investigates the movements of stock prices in the United Kingdom from 
1700 to 1987. A strong nominal interest rate effect on excess returns is found for the 
entire period, but it appears that inflation has a consistent, negative effect only after 
1950. The changing influence of inflation on equity prices may be linked to Britain’s 
adherence to the gold standard.
Chapter III analyzes major British financial crises since 1700. In the first part, using 
efficient and non-efficient market models, it is found that fluctuations in 
macroeconomic variables account for up to one half of equity price variation. In the 
second part, these models reveal that relatively few crises have been preceded by the 
excessive positive returns consistent with rational bubbles. The success of non­
efficient market models in explaining equity returns does imply, however, that the 
efficient markets hypothesis does not strictly hold for this data set.
2 1 5
Chapter IV finds that Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of the corporate 
sector to the replacement cost of its capital, is inappropriately modelled within a 
static framework but is improved markedly using a dynamic error correction model. 
The Q measures are also superior to real stock prices as predictors of investment in 
the OECD countries under investigation. These results imply that Q, and hence stock 
prices, are correlated to investment. However, the relationship is relatively weak and 
depends on the exclusion of other relevant explanatory variables from the investment 
equation.
Chapter V compares the broader effects of equity prices on corporate investment and 
output in Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. It 
seems that the effect of the equity market is greater in the latter two countries for 
various institutional reasons having to do with the degree of managerial autonomy 
from stock price fluctuations.
Overall, then, it appears that aggregate stock market prices are significantly linked 
to the real economy. The instances of non-efficient market behaviour, in terms of 
unexplained stock returns prior to financial crises, the predictability of stock returns, 
the influence of lagged and nominal variables on the equity premium, and, possibly, 
the weak statistical relationship between stock market prices and corporate 
investment, do, however, offer support to a view of the stock market influenced not 
only by fundamental factors, but also possibly by social and psychological elements.
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